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PREFACE

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Each quarterly issue contains abstracts and annotations of current literature in the English, French, and German languages, as well as abstracts and annotations of current literature in all languages published in English translation. Author and subject indexes appear in the first three numbers of each volume, with the fourth number containing cumulative author and subject indexes.

To facilitate the use of this bibliography the title of each foreign language entry is preceded by its English translation in brackets. For the convenience of readers in the Library of Congress, locations are shown by call numbers for cataloged items and by symbols for uncataloged items and materials held by custodial units of the Library. A list of these symbols appears on the next page.

Matters of fact and opinion presented in *Arms Control & Disarmament* are solely the responsibility of the authors of the items abstracted, and their inclusion does not constitute endorsement by either the Library of Congress or the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Information about the periodicals cited can in most instances be obtained readily from standard reference works.

The bibliography is compiled from a survey of the literature received by the Library of Congress that is likely to be available in the larger research and public libraries in the United States. Sources surveyed include trade books, monographs, selected government publications, publications of national and international organizations and societies, and approximately 1,200 periodicals. With the exception of materials delayed in arriving at the Library, the literature cited has usually been published in the 3 months preceding the month in which a number is sent to press. Entries are chosen under the assumption that arms control and disarmament is a subject area encompassing related topics such as weapons development and basic factors in world politics. The coverage is not exhaustive, however. It excludes articles in newspapers and the reporting of day-to-day events in newsmagazines.

The abstracts are written by the Arms Control and Disarmament Bibliography Section, except that abstracts or summaries published with the articles to which they relate are, with the permission of their copyright owners, sometimes used verbatim or in modified form and are designated as "abstract supplied" or "abstract supplied, modified."

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N&CPR	Newspaper and Current Periodical Room
Sci RR	Science Reading Room
Slav Rm	Slavic Room

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THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

BASIC FACTORS

505
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC IN THE 1970S: THE ROLES OF THE UNITED STATES, AUSTRALIA, AND NEW ZEALAND. Edited by Bruce Brown. Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1971. 253 p.
DS1.5.A7
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Introduction, by Bruce Brown.--The region in the 1970s: East Asia, by Ralph N. Clough. South Asia, by T. B. Millar. Southeast Asia, by Alan Watt. Southwest Pacific, by Mary Boyd.--Economic prospects: United States economic policy towards Asia, by Harry Williams. Problems and prospects in economic relations among the three ANZUS countries, by L. V. Castle.--Political and strategic relations: A view from Wellington, by Bruce Brown. A view from Canberra, By J. L. Richardson. A view from Washington, by Malcolm W. Hoag. Future strategic and political options in Asia, by Joseph A. Yager.--Review comments: Political and economic aspects, by Alexander MacLeod. Strategic aspects, by Hedley Bull.--Appendix: Extracts from the "Nixon Doctrine."--Index.

Ten papers together with discussions covering the present situation in the Asian and Pacific regions as well as the probable future course of events in the area and presenting national views of the situation and related future problems. In addition two reviews concerned broadly with political, economic, and strategic aspects are given. The dominant themes emerging from both papers and discussions are the consequences of the American disengagement from Asia, the future course of the Australia-New Zealand-United States relationship, and the position of Japan.

506
Bain, Henry, Nigel Howard, and Thomas L. Saaty. USING THE ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS TECHNIQUE TO ANALYZE A COMMUNITY CONFLICT. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, June 1971: 133-144. illus.
JX1901.J6, v. 15

The Analysis of Options is a technique for investigating the stability of various proposed solutions to a conflict between several parties. All the parties involved and the options available to each of them are listed by the assignment of 0 (in favor) or 1 (opposed) to each option. The set of assignments is a possible outcome of the conflict. Several tables are developed from the stand point of the preferences of each party, or coalitions of the parties. One such table contains a listing of a proposed outcome as solution, or status quo, and all other outcomes are given in either a preferred or not preferred (to the status quo) category. Elementary game theoretic ideas of stability are used to study whether the status quo outcome is stable under sanctions by opposing parties. The procedure is applied in this paper to the subway-highway debate of the District of Columbia which has been at an impasse for over a decade. The costs keep rising and attempts to break the impasse have resulted in falling back into it. A summary of the status of the problem from the Congressional Record, two years after the analysis, is included in the epilogue. Other applications are mentioned. (Abstract supplied)

507
Baldwin, David A. THE COSTS OF POWER. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, June 1971: 145-155.
JX1901.J6, v. 15

Social scientists have been slow to incorporate the concept of costs into the concept of power. Harsanyi's initial statement should be elaborated in order to facilitate the linking of deductive and inductive theories. This elaboration is focused on four topics: (1) The cost accounting problems associated with each of Harsanyi's four influence techniques; (2) The indirect costs and benefits of the actor's influence attempt; (3) The difficulties of linking costs to perceptions; (4) The difference between Deutsch's concept of costs as changes accepted by the actor and Harsanyi's concept of costs as net disadvantages to the actor. The paper is relevant to the continuing effort to develop a comprehensive theory of social power by integrating the findings of psychology, sociology, economics, and political science. (Abstract supplied)

508
Barnett, Robert W. PACIFIC STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS. Survival, v. 13, July 1971: 220-226.
U162.S9, v. 13
"Reprinted by permission."

Outlines the roles that international assistance, trade, and economic development will play in determining the strategic pattern in Asia. Barnett believes that "the strategic outlook is being transformed today by a general trend within all countries involved in the common experience of . . . the East Asian and Pacific area, to accord, increasingly, priority to internal national concerns over pursuit of foreign objectives, or fear of foreign threats," which means that "fac-

tors other than weapons would be ultimately the effective shaping influence on our future strategic outlook."

509
Bergner, Dieter. [POLITICAL-IDEOLOGICAL BASES OF CURRENT ANTICOMMUNISM] Politisch-ideologische Grundlagen des Antikommunismus der Gegenwart. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie, v. 19, no. 9, 1971: 1061-1078.
B3.D4, v. 19

Examines anticommunism and anti-Sovietism in the "imperialist" countries, manifested ideologically in vituperous mass-media campaigns and politically and militarily in the Vietnamese aggression, and ascribes them to a fear of the Marxist-Leninist movement that grows more acute as socialism waxes stronger. Bergner sees anticommunism as primarily an ideological phenomenon of social life in the decay stage of capitalist society, along with drugs, nostalgia, and mysticism. The current accommodation policies of the "imperialists" are just another anti-Communist strategy no less dangerous than the earlier strategies of containment and roll-back.

510
Bergsten, C. Fred. THE NEW ECONOMICS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 199-222. D410.F6, v. 50

Cites several reasons why "the international component of the New Economic Policy was wholly unnecessary" and points out the protectionist and isolationist trends the policy fosters. In Bergsten's opinion continuation of the policy could lead eventually to trade war and a world depression which "would have a disastrous impact on U.S. foreign policy, and on our own national security." The combination of relaxed presidential visiting and the new economic policy is producing "the most bizarre U.S. foreign policy imaginable: war on our friends, concessions to our traditional adversaries." Bergsten advocates liberalization of world trade, devaluation of the dollar, and "a better process through which national balance-of-payments positions can adjust." He also calls for a system of Special Drawing Rights which would eventually replace gold as a standard for currency convertibility.

511
Bixenstine, V. Edwin, and Jacquelyn W. Gaebelein. STRATEGIES OF "REAL" OPPONENTS IN ELICITING COOPERATIVE CHOICE IN A PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, June 1971: 157-166. illus. JX1901.J6, v. 15
"This work was supported in part by an Undergraduate Research Fellowship grant to the second author made available by the National Science Foundation."

Strategies of choice for other in a PD game were generated in terms of two considerations regarding the subject's (*S*'s) prior choice: (a) whether the choice was cooperative or competitive; and (b) whether it was transient or persevering. Probability functions were assigned such that other would match *S*'s prior choice immediately or gradually within four permitted strategy classes: Quick (to match cooperation)-Quick (to match competition); Quick-Slow; Slow-Quick; and Slow-Slow. One additional strategy was generated in which other immediately matched *S*'s cooperative choice, and then gradually mismatched it (called Defect-Slow or "Trap"). Fifty men and 50 women students given 150 trials in like-sexed pairs demonstrated distinct choice characteristics under the five strategies. *S*s under Slow-Slow were most cooperative, while those under Slow-Quick and Defect-Slow (Trap) were least cooperative. Other's probability slope to *S*'s prior competition was the most pertinent variable, but was conditional on the probability slope to *S*'s prior cooperation. Supporting data were adduced and the results discussed. (Abstract supplied)

512
Bondurant, Joan V., and Margaret W. Fisher, comps. CONFLICT: VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE. Chicago, Aldine-Atherton [1971] 206 p. ([An Atherton controversy])
HM281.B63
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--The search for a theory of conflict, by Joan V. Bondurant.--pt. 1. Familiar modes of nonviolence: The new peace movement, by Roy Finch. The new pacifism, by Stephan Thernstrom. Limits to the moral claim in civil disobedience, by Harry Prosch. The moral ground of civil disobedience, by Darnell Rucker.--pt. 2. Forms and uses of violence: The threat of violence and social change, by H. L. Nieburg. Violence and the process of terror, by Eugene V. Walter.--pt. 3. Symbolic violence or creative conflict?: Evolution and revolution, by Ernest Jones. Creative conflict and the limits of symbolic violence, by Joan V. Bondurant.--pt. 4. Is there an alternative to violence?: Fractionating conflict, by Roger Fisher. Comments on "fractionating conflict," by Lawrence S. Finkelstein. The technique of nonviolent action, by Gene Sharp. Some questions on civilian defense, by Thomas C. Schelling. --Epilogue: contrasting approaches to conflict, by Margaret W. Fisher.

Essays illustrating various approaches to understanding the role of violence and its alternatives in human conflict. The topics broached include recent developments in pacifism and the peace movement, the rationale of civil disobedience, the nature and uses of symbolic violence, the psychology of radicalism, and proposals for a nonviolent national defense policy and a method of conflict resolution based on "fractionation" of the issues. Bondurant's introductory essay outlines a social conflict paradigm based on the psychotherapeutic model, while Fisher's epilogue surveys some recent conflict theories, notably those advanced by Mohandus Gandhi and Tadeusz Kotarbinski.

513
Brain, Paul F. POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE PITUITARY/ADRENOCORTICAL AXIS IN AGGRESSIVE BEHAVIOUR. Nature (London) v. 233, Oct. 15, 1971: 489.
Q1.N2, v. 233

Suggests that action of components of the pituitary/adrenocortical axis may explain the recent finding by Cherkin and Meinecke (see item 1468, v. 7, no. 4, of this bibliography) that the aggressive behavior of previously isolated male rabbits can be suppressed for several weeks by allowing them to recover in pairs from barbiturate anaesthesia. It has been determined that "defeated animals show a pronounced increase in adrenocortical activity which is not evident in the victor and it seems likely that this increase in ACTH and/or glucocorticoids may have a cue function in inducing subordinate behavior by increasing the fear response and reducing the aggressive response." In the Cherkin-Meinecke experiments, the stress of anaesthesia may have served to trigger adrenocortical activity in the same way as defeat, thus causing the rabbits to adopt subordinate or nonaggressive behavior patterns on emerging from the anaesthetized state.

514
Bröll, Werner. [DECISION THEORY AND POLITICS. OUTLINE OF AN ANALYSIS ON THE QUESTION OF RECOGNIZING THE GDR] Entscheidungstheorie und Politik. Skizzierung einer Analyse zur Anerkennungsfrage der DDR. Politische Vierteljahresschrift, v. 12, Sept. 1971: 402-412.
JA14.P63, v. 12

Applies the decision-theory model to an analysis of the question of West German recognition of the German Democratic Republic. Bröll outlines a systematic comparison and analysis of the possible combinations of alternative decisions on this question with the counterreactions of the other party taking into account the goals of both parties. The value of the decision-theory model for international political analysis, Bröll concludes, lies in the requirement it imposes for precise definition, itself a helpful instrument in decisionmaking.

515
CHANGE AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM. Journal of international affairs, v. 25, no. 2, 1971: vii-xii, 209-314. JX1.C6, v. 25

Contents.--Editor's foreword.--The impact of technological change on the international system: reflections on prediction, by Bernard Brodie.--Population, technology, and resources in the future international system, by Robert C. North and Nazli M. Choucri.--The future of ideology in alliance systems, by Herbert S. Dinerstein.--The international functional implications of future technology, by Eugene B. Skolnikoff.--International organizations in the future international bargaining process: a theoretical projection, by William D. Coplin.--Race in the future of international relations, by Tilden J. LeMelle and George W. Shepherd, Jr.

Essays on the impact of technological change on the international system. A central concern of these essays is the problem of gaining and maintaining political control over modern technology and its sequela, especially the pervasive and large-scale violence threatened by technologically-induced, rapid social change. Military technology, the uneven distribution of resources and resource use between rich and poor countries, population growth and its control, the political roles of racism and ideology, and the potential and limitations of international organization are among the matters examined from this perspective.

516
Cousins, Norman. THE IMPROBABLE TRIUMVIRATE. KHRUSHCHEV, KENNEDY, AND POPE JOHN. Saturday review, v. 54, Oct. 30, 1971: 24-35. illus.
Z1219.S25, v. 54

Relates conversations with Khrushchev, Kennedy, and Pope John in connection with the author's emissary role between the Vatican and Moscow on the matter of religious freedom in the Soviet Union. Cousins reports that in his December 1962 Khrushchev meeting he was told that the Soviet Union sincerely desires to avoid a nuclear war, has no objection to reasonable inspection as part of a nuclear test ban treaty, and fears that German revanchist efforts may trigger a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. Khrushchev also said that war under capitalism is no longer inevitable as Communist ideology once held. Cousins finds that the improbable triumvirate of an American President, a Communist, and a Pope was brought together in a common concern for peace in face of the vulnerability of civilization to the destructive power of nuclear weapons.

517
Czernetz, Karl. [THE INTERNATIONAL REMAINS ON ITS COURSE. THE CONFERENCE OF THE GENERAL COUNCIL IN HELSINKI] Die Internationale bleibt auf ihrer Linie. Die Konferenz des Generalrates in Helsinki. Zukunft, July 1971: 10-16.
H5.Z85, 1971

Report on the discussions and resolutions of the General Council of the Socialist International. Czernetz's coverage includes the positions taken on human rights, the proposed European security conference, the Middle East dispute, the Vietnam War, disarmament, and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks.

518
Delmas, Claude. [NUCLEAR ARMS AND THE COLD WAR] Armements nucléaires et guerre froide. [Paris] Flammarion [1971] 183 p. (Questions d'histoire, 25) D843.D34
Bibliography: p. [175]-179.

Discusses events leading up to and occurring during the cold war, including the Berlin, U-2,

and Cuban missile crises, and examines the role nuclear weapons have played within these events. One section presents extracts from the documents and judgments of contemporary statesmen and observers. A section analyzing the controversies of the time takes the form of answers to questions, including, among others, the decisions to launch the attack on South Korea and to develop the hydrogen bomb.

519
EUROPEAN POLITICS: THE RELATIONS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. In Perspectives on Europe; proceedings of a symposium held at Wellesley College under the auspices of the Barnett Miller Foundation. Edited by Edward A. Stettner. Cambridge, Mass., Schenkman Pub. Co. [c1970]. p. 150-185.
D1055.P4

Panelists: Otto Zausmer, Ivan·Svitak, Pierre Hassner.

A discussion of the political situation in Europe and the prospects for détente in light of the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Dr. Svitak's opening remarks conclude that present efforts at détente have failed because of basic Soviet attitudes, that the West has yet to come to terms with what it desires for Eastern Europe and what it hopes for itself through détente, and that free peoples or those desiring freedom, especially in the small countries, must realize that problems of security must be a constant concern in the present international order. "And in this respect I think that unless and until the structure of the international world is changed, unless and until there is a new balance which makes it more difficult for the great powers to impose their own preferences and fears on the domestic experiments and orientations of other countries, we will still have to worry about the basic European problem, which is how to reconcile the necessities of balance, the necessities of the interests of the great powers, with popular aspirations."

520
Flint, Ronald A. THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURE AND INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN DETERMINING BEHAVIOR IN TWO PERSON GAMES. Ann Arbor, University Microfilms, 1971. 107 p.
Micro (Order no. 71-12,771)

Abstract in Dissertation Abstracts, v. 31, May 1971: 6932B. Z5055.U5A53, v. 31

Dissertation (Ph.D.) "completed under the Dissertation Support Program funded by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and administered by the National Academy of Sciences."

A study designed to separate the three factors considered determinants of game playing behavior--game structure, interaction between players, and individual differences. Previous studies isolated the structure factor from the combined effects of the two behavioral factors. Flint concludes that the players' individual characteristics "have little effect on game playing behavior, except when operating within the context of the interaction with the other player." He also observes that when partners were alternated, they showed improved game playing ability ("probably through improved learning of the logical structure of the game") as compared with players who kept the same opponent. A game structure that provided a goal-orienting reward when played by subjects who had experienced other partners was most productive. These participants showed "evidence of having learned to negotiate their actions so as to attain the greatest mutually satisfying outcome in every game."

521
Frei, Daniel. [DOES THE STATE STILL HAVE A FUTURE?] Hat der Staat noch eine Zukunft? Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 558-567.
AP32.S47, v. 51

Has the state as an independent political organization and the supreme expression of a people's will and loyalty become obsolete? Factors in the affirmative are the political significance of nuclear weapons, society's transnational demands, and increasing economic interdependence. History shows that the form of political organization is shaped by the means with which it can be defended. New requirements in fields like the environment, technological research, and currency reform can no longer be met adequately by the state. Finally, the economic interdependence of states has eroded territorially-delineated political policies. Paradoxically, however, some of these same factors militate against the obsolescence of the state. The nuclear stand-off of the two superpowers has increased the prestige and independence of action of nonnuclear and smaller states and their readiness to resort to arms. The growing number of services that modern society demands has resulted in the growth of bureaucracy and thus entrenched the position of the state. State-performed functions multiply at a far greater rate than the number of responsibilities being turned over to international organizations. Finally, the fervor of nationalism has evidenced no sign of decline, not even in the Northern Hemisphere. The state will remain the basic political organization in the foreseeable future in the absence of a viable alternative.

522
Gamson, William A., and Andre Modigliani. UNTANGLING THE COLD WAR; A STRATEGY FOR TESTING RIVAL THEORIES. Boston, Little, Brown [1971] 222 p. illus.
JX1291.G35

Bibliography: p. 213-217.

Research supported by grants from the Carnegie Corporation of New York through the University of Michigan's Center for Research on Conflict Resolution and from the Clark and Milton Funds at Harvard University, and by a predoctoral fellowship (no. 5 F1 MH-24 346-03) from the National Institute of Mental Health.

Contents.--An approach to studying the cold war.--Research tactics.--Rival belief systems about the cold war.--A decision model for deriving pre-

dictions.--Testing the belief systems.--Did the parameters of the cold war change?--Phases of the cold war.--Methodological appendices.--Data appendices.--Glossary.--Bibliography.--Index.

Analyzes the observable actions and reactions of the Soviet and Western coalitions in the cold war lasting from 1946 to 1963. Gamson and Modigliani consider as data only the actors' behavior (outputs), not the decisionmaking process (inputs) which generated action. The cold war is treated as a "dyadic, mutually contingent, hostile interaction," that is, as one in which two parties are each influenced by the actions of the other, with a resulting high ratio of disagreements. Alternative belief systems about the self-perceived goals of one side, its image of how its goals were perceived by the other side, and its interpretation of the other's goals are examined and a decision model for predicting reactions of each to the other's behavior is constructed around these belief parameters. Gamson and Modigliani find that the Western and Soviet coalitions' "overall interaction can best be understood if we assume that both coalitions had consolidationist goals, that both believed their goals were accurately perceived by the other, and that both actually misinterpreted the other's goals as expansionist." These assumptions remained fairly stable throughout the period. The authors, in developing a systematic method for analyzing the cold war, "intend the terms of our understanding to be in a form that makes them applicable to these same patterns when they occur in other international conflicts."

523
Graf, Richard G., and Duane Green. THE EQUITY RESTORING COMPONENTS OF RETALIATION. Journal of personality, v. 39, Dec. 1971: 581-590.
BF1.J66, v. 39

"This paper is based in part on a thesis . . . by the second author. . . . The research was supported by a grant from the San Diego State College Foundation."

Previous research has shown that retaliation can be an effective means of restoring equity to the relationship between a harm-doer and his victim. The present study investigated the equity restoring properties of two components of retaliation: the harm-doer "paying the price" for his harmful act, and the victim being given an opportunity to inflict harm. Equity was restored to the relationship between the harm-doer and his victim when the harm-doer believed that his victim would be given an opportunity to inflict harm either upon the harm-doer or a neutral party. When the harm-doer was led to believe that he would be retaliated against by someone other than his victim, equity restoration did not occur. The suggestion was made that the crucial factor in equity restoration may be the way in which the harm-doer thinks the relationship is viewed by his victim. (Abstract supplied)

524
Harsch, Joseph C. CHANGING GREAT POWER ALIGNMENTS. Current, no. 132, Sept. 1971: 56-57.
AP2.C9259, 1971

"From 'Five-corner World Emerging as Hostility Index Declines,' The Christian Science Monitor, July 17, 1971." N&CPR

President Nixon's visit to Peking signals the end of the postwar bipolar world. For the foreseeable future, world politics will be dominated by a multisided configuration composed of the United States, the Soviet Union, Communist China, Japan, and, if and when Great Britain gets into the Common Market, Western Europe. Peking's fears of Japan and of a Soviet-Japanese entente clearly have played a large part in the Chinese decision to seek friendlier relations with Washington. The immediate question is whether improving Sino-American relations will induce Peking to be more helpful in the settlement of the Vietnam War, but the new diplomatic situation also has important implications for U.S. relations with Taiwan and the Soviet Union. In the latter case, the results should be beneficial all around. Russia's cultivation of Western Europe and its more constructive attitude toward nuclear weapons may be direct results of the new China policy pursued by the United States. Certainly, one can expect that the Kremlin will take a much more cautious approach in a five-power world, for "no one wants to be odd man out in a game of five players."

525
Kovalskii, N. ON THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONAL AGGRESSION. XX century and peace, Sept. 1971: 19-22. illus. N&CPR

Theories ascribing international aggression to biology, demography, the personality of a leader, innate human violence or accident are fallacious, because they ignore the essential social, economic and political factors. Aggression has been practiced by different political groups at different stages of history but three preconditions are necessary for international aggression: encouragement of aggression by its victims, weakness of the democracy of the aggressor, and aggressive social tendencies in the political climate of the aggressor. Aggression can be averted by observing the principles of peaceful coexistence.

526
Laqueur, Walter. SIX SCENARIOS FOR 1980. New York times magazine, Dec. 19, 1971: 8-9, 29-32, 36-37. illus. AP2.N6575, 1971

Outlines six scenarios of varying degrees of probability for the international system over the next decade. The most probable future is "more of the same," i.e., a continuation of the three-sided power struggle between the Soviet Union, Communist China, and the United States, with the Soviet Union emerging as by far the strongest power in military-strategic terms, though still lacking the wherewithal to impose its will on either of its two principal adversaries. Other possibilities are a Sino-Soviet peace pact incorporating a division of the world into spheres of influence; the emergence of Western Europe and Japan as two new centers of power capable of holding their own

against China and the two superpowers; the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from an active role in world affairs following the collapse of its empire in Eastern Europe and an intensification of secessionist sentiments at home; the relapse of China into chaos and its division into spheres of influence by the Soviet Union, Japan, and the United States; and the economic collapse and political enervation of the West.

527
Nadeshdin, Andrei. [PEKING'S DIVISIVE MACHINATIONS AGAINST THE SOCIALIST COMMUNITY OF STATES] Pekings Spalterumtriebe gegen die sozialistische Ländergemeinschaft. Sowjetunion heute (Vienna) v. 17, Oct. 1, 1971: 14-15, 20-21.
DK266.A2S784, v. 17

In the dispute between the two Socialist world systems the Maoists have become tools of the imperialists. In their efforts to split the Socialist community they are undermining the world revolutionary movement and impeding the development of socialism in their own country. Had the Maoists not rejected close cooperation, China would have been more successful in its industrialization programs, for the Soviet Union and other Socialist states would have continued their massive assistance. Peking's foreign policy resembles in many respects the bourgeois-nationalist line of Chiang Kai-shek: hostility toward the alleged "red imperialism" of the Soviet Union, territorial ambitions, and covetous designs on the Mongolian People's Republic. In much the same way that Chiang once sought to provoke a clash between the Soviet Union and Japan, the Maoists sought to incite conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States. Especially damaging to the Socialist cause is the Chinese revisionism that espouses nationalism and is fed by it. The imperialists' policy of "bridgebuilding" and Peking's "policy of differentiation" within the Socialist world have one goal in common: to impede the revolutionary process of the world Socialist system.

528
NATIONALISM AND SEPARATISM. Journal of contemporary history, v. 6, no. 1, 1971: 1-196.
D410.J66, v. 6

Contents.--Unsatisfied nationalisms, by Hugh Seton-Watson.--Catalan and Basque nationalism, by Stanley Payne.--The Germans of Rumania, by Georges Castellan.--The Lebanese identity, by Kamal S. Salibi.--Kurdish nationalism, by C. J. Edmonds.--The southern Sudan, by Richard Gray.--Northern Ireland, by J. C. Beckett.--The nationalist movement in Scotland, by H. M. Begg and J. A. Stewart.--Welsh nationalism: the historical background, by Kenneth O. Morgan.--Canada: notes on two ideas of nation in confrontation, by Graham Spry.

An examination of some unsatisfied nationalisms--"old nations which have got left behind in the race for independence (Scots, Catalans, perhaps Welsh and Basques); nations in formation (Kurds, southern Sudanese); and communities whose identity is in some way ambivalent (Northern Irish, Lebanese)." Nationalism is often more a curse than a blessing and in Africa and Asia could produce separatist and irredentist movements on a scale surpassing anything seen in the Balkans in the 19th century. Even so, if the only alternatives to the nation-state are domestic and international anarchy or a barbaric, universal empire, the best policy might be to learn to live with its imperfections.

529
Nicholson, Michael. CONFLICT ANALYSIS. London, English Universities Press, 1970. 168 p. illus. (New science series)
U21.2.N53
Bibliography: p. 164-166.

Contents.--Social science and the study of conflict.--Aggression and war.--The statistical description of war.--The theory of games.--Bargaining and the theory of games.--The theory of alliances.--International crises.--The theory of arms races.--Experimental methods--international simulation.--Social science and values.--Index.

Describes current work on the application of the methods and tools of the behavioral sciences toward promoting the resolution of international conflict.

530
Odeschalchi, Edmond P. THE MAKING OF EUROPE. Midwest quarterly, v. 13, autumn 1971: 37-45.
AS30.M5, v. 13

The history of Europe has long included the conflicting themes of unity and nationalism; today the trend is clearly towards unity. The pressure of economic concerns has produced the Common Market. A central monetary system and common currency would further interweave the social, economic, and political lives of the associated countries. In fact, the organization of the Common Market already "has the appearance of a shadow government." Its Council of Ministers watches out for national interests, but its Commission is a supranational group and its third leg is the European Parliament. "The whole mechanism appears to work like a bona fide government." Other forces pressing towards unity include defense needs, the commercial challenge of Japan, and Soviet political pressure. Increased unity in Western Europe seems inevitable.

531
Oskamp, Stuart. EFFECTS OF PROGRAMMED STRATEGIES ON COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA AND OTHER MIXED-MOTIVE GAMES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, June 1971: 225-259. illus.
JX1901.J6, v. 15
"This paper developed from work done under US Public Health Service Grant MH 11505-01 and was supported by a research grant from Claremont Graduate School."

Strategy of the other player is one of the most important and frequently-investigated variables in studies of cooperation in non-zero-sum (or mixed-motive) games. Each simple mixed-motive game, such as the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game, is different from other simple games in the kind of conflict situation which it presents to players, and consequently a careful classification of games is needed in order to avoid misinterpretation and improper generalization of experimental findings. In contrast to previous reviews of non-zero-sum games, the present article carefully distinguishes between different types of two-person matrix games and presents extensive evidence of significant strategy effects on subjects' cooperation. Results show strategy effects for the PD game to be substantially different than for other games, such as Chicken. Research findings with the PD game support eleven conclusions about concurrent effects of various strategies, four conclusions about effects of early trial outcomes on later cooperation, and eight conclusions about delayed effects of various strategies. The validity of these conclusions for any particular real world conflict situation will depend on the situation's motivational structure and demand characteristics.

532
Pear, Tom H., comp. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS OF PEACE AND WAR. Freeport, N.Y., Books for Libraries Press [1971, c1950] 262 p. (Essay index reprint series) JX1952.P35 1971
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Preface, by T. H. Pear.--Foreword, by C. W. Judd.--pt. 1. Introduction, by T. H. Pear. Peace, war and culture patterns, by T. H. Pear. War and aggressiveness: a survey of social attitude studies, by H. J. Eysenck. Personality and attitudes towards warfare, by Madeline Kerr. Women in peace and war, by J. Cohen. Some neglected aspects of world integration, by J. C. Flugel. Guide lines for research in international co-operation, by G. W. Allport.--pt. 2. Frustration and aggression: a review of recent experimental work, by Hilde Himmelweit. Some psychological studies of the German character, by H. V. Dicks. Threats and security, by L. F. Richardson. Statistics of fatal quarrels, by L. F. Richardson.

Essays in the psychology of war and peace. The role of culture and instinct in the formation of aggressive tendencies; the influence of women on war and peace; social attitudes toward war; personality and violence; experimental studies of the relationship between frustration and aggression; national character as a cause of war; the psychodynamics of threat and counterthreat; the contribution of religion and social science to world peace; and psychological aspects of the problem of building a world community are some of the matters discussed.

533
Petković, Ranko. CHINA, THE USA, AND THE USSR. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Aug. 5, 1971: 6-8. D839.R4, v. 22

Translation of an article that appeared in Neue Politik, v. 16, Sept. 18, 1971.
H5.N377, v. 16

The triangle of Soviet-American-Chinese relations has borne three major configurations since 1949: a Sino-Soviet confrontation with the United States, a three-sided confrontation, and more recently a Soviet-American partnership for the isolation of China. Although this last phase has not fully ended, events point toward one of two new configurations: a Sino-American coalition against the Soviet Union or a triumvirate of the superpowers. The former alternative is purely theoretical despite the unrealistic speculation prompted by President Nixon's trip to Peking; the latter is a real possibility, although the longstanding differences between the superpowers and the hostility generated in the international community somewhat diminish the likelihood of such a triumvirate. Whatever its political, economic, and military power, the decisionmaking power of the triumvirate would be limited by such political forces as Japan, India, Europe, client states, and the nonalined world. It is, nonetheless, salutary that the world is moving away from a duumvirate of power toward greater polycentrism and democratization. China has many internal problems and favors peaceful existence. It can be hoped that its influence within a superpower triangle will be constructive in terms of the international community.

534
Petrov, Vladimir. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNIST UNITY. Modern age, v. 15, fall 1971: 338-349.
AP2.M628, v. 15

While Americans see the new measure of independence appearing in some of the Communist states as only quantitatively different from the old concept of the Communist monolith, it represents a new and dangerous phenomenon for the Soviet ruling élite. The messianic ideology of the Soviet Communists places paramount importance on Communist unity, transcending even the military and economic power of the Soviet Union. Soviet thought and foreign policy are imprisoned in a "siege" philosophy that views the Soviet Union as a beleaguered island in a sea of capitalism. Soviet leaders, therefore, give any setback macrocosmic proportions and are obsessively sensitive to any manifestations of their own weakness. The growing nationalist trend in the Communist world and even in the Soviet Union deprives the Soviet leaders of a necessary sense of security, making them less predictable. The United States should recognize that the struggle between the free world and the monolithic Communist world is over. "And no matter how weak we ourselves may at times feel, we need to learn to differentiate among the various devils confronting us, dealing with them according to a more realistic scale of priorities."

535
Rejai, Mostafa, comp. DECLINE OF IDEOLOGY? Chicago, Aldine-Atherton [1971] 325 p. illus.
JX76.R43
Bibliography: p. 317-322.

Contents.--Political ideology: theoretical and comparative perspectives, by M. Rejai.--pt. 1. The hypothesis: The passing of fanaticism, by Daniel Bell. The end of ideology? by Seymour Martin Lipset.--pt. 2. Empirical and comparative perspectives: Europe: the politics of collective bargaining, by Seymour Martin Lipset. Finland: institutionalized radicalism, by Erik Allardt. The Netherlands: from politics to administration, by A. Hoogerwerf. The United States: politics of affluence, by Robert E. Lane. Japan: the erosion of ideology, by Masaaki Takane. The Soviet Union: ideology in retreat, by Daniel Bell.--pt. 3. Critique: A dissenting view, by Joseph La Palombara. Empirical relevance of the hypothesis of decline, by M. Rejai, W. L. Mason, and D. C. Beller. Anti-ideological thought in France, by Roy Pierce. The student movement and the end of the "end of ideology," by Michael Novak. Toward a radical alternative, by Kenneth Keniston.

Collection of reprinted essays on the decline of ideological fervor and its "deradicalization" as economic development proceeds. Part one sets forth the hypothesis; part two subjects it to empirical examination; and part three evaluates it. Rejai provides an introduction to each part.

536
Rostow, Walt W. POLITICO-ECONOMIC WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AS THEY AFFECT NATO NATIONS IN THE 1970'S. Naval War College review, v. 23, Apr. 1971: 4-13. illus. N&CPR

"An address delivered at the Allied Command Atlantic Naval Symposium at SACLANT Headquarters, Norfolk, Virginia, on 4 November 1970."

Two trends working toward a stable international order today are the deconcentration of power away from the United States and the Soviet Union and the decline of the "aggressive revolutionary romantics" in the developing nations. In this dangerous transitional period the NATO nations should adopt policies which encourage the proper development of these trends. These policies include maintenance of a strong NATO to rule out Soviet adventurism in the 1970's, meaning that U.S. forces in Europe should be reduced only through negotiation and that NATO members should increase their own military contributions; serious initiatives from strength toward possible East-West détente; renewed attention to NATO's position in the Mediterranean and its economic and political policies toward developing countries. In the long run the last may determine the actual impact of the present Soviet Mediterranean policy. Europe must assume a new role in the world, for the United States can no longer do everything all by itself.

537
Rothenberg, Albert. ON ANGER. American journal of psychiatry, v. 128, Oct. 1971: 454-460. RC321.A52, v. 128

"Read at the 124th annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C., May 3-7, 1971. . . .

This study was supported by Public Health Service Research Scientist Development Award MH-23-621 from the National Institute of Mental Health."

Criticizes certain assumptions held by modern psychiatry concerning anger and its relationship to anxiety, hostility, and aggression. Anger in its own right has gotten very little attention from psychiatrists, with the result that most of the assumptions concerning it are false. In humans, anger "is an alerting phenomena for the individual and for others that provides a basis of communication." It is also an alternative to and a defense against anxiety. In both capacities, it is distinct from hostility, rage, and aggression, and may serve important constructive purposes.

538
Sebald, Hans, and Rudolfo N. Gallegos. VOICES OF WAR AND PEACE--WHAT DO THEY KNOW? Pacific sociological review, v. 14, Oct. 1971: 487-510. illus. HM1.P33, v. 14

Reports the results of a survey to determine the relationship between a person's knowledge concerning a particular war and his attitude toward that war. In regard to the Vietnam War, it was found that doves are more knowledgeable than the hawks. This finding was judged less important, however, than the discovery that for both groups emotional predisposition and basic attitudes, not knowledge, are the real determinants of position on the war. The rational dimension of the dispute is little more than an effort to legitimize prior emotional commitments, which would indicate that attempts to bridge the gap between the disputants by discussion and debate have little, if any, chance of success.

539
Snow, Edgar. RED CHINA TODAY. New York, Random House [1971] 749 p. illus. DS777.55.S6 1971

First published in 1962 under title: The other side of the river.

Bibliography: p. [725]-734.

An anecdotal account of Snow's return to China in 1960 presenting a broad picture of China in the '50's and early '60's. Footnotes reflecting Snow's 1970 trip have been added for contrast or explication. A new preface interprets the cultural revolution and the appearance of the "Thought of Mao as a unifying faith." Snow explains aspects of Mao's foreign policy and sees the "intensified fear of a Soviet preventive war" as a significant factor motivating Chinese interest in a Sino-American conversation.

540
SOUTHEAST ASIA, 1971. Current history, v. 61, Dec. 1971: 321-384. D410.C82, v. 61

Partial contents.--The Nixon Doctrine in Southeast Asia, by Richard Butwell.--Thailand and mul-

tipolarity, by Kenneth T. Young.--Indonesia: transition to stability? by David B. H. Denoon.--Possibilities for violence in Malaysia, by Paul Pedersen.--Whither Indochina? by Dennis J. Duncanson.--Laos: the contest of wills, by Arthur J. Dommen.

Examines several Southeast Asian nations and reports on internal tensions, alliance strategies and foreign policy shifts, future fears and threats, and the impact of American foreign policy.

541
Spiess, Herbert A. [INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING--A MANAGEMENT PROBLEM] Internationale Verständigung--ein Managementproblem. Wiesbaden, Betriebswirtschaftlicher Verlag Dr. Th. Gabler [c1971] 121 p. (Schriften zur Vergleichenden Managementlehre, Bd. 4) HF1532.5.U6S66
Bibliography: p. 115-121.

Contents.--Introduction.--The subject.--The significance of the world abroad for the American.--European limitations.--Europe's past.--Experiences of war.--Impressions of crises.--The value of money.--The position of the European vis-a-vis his government.--Conditions of living.--America's policy toward Europe.--The picture of the American in Europe.--The significance of foreign trade.--Americanization and governments.--Americanization and the Europeans.--The picture of the European in America.--Conclusions.--Prospects.--References.--Bibliography.

Presentation of the historical, political, and socioeconomic differences between the European and the American, their recent culmination in anti-American sentiment as New World dynamism clashes with Old World traditionalism, and recommendations on how multinational enterprises may improve transatlantic relationships. Spiess foresees these differences as continuing but thinks fruitful partnership possible if each side makes honest attempts to understand (not necessarily to accept) the other's views.

542
Tedeschi, James T., Thomas V. Bonoma, and Robert C. Brown. A PARADIGM FOR THE STUDY OF COERCIVE POWER. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, June 1971: 197-223. JX1901.J6, v. 15
"Research reported in the present paper was in part supported by Grant Number GS-3065 to the senior author from the National Science Foundation and by Grant Number ACDA-0331 to the second author from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Committee of the National Research Council."

Although a number of experimental paradigms have been developed to study coercive power, the results of the empirical studies to date indicate conceptual and methodological inadequacies with regard to the hypotheses tested. A critique of experimental investigations of coercive power which employ the trucking game, communication game, real estate game, and a modified Prisoner's Dilemma game is proffered. A threat paradigm is examined which permits rigorous and flexible evaluations of theoretically generated predictions and focuses upon behavioral compliance by target individuals to contingent threats. Research completed to date was used to evaluate the internal validity, external validity, and the experimental and mundane realism of the threat paradigm. It is suggested that each of the other paradigms examined could be strengthened by adding the controls introduced in the threat paradigm. (Abstract supplied)

543
Thole, Günther, Renate Wünsche, and Helmut Mardek. [THESES; THE FOREIGN POLICY AND FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY OF THE STATES OF ASIA AND AFRICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL CLASS STRUGGLE BETWEEN SOCIALISM AND IMPERIALISM] Thesen; die Aussenpolitik und die Aussenwirtschaftspolitik der Staaten Asiens und Afrikas in der internationalen Klassenauseinandersetzung zwischen Sozialismus und Imperialismus. Potsdam-Babelsberg, Institut für Internationale Beziehungen, 1971. 87 p. (Institut für Internationale Beziehungen. Aktuelle Beiträge der Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft. Heft 77)
JX1311.T5

Contents.--pt. 1. General bases of the foreign policy and foreign economic relations of the states of Asia and Africa.--pt. 2. Character and main tasks of the foreign policy of the Afro-Asian states.--pt. 3. Character and main tasks of the foreign economic policy of the Afro-Asian states.

Surveys the relevant factors of the foreign policy and foreign economic relations of the developing states in Asia and Africa within the framework of the class struggle.

544
Tuthill, John W. STRATEGY DRIFT IN THE ATLANTIC. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 9, summer 1971: 156-173. D839.A85, v. 9
"From a paper prepared for the Atlantic Institute, Paris."

The "strategy drift" that has befallen the Atlantic Community in recent years, together with the piecemeal approach to community problems that it encourages, must be overcome before the policies that have protected peace, prosperity, and freedom for the last quarter century are destroyed. This paper attempts to identify the main threat to Atlantic security, call attention to some areas of vulnerability, analyze the urgent economic problems that threaten to shatter existing security arrangements, determine precisely where the community stands today, and offer some suggestions for the future. Clearly, European unity and economic strength are the prerequisites of any solution. The progress that has been made toward these goals is not adequate. The economic issue is particularly troublesome, and perhaps only a commission of the best brains in Europe and

America could devise the bold new negotiating techniques and innovative substantive recommendations that the situation seems to require. Meanwhile, as a stopgap, the instruments at hand--the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the International Monetary Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development--ought to be improved and put to use.

545
U.S. Dept. of the Army. COMMUNIST CHINA: A BIBLIOGRAPHIC SURVEY. Washington; [For sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off.] 1971. 253 p. illus. Z3108.A5U48
"DA pamphlet 550-9."

Contents.--Global ambitions and objectives.--China's nuclear threat: the challenge to East and West.--The military posture.--Communist China and the world: foreign policy and international relations.--The Communist Chinese nation: the spectrum of politics, sociology, and economics.--The great upheaval: the cultural revolution.--Republic of China on Taiwan.--Source materials for further research and reference.--Appendixes.

Presents 800 abstracts of selected periodical articles, books, studies and reports surveying the internal activities of the People's Republic of China since 1966, the date of issuance of the previous edition of this bibliography. Additional charts, tables, and colored maps supporting the abstracts appear in a lengthy appendix which offers detailed information on the strength of the Chinese military, the organizational structure of the Chinese Communist Government, party and military organization, Chinese defense expenditures, and comparisons of Chinese military manpower and population with those of other nations of the world. Also included are maps of China's military, geographical, vegetative, industrial, economic, ethnolinguistic, administrative, and political regions.

546
Wilson, Warner. RECIPROCATION AND OTHER TECHNIQUES FOR INDUCING COOPERATION IN THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, June 1971: 167-195. illus. JX1901.J6, v. 15
"This research was supported by National Science Foundation Grant GS-1355."

Undergraduates (520 males) forming 260 teams played a Prisoner's Dilemma game for 300 or more trials. Teams made more cooperative choices in response to a tit-for-tat strategy, played by a simulated opposing team, than they did in response to any of three variations on a tit-for-tat theme ($p<.05$). A preliminary period of 30 competitive choices resulted in more cooperation during the 300 main trials ($p<.05$). In all conditions, partners received better ratings than opponents ($p<.01$). When the *Ss* played confederates, they favored the ingroup most on sociometric traits ($p<.05$). When they played other naive *Ss*, they favored the ingroup most on motive traits (borderline significance). This last result agrees with three earlier studies using only naive subjects and supports a hypothesis of selective bias in intergroup perceptions. A striking contrast occurred between the high level of cooperation (68 percent) elicited by the predictable, reciprocal programmed strategies and the much lower level (43 percent) which occurred in the natural play condition. The discussion suggests the general applicability of a predictably contingent strategy. (Abstract supplied)

547
Wimmer, Hans. [IVAN BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. NATO AND THE SOVIET NIGHTMARE] West-östlicher Iwan. Die NATO und der Alptraum der Sowjets. Europäische Begegnung, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 15-16. AP30.E78, v. 11

What the Soviets have long dreaded is becoming a fact: they are being squeezed in a political vise by Sino-American rapprochement in the East and by NATO in the West. As a result NATO optimists look for a greater Soviet willingness to negotiate concrete measures for détente, especially mutual balanced force reductions. NATO skeptics, on the other hand, wonder whether the Soviets will accept a status quo in Europe without first securing Romania and Yugoslavia firmly in their orbit. They also point to the worsening NATO situation in the Mediterranean. Their greatest concern, however, is that the Americans will withdraw from the continent and the hard-pressed economies of Western Europe will have to bear the cost of defense. The question is now which side can hold out the longer: the NATO governments plagued by recession and inflation or the Soviets threatened by political encirclement and the disintegration of their satellite system. The hope lies in balanced force reductions and a continuing détente in the Far East that brings with it the prospect of new markets.

FOREIGN POLICIES

548
Albert, Ernst. [HEATH AND WILSON IN THE EUROPE DEBATE] Heath und Wilson in der Europadebatte. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Sept. 1971: 531-540. D839.A885, v. 22

Outlines the party faction position and substance of the ongoing debate in the United Kingdom on entry into the Common Market and discusses the foreign-policy and defense questions arising from an affirmative decision. Albert holds that Heath's Conservative Government will win a parliamentary majority for entry, and sees the Labour Party splintered in its opposition. Heath's argument is the need to stave off the country's declining economic and international status. Once in the expanded Common Market, the United Kingdom will have to face up to the implications of mem-

bership for its relationship to the European Parliament and the Western European Union. Distrustful of the Russians and seeing mutual balanced force reduction as playing into their hands, the British are greatly concerned over the growing U.S. isolationism. As a result, Albert foresees closer ties with France, perhaps leading to some sort of nuclear cooperation should the United States abandon the continent. The British will, however, make no rash decisions, he concludes, until the future American role becomes clear.

549
Alten, Jürgen von. [MEANING AND FUNCTION OF DÉTENTE IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS] Sinn und Funktion der Entspannung im Ost-West-Verhältnis. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Sept. 25, 1971: 639-644.
D839.E86, v. 26

Endorses President Nixon's phrase "era of negotiations" as the most concrete definition of détente. Alten regards the relaxation of tensions not as a goal in itself but as necessary for clearing the international climate. Unlike the "era of confrontation" in the new climate each can seek its foreign policy aims not in the rancor of public debate but in substantive negotiations where a dynamic policy is possible.

550
Amirsadeghi, Hossein. WITH RUSSIA AND AMERICA: THE SHAH'S BALANCED ALIGNMENT. New Middle East, no. 38, Nov. 1971: 10-11.
DS63.1.N48, 1971

Traces the history of Iranian foreign policy since World War II from the vantage point of "Iran's new economic and political significance" and explains Iran's increasingly larger role in Asian affairs. Anticipating that the U.S.-Soviet power monopoly will soon be weakened by the emergence of a strong Europe and an Asian "Fourth Force" centered in Japan, Iran has established diplomatic relations with Peking. The Shah's foreign policy--"and it is the Shah who formulates it in total"--is designed to restore Iran's international importance. At the same time "the Shah wants to work towards a solution of the perennial problems of poverty and ignorance that plague our world today."

551
AS A U.N. MEMBER, BONN WOULD UPHOLD GERMAN UNITY. In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, v. 19, Nov. 30, 1971: 313, 316-317.
DD259.A35, v. 19

Bonn's official view, as given in reply to a query by the opposition, is that West and East Germany could coexist as members of the United Nations without the two Germanys formally recognizing one another in the international legal sense. The seating of the two delegations could take place only after a bilateral agreement on their relationship. This agreement would establish some normalization of relations but would not prejudice the Federal Republic's claim to be the successor of the German Reich.

552
Bailey, Norman A. COLOSSUS OF THE SOUTH. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Dec. 1971: 3-7. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

While Argentina flirts with economic and social chaos, and the United States manifests diminishing interest in Latin America, Brazil has begun once more to assert the "claim to regional hegemony so amply justified by its size, population, geographic position, military strength, and natural resources." The present Government is staunchly anti-Communist, but its outlook is more technocratic than ideological, and the military leadership, aware of its own limitations, has put the management of the nation's economy into the hands of civilian experts, with superb results. Not surprisingly, stability and economic progress at home have bred a more active diplomacy abroad. It is well-known that Brazil has long been interested in acquiring an outlet on the Pacific and asserting control over the Charcas highlands in Bolivia. So far, Brazilian initiatives have been limited to trade and aid, but politics follows economics, and Latin America may well be witnessing the emergence of a "minisuperpower." It is not without reason that the Argentines are speaking of a "Brazilian threat" with renewed apprehension.

553
Bark, Dennis L. CHANGING EAST-WEST RELATIONS IN EUROPE: THE BONN-MOSCOW TREATY OF AUGUST 1970. Orbis, v. 15, summer 1971: 625-642.
D839.068, v. 15

"Adapted from an address before the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco on December 18, 1970."

"Recapitulate[s] and analyze[s] the events that have transpired in West Germany's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe since the Bonn-Moscow treaty was signed." Bark states that the Soviet willingness to negotiate reflects its anxiety over the People's Republic of China and the economic difficulties plaguing its East European satellites. He concludes that the treaty is not détente, that relations with East Germany have not improved, and that Brandt's Ostpolitik equivocates on the definition of certain realities important to the situation. Bonn's failure to recognize that the Soviet Union works only for its own interests may yield further unilateral concessions that could result in a "united peaceful Europe from the Ussuri to the Atlantic rather than from the Atlantic to the Urals."

554
Bechtoldt, Heinrich. [MOSCOW'S INTEREST IN THE BERLIN SETTLEMENT] Moskaus Interesse an der Berlin-

Regelung. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Oct. 1971: 577-580. D839.A885, v. 22

West German ratification of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw and the convening of a European security conference, two major objectives of Soviet foreign policy, are being held up until final settlement of the Berlin question is attained by the four-power protocol. What the Soviets hope to achieve from the security conference are a renunciation-of-force agreement (probably not applicable to Soviet Union-Eastern Europe relationships because of the Brezhnev Doctrine), economic and scientific collaboration, and some type of permanent committee for settling disputes. These aims point to Soviet recognition that two different socioeconomic systems will exist in Europe for a long time to come. The Soviets also appear to recognize that ties between the United States and Western Europe will continue and that a Sino-American rapprochement can no longer be prevented. There is no doubt that the Soviet Union's realistic policy vis-a-vis Western Europe is in large measure a reflection of its concern over developments in China.

555
Benjamin, Roger W., and Lewis J. Edinger. CONDITIONS FOR MILITARY CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS IN MAJOR STATES: A HISTORICAL EXPLORATION. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, Mar. 1971: 5-31. JX1901.J6, v. 15

Analyzes empirical aspects of sixty-two cases of military participation in foreign policy decision-making in France, Germany, Japan and the United States over the period of a century to answer such questions as "when, under what circumstances, and why military leaders in their professional capacity, exercise control over foreign policy-making." Employing a modification of Richard Snyder's approach to the decisionmaking process, the authors identify probabilistic hypotheses which link military control of foreign policy decisions to six categories of possible causal variables: decision-making framework, normative role perceptions, military resources and organization, political structures, socioeconomic patterns, and foreign relations. Extensive tabular data are included to support the conclusion that multivariate hypotheses of military control should be substituted for empirically weak unicausal explanations.

556
Berger, Roland. CHINESE CITIES, CHINESE HAMLETS: "BECKONING A NEW GENERATION." Nation, v. 213, Oct. 18, 1971: 361-367. AP2.N2, v. 213

Reports on China's economic and industrial improvement under the leadership and inspiration of Chairman Mao. Berger concurs with Chou En-lai's assertion that China does not intend to become a superpower but points out that the country certainly is growing in "international prestige and world influence." President Nixon confirmed its importance by agreeing to go to the People's Republic rather than expecting the Communists to come to America. Although Nixon may hope to divide China's Asian allies, his visit is more threatening to his own treaty partners. The proposed trip represents "a depth charge under Chiang Kai-shek and a time bomb under Sato." In conclusion, Berger wonders if Nixon is planning to revise the "containment of China" policy and hopes he is considering its implications for America's Asian allies.

557
THE BERLIN AGREEMENT: THIN EDGE OF THE WEDGE. East West digest, v. 7, Oct. 1971: 289-296. N&CPR

The Berlin Agreement will operate against Western interests and lead to further agreement between the East and the West that will lighten the strategic tasks of the Communist world. The Soviets have five European policy goals: tightening their colonial reign over Eastern Europe, effecting an American withdrawal, sabotaging the Common Market, expanding their influence in Western Europe, and lulling their opponents into political and military disarmament. The Berlin accord and the euphoria it has released contribute to the achievement of these Soviet goals. In view of the balance of power the Berlin Agreement vitally concerns the entire Western world as well as Germany. "The Berlin Agreement is the thin edge of a wedge which is designed to divide and weaken the West on a massive scale while the Warsaw Pact countries build up their strength." When its strength has grown sufficiently, the Soviet bloc may be willing to take dramatic risks to achieve its aims, scrapping all agreements in the process, as the Soviet Union has been wont to do.

558
Birrenbach, Kurt. THE WEST AND GERMAN OSTPOLITIK--THE GERMAN OPPOSITION VIEW. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 9, summer 1971: 196-204. D839.A85, v. 9

Extracts from a speech before the West German Bundestag on Jan. 29, 1971.

Analyzes foreign reactions to the Moscow Treaty and other aspects of Germany's Ostpolitik. Birrenbach argues that those in the West who have approved the new developments do not give sufficient weight in their calculations to the interests of the Federal Republic. Western criticism, on the other hand, reflects a real and deep-rooted anxiety that Bonn's Ostpolitik bodes ill for Western security and interests. The substance of this criticism with regards to the Moscow Treaty itself, East-West negotiation more generally, Western security, other European problems, Communist China, world tensions, Berlin, and calls for a European security conference, is summarized.

559
Brandt, Willy. "LET ME SPEAK OF PEACE POLICY IN OUR TIME . . . AND ABOUT WHAT MY OWN COUNTRY CAN DO."

In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-) Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, v. 19, Dec. 14, 1971: 334-340. DD259.A35, v. 19

"Address . . . on the occasion of the presentation of the 1971 Nobel peace prize in Oslo on December 11, 1971."

Background and aims of West German foreign policy and a six-point program for building peace in Europe. Brandt calls for a balance between states and groups of states in which each will maintain its identity and security, the renunciation of force and recognition of the inviolability of existing frontiers, equal participation by the European states in specific agreements on arms limitation and control, noninterference in the internal affairs of other states, development of new forms of cooperation and the creation of an all-European infrastructure, and the overcoming of material want. These points are "realistically based on the assumption that we must first of all take the world with its systems and ideologies as it stands today." Two practical steps toward the attainment of these goals lie ahead: a European conference on security and cooperation and negotiations on force reductions. "We can arrive at a system of security in Europe superimposed on the blocs, [and] judging by the world situation, that system is feasible neither without the United States nor without the Soviet Union." Brandt concludes balanced force reduction will facilitate the attainment of such a security system.

560
Brandt, Willy. ["WHAT WE ARE DOING HAD TO BE DONE"] "Was wir machen, musste gemacht werden." Spiegel, v. 25, Sept. 27, 1971: 28-32. illus.
AP30.S66, v. 25

An interview with Federal Chancellor Willy Brandt on the conduct of West Germany's Ostpolitik. Dissolution of the Alliance systems, like general disarmament, is a long-range goal incompatible with the realities of the present and near future. The most to anticipate is a balanced mutual reduction of forces, Brandt states, adding that this too would be jeopardized by failure to maintain the Atlantic Alliance. Bonn's bilateral preparations for a European security conference and discussions preliminary to troop reduction negotiations are logical developments of a policy agreed upon in the Alliance. The Soviets have a great interest, Brandt continues, in defusing any possible confrontation with Western Europe and the United States. They see in a secure peace in Europe the chance to divert some of their defense budget to other purposes. In the foreseeable future, U.S. conventional forces will remain in Europe, and its deterrent forces, wherever stationed, will continue to play a decisive role.

561
Brzezinski, Zbigniew. JAPAN'S GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 270-282.
D410.F6, v. 50

Major adjustments are necessary if America and Japan are to maintain a viable relationship. In the extreme possibility a division between the United States and Japan, like that created by an economic crisis, might swing Japan to China's door for diplomatic-economic cooperation. Potential problems in Japanese-American relations derive from "three broad issues: economics, security, and status." Complicating all three is "the psychological dimension" in these relations which both sides have tended to overlook, despite its importance. The United States has been alternately paternalistic or threatening; the Japanese tend to be short-sighted, rigid, and subject to feelings of inferiority. The problems troubling the Japanese-American relationship should not be dealt with bilaterally, but on a broader Asian scale involving other powers like Australia, Korea, and perhaps Indonesia. "Seen in a broader historical perspective, America, Western Europe and Japan are sharing a unique experience: they are in the vanguard of societies leaving the industrial age and beginning to confront the challenge of the new technetronic era."

562
Bury, Leslie. FOREIGN MINISTER'S INTERVIEW ON TELEVISION. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 42, May 1971: 275-282. illus.
JX1162.A33, v. 42

Text of a televised interview given on May 17, 1971.

An interview with the Hon. Leslie Bury, M.P., Minister of Foreign Affairs, in which he elaborates on Australian policy towards the People's Republic of China, Nationalist China, the Soviet Union, and Japan. Bury defends Australia against charges of facile policy change in regard to Communist China, supports an independent government for Taiwan and a "two-China" policy in the United Nations, and denies that Australia is entering a dialog with China only to liberalize its trading position. He states that "it is not reassuring to see another Soviet power, particularly Soviet Russia, expanding its force and influence in the Indian Ocean." Bury believes that Australia has participated in a successful effort to prevent South Vietnam from falling to Communist aggression. He discounts fears that abandonment by the United States might force Australia into a neutralist position and sees no Japanese military threat to the Pacific area.

563
Butwell, Richard. THE NIXON DOCTRINE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. Current history, v. 61, Dec. 1971: 321-326, 366-367. D410.C82, v. 61

Although some Asian leaders anticipated dramatic changes from the Nixon Doctrine, the role of the United States in Southeast Asia has not been markedly altered. While U.S. troops are now being gradually withdrawn from Vietnam, Thailand, the

Philippines, and Japan, American involvement in Laos and Cambodia has increased "in spite of the Nixon Doctrine," which raises doubts about its workability. Closer analysis indicates that the self-reliance aspects of the Doctrine are more appropriate for the insular states of Southeast Asia than for the mainland states like Burma, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam which are much nearer China and North Vietnam. They are also, with the exception of Thailand, the "weakest and most vulnerable" states in Asia and could not survive the Communist challenge on their own. In its broad application in Asia and other parts of the world, the Nixon Doctrine may reflect an important policy shift. However, Nixon may find it is "much easier to proclaim policy changes than to carry them out." It is probably impossible to employ the Nixon Doctrine to save Laos and Cambodia from the Communists.

564
Campbell, John F. THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS FUDGE FACTORY. New York, Basic Books [1971] 292 p.
E840.C35
Includes bibliographical references.

Criticizes the organization and policymaking processes of the U.S. Department of State, diagnoses the malaise of American foreign policy, and offers a program of practical reform for the State Department and the Foreign Service.

565
CANADA'S FOREIGN POLICY. International journal, v. 26, winter 1970/71: 290 p.
D839.I5, v. 26
Entire issue devoted to Canadian foreign policy.

Partial contents.--After 25 years, by John W. Holmes.--National interest and the new look, by James E. Hyndman.--The Trudeau Doctrine, by Peyton V. Lyon.--Canada's strategic position and the 1970's, by Albert Legault.--Africa in Canadian affairs, by R. O. Matthews.--The relations with the Pacific countries: present and future, by Gilles Lalande.--The management of a foreign policy for Canadians, by Peter C. Dobell.--Publics and policy-makers: the domestic environment of the foreign policy community, by Denis Stairs.--The role of the provinces in international affairs, by Ronald G. Atkey.

Emphasis on the issues that will face Canada in its relations with the rest of the world, and how the nation will live with its wealth in a world of have and have-not nations.

566
CHINA AND EASTERN EUROPE. Current scene, v. 9, Sept. 7, 1971: 11-13.
DS701.C9, v. 9

China's re-energized diplomacy has been most noticeable in Eastern Europe, particularly in Romania and Yugoslavia. Romanian Communist Party chief Ceausescu was given special treatment on his June visit. Economic relations are so good that China is second only to West Germany as a Romanian creditor. Sino-Yugoslav relations have been gradually improving since Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia. Previously Chinese propaganda had used Yugoslavia as the whipping boy for Soviet revisionism. Chinese relations with the Czechs have been uneven, but economic ties are being restored.

567
Chopra, Maharaj K. THE INDO-SOVIET TREATY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Dec. 1971: 22-28. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Analyzes the terms of the Indo-Soviet treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation, and speculates on its consequences for the politics of South Asia and the world. Though the defense and security features of the treaty are quite evident, it lacks the operational capability associated with a true military alliance. Its principal value will be as a deterrent, making available to India a kind of nuclear umbrella that should reduce the pressure on the Indian Government to "go nuclear." Charges that the treaty will strengthen India's Communist movement or embroil India in world affairs to an extent not justified by its own interests are unfounded.

568
Clark, Joseph. CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. Dissent, v. 18, Dec. 1971: 527-530.
HX1.D58, v. 18

Analyzes several aspects of the thaw in Sino-American relationships. Clark warns against forgetting that Chinese communism is a totalitarianism maintained by repressive force. President Nixon should avoid the mistakes of those correspondents who have enthusiastically embraced the makers of the cultural revolution as a government supported by the people. It is more realistic to point to Chinese fear of Soviet aggression as a reason for taking down the "stupid wall" between the United States and China. Noting the "difficulty U.S. diplomacy has in maintaining old alliances when forging new ones," Clark warns against discord with Japan. The two major obstacles to improved Sino-American relations are Taiwan and the American involvement in Vietnam.

569
COMMUNIST CHINA, 1949-1969, A TWENTY-YEAR APPRAISAL. Edited by Frank N. Trager and William Henderson. [New York] Published for the American-Asian Educational Exchange by the New York University Press, 1970. 356 p. DS777.55.C638

Partial contents.--Communist China in the light of Chinese history, by Frank A. Kierman, Jr.--The military: their role in the policy process, by

William W. Whitson.--The economy after twenty years, by Yuan-li Wu.--China and the Communist world, by Richard C. Thornton.--Peking's approach to the outside world, by Richard L. Walker.--The United States and Communist China, by Frank N. Trager and William Henderson.--Brief chronology: 1949-1969.--Selected bibliography.--Index.

Addresses, lectures, and essays on the history of the Maoist period in China. Kierman analyzes the effect that the Chinese Communists have had on fundamental and traditional Chinese psychological sets and social patterns within the context of Peking's quest to "make it" in the modern world. The role of the military in the decisionmaking process is examined by Whitson, and Yuan-li Wu assesses the progress of China's economy after twenty years of Communist rule. Surveys of China's foreign policy and relations, specifically of its relations with the Communist world, the international community as a whole, and the United States are undertaken by Thornton, Walker, and Henderson and Trager.

570
Cooper, Chester L. THE CIA AND DECISION-MAKING. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 223-236.
D410.F6, v. 50

Harry Truman described the function of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as the prediction, for the National Security Council, of the effect of a particular policy under consideration. Specifically, the CIA's Office of National Estimates produces about 50 reports a year relating to "situation or policy considerations affecting the national security interests of the United States." These National Intelligence Estimates have not always received close attention or exercised much influence, unfortunately, for they advised against American military escalation in Vietnam and in 1964 "challenged the validity of the hallowed 'dominoe theory.'" A reorganization is necessary to bring the estimates experts closer to policy concerns and to make their voices more audible to the decisionmakers.

571
THE DANCE OF THE THREE. Economist, v. 240, Sept. 11, 1971: 9-11. illus.
HG11.E2, v. 240

The balance of world power is no longer a "two-way, Russian-American business," since Mr. Nixon opened the door for Communist China. In the resultant three-sided power structure each member will try to stand between the other two, its goal being "to become one of a twosome and to avoid finding itself a permanent onesome." The United States, though longing for peace, must take care not to misinterpret the desires of Moscow and Peking. Negotiations with the Soviets, "if they produce a frozen Eastern half of Europe and a weaker western half, . . . will have been a defeat." The Chinese demands may exceed the limits of negotiation if the United States is expected to remove its troops from Asia and to guarantee that Japan will not rearm. A three-handed power distribution may prove to be advantageous for the West, but the complexity of the negotiations required will make the old two-power diplomacy seem simple.

572
Destler, I. M. CAN ONE MAN DO? Foreign policy, winter 1971/72: 28-40.
N&CPR

The weaknesses shown by President Nixon's National Security Council system for handling foreign policy stem from the dichotomous role of Henry Kissinger, who is at once the President's foreign policy advisor and "institutional kingpin" of the Council system, global strategist and operational coordinator. The chief weakness is that the too-great reliance on the Assistant for National Security Affairs limits the number of issues that can be brought before the President. Kissinger's disinclination to delegate authority and his penchant for National Security Council memoranda have resulted in greater responsibility for himself and bureaucratic tie-ups for the Council. The system has operated to concentrate power and Presidential access in Kissinger's hands and to undercut the influence of Executive Departments and their staffs. What has occurred is that Nixon has built a center of strength in the White House and lost it in other parts of Government dealing with foreign affairs. An alternative to this one-man system would be the centering of foreign policy coordination on the only other logical choice, the Secretary of State.

573
Dmitriev, B. POLICY OF DETENTE. New times, no. 43, Oct. 1971: 7-8.
D839.N483, 1971

The serious attention that the Soviet Union gives to its relations with the United States is demonstrated by the invitation extended to President Nixon to visit Moscow. Washington finally has recognized the danger of its policy of confrontation with the Soviet Union in view of the new balance of power of the 1970's. Though the President has announced that the United States seeks an "era of negotiation" to replace the "era of confrontation," there has been no rush to the conference table. The American people want reduced tensions and better relations with the Soviet Union. Along with the people of other states, they look forward with hope to the Moscow meeting next spring as a positive step toward peace.

574
Duncan, W. Raymond. SOVIET POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA SINCE KHRUSHCHEV. Orbis, v. 15, summer 1971: 643-669. illus.
D839.068, v. 15

Examines the Soviet Union's Latin American posture after Khrushchev, identifying the basic

trends in Moscow's policy toward Africa and Asia during the past decade, comparing these trends with Soviet-Latin American relations, and discussing Moscow's special relationship with Cuba. Duncan considers whether or not the changes in Soviet policies in Asia and Africa observed by scholars have appeared in new Soviet policies toward Latin America and analyzes the implications of any changes for the future. He concludes that future Soviet-Latin American relations will be conditioned by the political cultures south of the Rio Grande, the political instability of the region, and the perceptions of the United States held by the Latin American countries.

575
Ellsberg, Daniel. THE QUAGMIRE MYTH AND THE STALEMATE MACHINE. Public policy, v..19, spring 1971: 217-274. illus. JA51.P8, v. 19

"This article is part of a larger study . . . now in progress at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. . . . An earlier and longer version . . . was delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Los Angeles, September 12, 1970."

Some writers, notably Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., have conjured up an image of successive Presidents being inexorably sucked into a quagmire, bog or swamp in the belief that just one more step would achieve success in Vietnam that does not square with the facts. In actuality, the administrations concerned felt that, because of domestic political risks, they could neither allow a Communist takeover nor initiate the actions necessary for complete attainment of U.S. ends. To resolve this predicament, each President consciously opted for a policy of deliberate stalemate which avoided the messy alternatives, but also resulted in a higher level of violence where the process had to be repeated. The quagmire myth is popularly accepted because it allows the dilution and final dismissal of responsibility for the decisions which led to the war, which become unforeseen developments beyond anyone's control. "Just as Presidents and their partisans find comfort and political safety in the quicksand image of the President-as-victim, so Americans at large are reassured in sudden moments of doubt by the same image drawn large, America-as-victim."

576
EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC AFFAIRS. 2nd ed. London, National Book League with the European Atlantic Movement, 1970. 29 p.
Z6207.W811E93 1970
Distribution in the United States and Canada: Richard Abel, Portland, Oregon.

A bibliography to accompany a travelling exhibition giving 139 entries on relations within the Atlantic Alliance, European integration and international organizations, and aspects of American and European history related to the "Atlantic consciousness." A list of specialized publications of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is included.

577
EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM: CONTENT AND WAYS OF ENSURING IT. International affairs (Moscow) Nov. 1971: 64-88. D839.I465, 1971

Speeches before a symposium on European security in September 1971 by Soviet scholars S. I. Beglov, L. M. Vidiasova, M. S. Voslenskii, G. A. Zhukov, N. I. Kapchenko, IU. N. Kapelinskii, I. A. Lomko, E. N. Novoseltsev, N. E. Polianov, SH. P. Sanakoev, and V. M. Khvostov dealing with the Soviet approach to strengthening European security, the urgency with which such a system is needed, and the improvements in international relations such a system would make possible.

578
Fannon, Peter M. ON SWEDISH NEUTRALITY. SAIS review, v. 15, no. 4, 1971: 11-14.
D839.S35, v. 15

Sweden's neutrality has had only a marginal impact on world politics and has been applied inconsistently. Swedish capacity to influence the East-West balance is quite limited, but "by fostering 'peaceful coexistence' through her policy of neutrality, Sweden protects her security while supporting an East-West balance which allows Sweden room for international economic maneuvers." Analysis of Swedish foreign policy uncovers three patterns of sometimes inconsistent activity which illustrate the accommodations a small state may have to make in international politics: momentary concerns for national safety, cyclical patterns of international activity, and legalistic maneuvering rather than direct confrontations.

579
Fernau, Friedrich-Wilhelm. [GREECE BETWEEN THE BALKANS AND THE MEDITERRANEAN] Griechenland zwischen Balkan und Mittelmeer. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Oct. 10, 1971: 673-683.
D839.E86, v. 26

The position of Greece as an integral part of the European continent and as a peninsula-archipelago jutting out toward Asia and Africa has traditionally dictated a two-phase foreign policy that the military regime in Athens has not altered. Athens has pursued a successful policy of détente with its northern neighbors--Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and even Albania and is now endeavoring to establish a Balkan "zone of peace and collaboration." Athens is also seeking to enhance its influence to the South, not only in its traditional bases in Egypt and Libya but in Sub-Saharan Africa as well. Although Greek foreign policy is firmly anchored to close and peaceful relations with Turkey, the latter's phenomenal population growth will soon upset the relation of forces be-

tween the two countries. This may be one of the reasons for Greece's rapprochement with its northern neighbors; but realistically-minded Greeks think the safest path lies in maintaining friendly relations with their big neighbor across the Aegean.

580
Feuer, Lewis S. IS THE COLD WAR REALLY OVER? New leader, v. 54, Oct. 18, 1971: 7-12. illus.
HX1.N37, v. 54

Critics of American involvement in Vietnam who want to "close the books on Soviet imperialism and Chinese expansionism" to open a new era of détente should be aware that the Communists' long-term goal of world domination has not changed significantly. The persistence of the Soviet drive for imperialism is revealed in the Brezhnev Doctrine. In Asia the domino theory of the successive occupations of Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, and India is a fact, not a theory, for "all Leftists, Old and New." Only the United States has been consistently motivated by a "politics of morality" that forced England and France out of the Suez Canal, defended Israel in defiance of American best interests, and sent troops to Vietnam to defend "an international order." Today the Communist world division between China and the Soviet Union leaves three major powers, each on guard against the others. Each would like to see the other two at war; while the Communists hope for a nuclear engagement, the United States would be content with conventional war. At the same time, since there are reasons for wanting cooperation, both Communist states are likely to seek friendly relations with Washington.

581
Forschungsdienst China-Archiv. [PEKING-WASHINGTON: A NEW WORLD-POLITICAL CONSTELLATION?] Peking-Washington: Eine neue weltpolitische Konstellation? China-Analysen, v. 10, Sept. 1971: 1-5.
DS701.C356, v. 10

The People's Republic of China projects three coexisting images on the international stage that are somewhat contradictory in practice. To some of the smaller states of the Third World, China is the Mecca of world revolution and the champion of national struggles of liberation. To the Soviets, China is the bastion of great-power chauvinism bent on destroying the unity of the Socialist world. To the Chinese and more especially to Chou En-lai, China is a hegemonial power seeking to exercise and consolidate its leadership in Asia much as the Mandarin nationalists did in generations past. It is with this third image in mind that the United States must view its forthcoming talks with the Chinese leadership, for Peking will seek the removal or thinning out of the American military presence in the Pacific.

582
FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT ON WEST BERLIN. GDR review, v. 16, no. 11, 1971: 22-24.
DD261.G2, v. 16

Outlines the major provisions of the four-power agreement on Berlin and interprets its significance from the East German viewpoint, stressing that the accord is applicable only to West Berlin and thus confirms East Berlin as the capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). The agreement likewise confirms the status quo as the consequence of World War II and explicitly precludes West Berlin from ever being governed by the Federal Republic. The East Germans were consulted by the Soviet Union during the Allied negotiations, and Socialist unanimity barred any concession prejudicial to GDR sovereignty. The article concludes that the treaties of Moscow and Warsaw and the Berlin Agreement provide a good basis for a general improvement of the situation in Central Europe, strengthening security and cooperation in Europe, and facilitating international legal recognition of the GDR and the entry of both German states into the United Nations.

583
Furtak, Robert K. [COOPERATION AND STRUGGLE--THE JANUS COUNTENANCE OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY] Kooperation und Kampf--Die Janusköpfigkeit der sowjetischen Aussenpolitik. Osteuropa, v. 21, Aug./Sept. 1971: 692-707.
DR1.08, v. 21

Analysis of the 24th Soviet Party Congress shows that the Soviets are conducting a two-sided foreign policy of struggle and accommodation. One side of this policy is designed to expand the Socialist world system through continuing support of national liberation movements and close collaboration with Socialist workers' organizations in the capitalist world. The other side is aimed at détente in Europe and at easing the burden of the arms race. Détente, as the Soviets see it, is an opportunity to consolidate the status quo as a point of departure for the expansion that will come eventually as the capitalist world declines. The Soviet interest in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and other measures to reduce armaments is based on a three-fold requirement: to free funds for urgently needed domestic programs, to consolidate the bases of communism in the Soviet Union and its client states, and to "tame" China's growing nuclear might. The compatibility of the Soviet policies of struggle and accommodation is evident. The Soviets seek to secure peace through exploitation of the fear of nuclear war and popular resentment against arms expenditures, to use that peace then to strengthen their own system, and to support revolutionary wars at little risk to themselves.

584
Garrett, Stephen A. THE LESSONS OF VIETNAM. Center magazine, v. 4, July/Aug. 1971: 10-20. illus.
N&CPR

The Vietnam War points up the moral problem in American foreign policy. Most people agree that national security is necessary, and many hold it part of American tradition that it is just to as-

sist the weak and the oppressed in their struggle for freedom. A case can be made for the American involvement in Vietnam in terms of an indirect Communist threat to U.S. security, for "moral attitudes toward the war . . . cannot be divorced from analytical conclusions about current military and political realities." As good a case cannot be made for supporting the South Vietnamese Government, unless any system is regarded as preferable to a Communist one. The dreadful destructive power of conventional weapons, even in a localized war, and the blurred distinction between combatant and civilian have complicated the moral issue of the Vietnam War. Many Americans, who initially favored the goals of U.S. involvement, have been turned against the war by the lack of "proportionality" between the means and goals sought. Two lessons may be derived: substantiating a moral position on the Vietnam War is complicated, involving as it does the ends and means of national policy, and one's own state may no longer be "inevitably the chief defense of right and justice in the world."

585
Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-). Presse- und Informationsamt. [THE TREATY BETWEEN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF POLAND] Der Vertrag zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der Volksrepublik Polen. [Bonn] Presse- und Informationsamt der Bundesregierung [1970] 288 p.
JX697 1970.A5

Official Government publication that includes the text and associated documents of the West German-Polish Treaty, speeches and public pronouncements attending the signing of the Treaty, commentaries by Walter Scheel, Erich Küchenhoff, Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde, and Hans Roos. Selected press comments are given in the appendix.

586
Gregg, Robert W., and Charles W. Kegley, comps. AFTER VIETNAM: THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY. Garden City, N.Y., Anchor Books, 1971. 343 p.
E840.G73
Includes 6 papers from a symposium held Feb., 1970 at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University.
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Preface.--An introduction to future directions in American foreign policy, by Robert W. Gregg and Charles W. Kegley, Jr.--The folklore of power politics and American foreign policy in the 1970s, by William D. Coplin.--The security of empire, by Richard J. Barnet.--A third-world averaging strategy, by Max Singer and Aaron Wildavsky.--Vietnam, Western Europe, Latin America: where do our vital interests lie? by Leslie M. Lipson.--Future directions for United States policy toward the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, by Marshall D. Schulman.--Toward a reappraisal of United States foreign policy in Latin America after Vietnam, by Martin C. Needler.--United States policy in South Asia after Vietnam, by Richard L. Park.--American foreign policy in Africa after Vietnam, by Immanuel Wallerstein.--American foreign policy in the Middle East: toward the future, by John S. Badeau.--The third world and American politics, by Michael K. O'Leary.--The American economy after Vietnam, by Kenneth E. Boulding.

A collection of essays published in connection with a symposium at the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs focusing on the future of post-Vietnam American foreign policy and examining the salient American foreign-policy problems and issues of the 1970's which have been overshadowed by American preoccupation with the war in Southeast Asia.

587
Hahm, Pyong-choon. KOREA AND THE EMERGING ASIAN POWER BALANCE. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 339-350.
D410.F6, v. 50

While the United States is suffering economic difficulties because of the Vietnam War and European communism is threatened with disunity, the Japanese economy is booming. The emergence of Communist China as an international power motivated the United States to seek a rapprochement that would aid in inhibiting Russian "adventurism and expansionism." All the participants are playing "checks and balances." Korea has been the pawn of this balance-of-power struggle, continuously victimized by "dehumanizing and destructive violence" as it tried to stay neutral and nonalined. The United States must be a shield in Korea against Japanese militarism, and a referee helping to make new rules. "The chances for peace in East Asia, however, will be diminished without American involvement in South Korea as a force to keep Korea's neighbors from warring against one another."

588
Harrison, Lawrence E. WAKING FROM THE PAN-AMERICAN DREAM. Foreign policy, winter 1971/72: 163-181.
N&CPR

Differences in all aspects of life have dashed the unrealistic dreams of the New World states marching democratically side by side in an unbreakable partnership variously called the Good Neighbor Policy or the Alliance for Progress. Latin Americans are sensitive to these differences, especially to the disparity of wealth and accomplishment, and as a result anti-Americanism has grown from this lack of self-confidence vis-a-vis the United States. A new realism is in order, one that recognizes that for the years to come the only uniformity of political progress in Latin America will be a general trend to the left, frequent political upheavals will continue to characterize some of the states, socioeconomic progress will continue at least at its present rate, and nationalism will be the dominant political theme.

The United States should allow Latin American self-confidence and international awareness to develop by not treating the states south of the border as an American "responsibility." The relationship should be like that now beginning to develop between the United States and Western Europe.

589
Head, Ivan L. THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE NEW CANADA. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 237-252.
D410.F6, v. 50

For Canada a foreign policy "is a relatively new acquisition." Postwar industrial development thrust Canada onto the international scene. By 1949 it had developed a policy standing on four legs--the United Nations, the Commonwealth, NATO, and the United States. A changing and crisis-filled world situation has stimulated the formulation of a new policy, one that emphasizes "the quality of life and the importance of human relations." Under trial now is how the new policy will work with regard to the United States, particularly in a period of increasing anti-American feelings. The Canadian faith is now being sorely tried by President Nixon's present imposition of the ten percent surcharge despite Canada's long-standing special economic relationship, although the return "of a climate of understanding and cooperation" is hoped. The absence of pretentiousness and desire for cooperation of Canadian foreign policy are reflected in its participation in U.N. peacekeeping duties, its concern for peaceful relationships with the Soviet Union, and its contributory memberships in the Commonwealth of Nations and La Francophonie.

590
Hilsman, Roger. THE POLITICS OF POLICY MAKING IN DEFENSE AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS. New York, Harper & Row [1971] 198 p. (Harper's American political behavior series) JX1417.H54
Includes bibliographical references.

Analyzes the policymaking process in the fields of foreign and defense policies, examining the roles played by the President, his advisors, career bureaucrats, Congress, the electorate, interest groups and the press and focusing on how they interact and what pressures are exerted on them.

591
Hoffmann, Erik P., and Frederic J. Fleron, comps. THE CONDUCT OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. Chicago, Aldine-Atherton [1971] 478 p. illus.
DK274.H58
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--Origins of the cold war, by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.--The cold war revisionists, by William A. Williams.--United States-Soviet cooperation: incentives and obstacles, by Robert C. Tucker.--A test of the mirror-image hypothesis: Kennedy and Khrushchev, by William Eckhardt and Ralph K. White.--Ideology and American policy, by Bernard S. Morris.--Counter-ideological uses of "totalitarianism," by Herbert J. Spiro and Benjamin R. Barber.--The Cuban missile crisis: an analysis of Soviet calculations and behavior, by Arnold Horelick.--The limitation of strategic arms, by George W. Rathjens and G. B. Kistiakowsky.--Recent Soviet foreign policy: some patterns in retrospect, by Marshall D. Shulman.

Essays dating from the 1950's and 1960's dealing with contemporary Soviet foreign policy within the broader framework of international relations. They examine the internal and external factors like domestic Soviet politics, ideology, western diplomacy, and developments in the Third World that shape Soviet policy and international behavior.

592
Horowitz, David. THE MAKING OF AMERICA'S CHINA POLICY. Ramparts, v. 10, Oct. 1971: 40-47. illus.
AP2.R19, v. 10

Summarizes the course of Sino-American relations in the twentieth century with emphasis on the part played by American business. Horowitz explains how a policy of containment, first developed to isolate the Communist Government and encourage its eventual collapse, was replaced after interest in a more flexible policy slowly began to take shape. Research into Asian studies together with a public education program, all sponsored by the Ford Foundation and advised by the Council on Foreign Relations, prepared the way for a generally positive reaction to Nixon's announcement that he would go to China. Horowitz speculates that Nixon and Kissinger hope to gain an end to the Vietnam War and a "front-line position in the current oil rush now in process in the Asian seas." Horowitz concludes that the turnaround in United States China policy was arranged by "those long-term corporate interests and powers on which the American overseas empire is built and which American foreign policy, by the grace of such bodies as the Council on Foreign Relations, is designed to serve."

593
Hupka, Herbert. RETREAT IN BERLIN. Central Europe Journal, v. 19, Nov. 1971: 358-360.
DB200.7.S74, v. 19

Although the easing of restrictions on travel to and from West Berlin and the opening of the surrounding hinterland to visits by West Berliners could be salutatory developments, the four-power accord on West Berlin is heavily weighted to favor the Communists. First, the workability of any arrangement hinges on the cooperation of the East Germans. Secondly, the Berlin settlement fails to include East Berlin. Thirdly, the recognition is made that West Berlin is not governed from Bonn but is a four-power responsibility, with the Soviet Union a co-equal in West Berlin affairs. Finally, the establishment of a Soviet consulate-

general in West Berlin gives the city the appearance of an independent political unit, something the Soviets have long sought. "It certainly looks as if the Communists, both in Moscow and particularly in East Berlin, want and will reap a political harvest from the Berlin settlement."

594
Huyn, Hans, Graf von, comp. [OSTPOLITIK IN THE CROSS-FIRE] Ostpolitik im Kreuzfeuer. Willy Brandt[s] Zu den Ostverträgen [und] Beiträge[n] von Bruno Heck [und andere] Seewald Verl., Stuttgart [1971] 235 p.
DD259.4.H78
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface, by Hans Graf Huyn.--The treaties of Moscow and Warsaw, by Willy Brandt.--Soviet Western policy, by Bruno Heck.--Change through convergence? by Heinrich B. Streithofen.--The Moscow treaty, by Hans Graf Huyn.--The Warsaw boundary treaty, by Herbert Hupka.--Policy regarding Germany as the turning point, by Karl T. Freiherr zu Guttenberg.--Berlin: key to predominance, by Franz Amrehn.--The trade unions as an example, by Günter Triesch.--The pseudo-historical thesis: "25 years are enough!" by Paul W. Wenger.--The alternative--a policy for the freedom of Europe! by Alfred Dregger.--Biographies of authors.--Appendix: texts of the treaties.

Appraisals of the West German Government's Ostpolitik, with contributions championing and opposing this policy and placing it in the cross-fire of "objective criticism." Huyn holds that the party unanimity that characterized West German foreign policy up to the signing of the nuclear test ban, the acknowledgement of the existence of two Germanys, and the signing of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw has dissolved and that the resulting polarization of opinion is unprecedented in the Federal Republic.

595
THE IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICA'S EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP WITH CHINA. In American Academy of Arts and Sciences, Boston. Bulletin, v. 25, Dec. 1971: 2-18.
AS36.A48516, v. 25

Summarizes the remarks of members of a panel of Asian specialists convened to discuss the implications of recent and anticipated changes in U.S.-Communist Chinese relations. The panelists attribute the recent dramatic about-face in Chinese policy to the combination of friendly overtures from the Nixon Administration with the realization that, in view of the continued hostility of the Soviet Union and the disturbing reemergence of Japan on the world scene, the United States is no longer the most dangerous enemy. If a lasting accommodation is to be achieved, both sides will have to "disregard the myths and illusions which have clouded so much of their past history and strive to achieve a reunion based not on sentimentality but on a realistic analysis and true understanding of the problems involved in their complex and crucial relationship."

596
IUrkov, S. PEKING'S POLICY TOWARDS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. International affairs (Moscow) Nov. 1971: 17-24. D839.I465, 1971

Chinese foreign policy "reeks of great-power pretensions." While the goal of Chinese foreign policy remains the same--to make the People's Republic into the world's major superpower--China has abandoned the tactics of the Cultural Revolution in favor of new ones. At the same time that it follows a divisive, anti-Soviet line aimed at undercutting the unity of the Socialist countries and the leadership of the Soviet Union, China depicts itself as leader of the revolutionary movement and protector of the oppressed. Even when under the strain of deteriorating relations the Soviet Union tried persistently to prevent further erosion of relations, Peking continued to undermine the Socialist countries' fraternal friendship with the Soviet Union. "The Chinese leaders' attempts to shatter the socialist community by means of a differentiated approach are objectively grist to the mill of the imperialist powers, which have been trying to bring about complications within the world socialist system by 'bridge-building' and ideological subversion."

597
Jackson, Keith. NEW ZEALAND AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. Journal of Commonwealth political studies, v. 9, Mar. 1971: 3-18. JN248.J65, v. 9

Discusses New Zealand's relations in Southeast Asia, focusing on Wellington's military and economic activities in the area. Jackson maintains that the official explanations for New Zealand's interest in Southeast Asia usually reveal an underlying fear of Communist China. He concludes that the most promising course for New Zealand's Southeast Asian policy lies in direct association with the states of the region through international arrangements like the Asian and Pacific Council and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

598
Jain, Girilal. A DIALOGUE WITH CHINA. Survival, v. 13, Aug. 1971: 264-266.
U162.S9, v. 13
"The Times of India, 3 June 1971. Reprinted by permission."

Domestic preoccupations and outmoded attitudes apparently kept India from responding in 1970 to several hints that the Chinese would like to improve relations. When the Pakistani Army ravaged East Bengali, India had available, and should have used, several avenues to better communication with China. These approaches might have failed, but it should be noted that China's response to the crisis has not been one of total commitment to Paki-

stan, suggesting that Chinese leaders are well aware of the realities of the situation. India can exclude China from a voice in the subcontinent's affairs only if it has the full backing of the Soviet Union and the United States, which is not the case. India's position would be stronger if relations with China had been repaired. As matters now stand India "is finding it extremely difficult to secure even its minimum vital interests without Peking's acquiescence."

599
JAPAN IN CURRENT WORLD AFFAIRS. Edited by Kajima Institute of International Peace [Tokyo, The Japan Times, 1971] 308 p.
DS889.J33

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Japan-U.S. relations: The Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, by Morinosuke Kajima. U.S.-Japan relations in the seventies, by Toshio Kimura. Impressions of past American Presidents and comments on the Nixon Administration, by Koichiro Asakai.--pt. 2. Japan and the Communist world: The multipolarization of the Communist world and Japan, by Hisanari Yamada. The future of Japan-Soviet relations, by Katsushiro Narita. Views on Japan's territorial problems, by Tokuji Tokonami. The Taiwan problem and U.S.-China relations, by Sadao Iguchi. The world will revolve around Peking, by Saiji Hasegawa.--pt. 3. Japan and Asia: As we prepare for the 1970's, by Shojiro Kawashima. Japan's role in the post-Vietnam period, by Kiichi Aichi. Asia and Japan in the 1970's, by Zentaro Kosaka. The rationale of an Asian-Pacific community, by Eiji Wajima.--pt. 4. Economic diplomacy: The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as seen from an economic viewpoint, by Heigo Fujii.

Compilation of articles from the Japanese monthly Kokusai Jihyo concerning the political and economic international relations of Japan in the seventies, and viewing the future of U.S.-Japan relations, Japan's post-Vietnam role in Asia and the Pacific and the development of Japanese relations with the Communist world.

600
Keil, Hartmut. [NEW EDITION OF AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM?] Neuauflage des amerikanischen Isolationismus? Frankfurter Hefte, v. 26, Aug. 1971: 587-597. AP30.F555, v. 26

Detects in recent American political, social, and economic events a tendency toward isolationism. The Nixon Doctrine, antimilitary movements, and demands for protectionist trade measures point in this direction. Disenchantment with Asian policies, Keil claims, has largely caused the resurfacing of latent isolationism. The Vietnam War has brought liberals and conservatives together in an isolationist coalition, albeit for different reasons. The Administration may not be able to stem the popular tide favoring retrenchment, he reasons, because Congress is beginning to limit the President's initiatives in foreign affairs.

601
King, David B. DIPLOMACY AND POWER: GERMANY, EUROPE, AND THE FUTURE. South Atlantic quarterly, v. 70, autumn 1971: 439-448.
AP2.S75, v. 70

West Germany may be on the road to achieving the European hegemony and world-power status that German arms failed to obtain. The most populous and industrialized of the European Economic Community (EEC) states and bordering on the Communist East, West Germany has launched a successful diplomatic offensive aimed at détente and trade. Even should the EEC be expanded to the projected 10-state community, West Germany will remain at least primus inter pares. But West Germany is also seeking expanded trade with the East, and the Soviet Union needs the type of expertise and equipment that West Germany can provide. "If the Federal Republic acts moderately, she stands a very good chance of becoming the nucleus not only of western Europe, but all of Europe . . . there is almost no possibility of her extending her influence by military force."

602
Kloss, Heinz. [THREE DESIDERATA OF GERMAN OSTPOLITIK] Drei Desiderata der deutschen Ostpolitik. Mitarbeit, v. 20, Sept. 1971: 160-165.
H5.M55, v. 20

The Federal Republic of Germany faces three principal problems in the pursuit of its Ostpolitik: Berlin, recognition of the German Democratic Republic, and the Oder-Neisse issue. Responsibility for the last two problems belongs to West Germany alone. East Germany needs West German legal recognition to achieve international status as an independent, sovereign state. Once Bonn diplomatically extends recognition, it is likely that East Germany will use some pretext to sever relations, for East Germany could not long survive close relations with its free neighbor. A way out of this dilemma would be the declaration of a loose confederation of the two states with provision for the indissolubility of the arrangement. Ratification of the Warsaw Treaty without reference to the bloody expulsion of the two million German former residents of the Oder-Neisse lands would not only be a crime against humanity but would set a dangerous international legal precedent, especially for Third World states with their minority problems. A memorandum of reservation to be separately tendered to the Polish Government at the time of ratification should specify that treaty ratification does not imply Bonn's recognition of the legality of the expulsion.

603
Kozlovski, E. A NEW CHAPTER IN POLISH-WEST GERMAN RELATIONS? Poland and Germany, v. 15, Jan./June 1971: 8-19. illus.
DK418.5.G3P55, v. 15

The unwillingness of West German governments to recognize the Oder-Neisse as Poland's western

frontier long thwarted Polish initiatives to normalize relations with Bonn. That the Federal Republic finally agreed in the Treaty of Warsaw to affirm a frontier that history had already made a political reality may be attributed to the new Socialist Government in Bonn, changed power relationships in Europe, and the atmosphere of détente occasioned by the Treaty of Moscow. The Treaty of Warsaw is significant because it indicates that Bonn is aware of the dangers inherent in revanchist policies. The doubt remains, however, that "the change of government does not obviously automatically invalidate all the West German aims . . . [and that] the aims of Brandt's government may well be the same as those of his predecessors. . . ."

604
Kraft, Joseph. THOSE ARABISTS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT. New York times magazine, Nov. 7, 1971: 38-39, 82, 88-89, 92, 94-96. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1971

Asserts that the "Arabists" in the State Department suffer from careerism, bureaucratic overcaution, and a biased view of the Arab-Israeli dispute. Kraft examines the parts played by various interests--U.S. Jews, the oil companies, the other Government departments, and the State Department's own Arabists--in the making of U.S. policy for the Middle East. In the Arabist view, "the Arabs represent an opportunity for the United States; Israel is a headache." Although their influence declined drastically from its peak in the immediate postwar years, the Arabists have experienced a mild resurgence under the Nixon Administration.

605
Kröger, Herbert. THE PRINCIPLE OF UNIVERSALITY AND THE EFFICACY OF THE UNITED NATIONS. German foreign policy, v. 10, no. 5, 1971: 400-409.
DD261.4.D353, v. 10

The ever-closer interrelationship of international problems and the worldwide consequences of international conflict demonstrate the urgent need for implementation of the often-endorsed U.N. principle of universality of membership. The German Democratic Republic, which has subscribed to the principles of the U.N. Charter since its founding, lays legal claim to membership in the United Nations and all its agencies on the basis of sovereign equality in the community of states. Although this claim has of late received increasing international support, the imperialist powers and their client states are bent on denying that membership. The West Germans, in particular, seek to discredit the sovereignty of the German Socialist state by characterizing their relations with the Democratic Republic as "intra-German." This obstructionist maneuver is only a variant of the old Hallstein Doctrine and it contradicts a declaration made by the Federal Republic at the time of the signing of the Treaty of Moscow.

606
Kyōzō, Mori. WHEN THE COLD WAR ENDS. Japan quarterly, v. 18, Oct./Dec. 1971: 392-401.
DS801.J274, v. 18

Argues that Japan must improve its relations with China without endangering American friendship. This effort must be based on a three-sided philosophy: "first, absolute denial of war, second, self-determination of peoples, and third, retrenchment and ultimate denial of state power." Kyōzō emphasizes that the people must be free to choose their own government and even to define their own country. The trend will be toward human rights rather than state power. Kyōzō rejects American policy in Asia and criticizes those Japanese who still feel they must practice a policy of rigid anticommunism.

607
Leacacos, John P. KISSINGER'S APPARAT. Foreign policy, winter 1971/72: 3-27.
N&CPR

Examines and evaluates Henry Kissinger's management of the National Security Council (NSC). Kissinger's approach, Leacacos asserts, has caused some revisions of foreign policy assumptions. The bureaucracy is forced to think hard by the detailed questions in its studies that he assigns and uses to formulate Presidential options. Kissinger takes special pride among the successful studies in those prepared for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). These studies "have virtually eliminated the narrow adversary approach to arms limitation . . . which used to provoke bitter intramural controversies leading to stultified international negotiations." The NSC studies identified four principles of military posture as guidelines for American SALT negotiators: need for a second-strike capability, need for stable forces invulnerable to sudden attack, "the requirement that the Russians not be allowed large leverage in the parity of inflicted damage," and adequate defense against threats from third countries. Leacacos states that the NSC prides itself on its contributions to the Berlin settlement and the new China policy. He adds that the principal weaknesses of the NSC system lie in the areas of international economics and foreign intelligence. "To date, Nixon's foreign policy record has indicated the seizure of opportunities, and so the NSC process that made those opportunities apparent must be judged a success." Included is a chronological listing of the dates and subjects of each of the 138 "National Security Study Memoranda" prepared between January 1969 and October 1971.

608
Lederer, Herbert. [PEACEFUL COLLABORATION--ON THE NEW U.S. POLICY OF THE MAO TSE-TUNG GROUP] Friedliche Kollaboration--zur neuen US-Politik der Mao Tse-Tung-Gruppe. Marxistische Blätter, v. 9, Sept./Oct. 1971: 8-12.
HX6.M32, v. 9

The anti-Socialist, anti-Soviet coloring of Maoist foreign policy was highlighted again when Peking accepted Nixon's visit request. The willingness of the Mao group to play into the hands of imperialist circles in Washington came at a time when Peking was congratulating Numeiri on his suppression of Sudanese Communists and abetting CIA bandits in their campaign against Ceylon's popular front government. This is not peaceful coexistence, a policy the Soviets have long urged and which the Maoists have rejected. It is collaboration with imperialism, for in the visit Washington seeks to retrieve its lost international initiative and to salvage its defeat in Southeast Asia. Putting out the welcome mat for the American President in Peking is sabotaging the efforts of all peoples struggling against U.S. imperialism.

609
Lippmann, Walter. THE WORLD WE'RE IN. New republic, v. 165, Nov. 13, 1971: 18-23.
AP2.N624, v. 165

"The conversation between Mr. Lippmann and his biographer, [Ronald] Steele, appeared in somewhat longer form in The Washington Post, October 10 and 17," 1971.

An interview with Walter Lippmann, who responds to questions on various aspects of current world affairs and U.S. foreign policy. The discussion ranges over recent changes in U.S. foreign policy vis-a-vis China; shifts in the global balance of power; problems in the Middle East; the Vietnamization policy; issues in the interpretation of postwar U.S. foreign policy; role of the military and the economy in the formulation of U.S. policy; the role of the Congress in policymaking; Nixon and Johnson as Presidents; the definition of the national interest; and technology and democracy. In Lippmann's view, the international system is evolving rapidly in the direction of a more stable and safer multipolar division of powers, with the United States, Japan, Communist China, the Soviet Union, and, perhaps, Western Europe as the principal actors. He recommends less activism on the part of the United States, suggesting that it abandon the "foolish globalism" of the postwar years.

610
Liu, Leo Y. CHINA'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS HER NUCLEAR WEAPONS. China report, v. 7, May/June 1971: 34-42.
DS777.55.C4484, v. 7

Traces the historical development of China's nuclear capability and of the official attitude towards nuclear weapons, concluding that China will become a formidable nuclear power in the next fifteen years. Liu cites official statements that have consistently stressed that all nuclear weapons should be destroyed, that China would never be the first to use nuclear weapons, and that China's nuclear weapons were for defense only. However, he thinks these statements outweighed by other statements showing the change in attitudes towards the effects of Chinese nuclear weapons on revolutionary wars and the effects of its nuclear tests on the great power nuclear monopoly. In 1964 China stated generally that its nuclear tests offered "encouragement to the revolutionary peoples," while in 1969 it asserted that the tests supported specific revolutions in Vietnam and Laos. Liu points out how after its first nuclear test China began to claim the breakup of the superpowers' nuclear monopoly and nuclear blackmail.

611
Livingston, Robert G. EAST GERMANY BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BONN. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 297-309.
D410.F6, v. 50

The recent Berlin Agreement "virtually ensures the emergence of the German Democratic Republic [GDR] as a full-fledged actor in the politics of European security." At the same time the NATO allies must assume that only the West German Government is the official representative of all Germans. The Brandt Government indicates, however, that it is willing to treat the GDR as though it were a state, thereby retaining self-determination for both sides and the distant possibility of future unity. The Socialist Unity Party of East Germany has steadily built a stable government; education- and science-oriented, it controls the populace by improving living standards, and popular sentiment has moved from its original hostility to positive loyalty. Despite its apparent stability, however, the GDR needs the Soviet Union for economic and political support. It is generally accepted that the GDR will achieve full international status, including U.N. membership. The Brandt Government agrees but hopes first to confirm by treaty the "special" relationship of the two Germanys.

612
Lukas, Anthony J. THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS—IS IT A CLUB? SEMINAR? PRESIDIUM? "INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT"? New York times magazine, Nov. 21, 1971: 34-35, 123-131, 138, 142. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1971

Considers the role of the Council on Foreign Relations in the formulation of American foreign policy. Membership of the Council includes most of those who have had a significant voice in foreign policy over the last 30 years. Influence on Washington officialdom is exerted not directly through the Council but indirectly through the intricate channels of "personal ties forged among men whose paths have crossed time and again in locker rooms, officers' messes, faculty clubs, embassy conference rooms, garden parties, squash courts and board rooms." Recently, the Council has come under fire for being too "establishment oriented." Some critics have saddled it with a large share of the blame for the Vietnam War, and many outside the organization and some inside would like to see major changes made in membership and political philosophy.

613
McMahon, William. PRIME MINISTER'S ADDRESS TO THE CITIZENS CLUB DINNER. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 42, May 1971: 269-274.
JX1162.A33, v. 42

Speech made at the Citizens Club dinner, Sydney, May 13, 1971.

Stresses that the change in relations with Japan, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China preceded the initiation of ping-pong diplomacy. While the United States and the United Kingdom will remain permanent and powerful friends, in an effort to build a peaceful world and a more powerful economy, Australia will extend its trade and other relationships with Japan and the Soviet Union. McMahon asserts that Australian establishment of relations with other states is done in order to achieve an advantage and does not reflect approval of a political system or national policies. The Prime Minister wants to open a dialog with China and proceed cautiously to normal relations. Cultural, artistic, economic and political ties will be made only if they serve Australian security and defense interests. McMahon stresses his desire to act only in the vital interests of Australia and to preserve political stability in the Pacific area.

614
McMahon, William. PRIME MINISTER'S SPEECH ON AUSTRALIA-JAPAN RELATIONS. In Australia. Dept. of External Affairs. Current notes on international affairs, v. 42, June 1971: 333-338.
JX1162.A33, v. 42

Speech to the Australian Institute of International Affairs in Sydney, June 12, 1971.

Emphasizes cooperation with Japan as offering the greatest material and political advantages for Australia and "for the political and economic betterment of the South-East Asian region." Australian objectives in closer relationships with Japan are to assure development of a broad-based Australian economy and an independent foreign policy, to give developing states scientific and technical aid to enable them to feel secure within the Pacific area, and to establish a stable relationship among the other major powers in the Pacific region--the United States, the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. McMahon stresses the importance of trade to the development of the close relations with Japan that will stabilize the Pacific region.

615
Majonica, Ernst. [BONN-PEKING; RELATIONS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY WITH THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] Bonn-Peking; die Beziehungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland zur Volksrepublik China. Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer [c1971] 259 p.
DD259.4.M267

Bibliography: p. 218-220.

Contents.--Preface, by Federal Foreign Minister Scheel.--Introduction.--Prior conditions.--Relations from 1949 to 1963.--The year 1964.--German-Chinese discussions.--The years 1965 to 1966.--China and German Ostpolitik.--Economic relations.--Evaluation.--Appendix.--Sources.--Bibliography.--Notes.

Documents the history of relations between Bonn and Peking since 1949 by hitherto unpublished information released from official German records. Majonica ascribes the limited relations between the two states to each's claim to an exclusive right to represent the whole nation and to Peking's diplomatic relations with East Germany. Majonica reveals that in 1964 the Federal Republic attempted to revive its stalled German policy through talks with Peking. The foundering of this endeavor was not a result of the German position, as is generally believed. Economic relationships have not been sufficient to lead to political understanding. Recent political moves by Bonn like the recognition of the existence of two German states have likewise failed to effect a change in Peking's position. Peking continues to support the German Democratic Republic's more extravagant demands and to view the Treaty of Moscow as a betrayal of East German interests.

616
Majonica, Ernst. [THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE GERMAN QUESTION] Die Volksrepublik China und die deutsche Frage. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Sept. 10, 1971: 599-607.
D839.E86, v. 26

Whatever benefits Moscow hurts Peking. It is from this general foreign policy principle that the People's Republic views the West German-Soviet renunciation-of-force agreement. Specifically, Peking sees the Moscow Treaty as strengthening the Soviet hand against China, selling out the German Democratic Republic, and providing another example of Moscow's indirect accommodation with the United States. In short, any Sino-German relationship is dependent on the state of Sino-Soviet and Sino-American relations. The Federal Republic should not entertain great expectations of establishing diplomatic relations with Peking. The Chinese are not yet ready, possibly because they wish to see first a normalization of relations between Bonn and East Berlin. A Bonn-Peking agreement should not be regarded as an anti-Soviet ploy, and the Federal Republic should not be intimidated by third parties from concluding such a bilateral arrangement.

617
Meier, Christian. [THE GERMAN QUESTION] Die deutsche Frage. Osteuropa, v. 21, Aug./Sept. 1971: 707-715. DR1.08, v. 21

The overall impression as regards the German question emerging from the 24th Soviet Party Con-

gress is that the Treaty of Moscow, when ratified, will fulfill three functional goals of Soviet foreign policy: consolidate the political and territorial status quo, serve as a model for future treaties between West Germany and Socialist states in Eastern Europe, and hasten preparations for a European security conference. To prod Bonn into speedy ratification, the Soviets may denounce West Germany as an enemy of the peace, seek anti-Bonn arrangements with France, exert pressure in the Berlin talks, or obstruct further efforts for détente. The Congress also revealed that the Soviet interest in the diplomatic recognition of the German Democratic Republic by the Federal Republic and the three Western powers is greater than ever. The Soviets see the international climate as propitious for settling the German question once and for all through international legal recognition of two independent German states.

618

Molchanov, IU. 24TH CONGRESS OF THE CPSU: THE INTERNATIONAL POSITION OF THE USSR AND CPSU FOREIGN POLICY TODAY. International affairs (Moscow) Sept. 1971: 68-75. D839.I465, 1971

Summarizes the present results and projects the future course of Soviet foreign policy as reported at the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The Congress fully approved the foreign policy of the Soviet Government, reaffirmed the basic principles of Leninist foreign policy, renewed the struggle against imperialism, and emphasized the major role played by the Soviet Union in preventing another world war. Also stressed was the importance of economic, scientific and technical as well as political cooperation between the Soviet Union and the other Socialist states. The comprehensive peace program set forth calls for a conference on European security and five-power talks on nuclear disarmament.

619

Newhouse, John. DE GAULLE AND THE ANGLO-SAXONS. London, Deutsch, 1970. 374 p. E183.8.F8N45 1970b

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Foreword.--On the eve of power.--The General.--Seeding the quarrel.--Allies at cross purposes.--The education of John F. Kennedy.--Nuclear aid to France--the great temptation.--The psychodrama of Skybolt and Rambouillet.--The Anglo-Saxons routed.--Contact with Moscow.--De Gaulle between the blocs.--Decline and departure.--Reference notes.--Index.

Discusses the relations between the United States, Great Britain, and France, focusing on the attitudes and policies adopted during De Gaulle's period by these nations and on the issues and events that most influenced their relations. Newhouse contends that although De Gaulle's quarrel with the United States over nuclear and strategic policies reflected a real doubt about America's commitment to the continent, his objective of guaranteeing West European security by France alone was unrealistic. Newhouse concludes that despite the mistakes made by British and American leaders during this period "there was never a possibility of doing serious business with de Gaulle on reasonable terms."

620

Niu, Sien-chong. JAPAN AND SOUTHEAST ASIA. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 63-71. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Evidence of Japan's growing impact in Southeast Asia is everywhere, and not surprisingly has produced some adverse reactions. The Japanese themselves, however, are uncertain about what course to follow, and while Japanese economic penetration grows apace, the political posture is still low profile. They cannot, of course, be indifferent to the political fate of the region, since they would be at the mercy of any power that gained control of its natural resources and vital sealanes. Should internal disturbances or local wars threaten Japanese interests there, and the United States be unwilling or unable to intervene, the Japanese would be faced with the difficult choice of whether or not to act on their own. For the moment, despite pressures to take a more active role in collective security, Japan probably will continue with its present defense policies. It would like to expand its political influence to a point commensurate with its economic power, but hopes to do so with nonmilitary means alone. Whether this course is a feasible one in today's world is open to question.

621

Olson, Lawrence A. JAPAN IN POSTWAR ASIA. New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Praeger Publishers [1970] 292 p. DS849.E3048 1970

Bibliography: p. 261-266.
Notes: p. 267-277.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Japan's return to Asia, 1952-64: The first steps: relations with Southeast Asia and India. The long wait: relations with China and Korea.--pt. 2. Japan and Asia, 1964-69: The level of rhetoric: Asia as seen from Tokyo. The level of action: Japanese activities in non-communist Asia. Conclusion: a look at the future.--Appendix table.--Bibliography.--Notes.--Index.

Describes "the slow, often only half-grasped searchings of the Japanese between 1952 and the present, as seen through the complex of their attitudes, actions, and policies vis-à-vis other Asian countries, for a national role expressive of Japan's true interests in the whole region." Olson finds two periods of Japanese interest in Asia, i.e., 1952-1964, and 1964 to the present. In both periods the primary considerations were

economic, but since 1964 political factors have been increasingly important. Olson concludes that "the question is not whether Japan should play a larger role in Asia," but what should be "the manner and spirit of the role."

622
OPPORTUNITY IN DEFEAT. Progressive, v. 35, Dec. 1971: 3-5. illus. AP2.P8655, v. 35

The seating of Peking in the United Nations and the U.S. Senate's rejection of the foreign aid bill signal the end of an era in U.S. foreign policy. The United States pursued its "psychotic perspective" right to the end by insisting on a seat for Taiwan and reacting petulantly when the nations of the world resisted U.S. pressure and laughed to see "a bully get his comeuppance." Similarly the Senate reacted against "Administration arm-twisting" and rejected aid that had been primarily military and only faintly economic. As Secretary of State Rogers emphasized, however, the United States does have a responsibility to assist the world's poor and deprived, but the aid should be effective and never employed "to thwart the wishes of oppressed and exploited peoples." If the United Nations were to administer the American economic aid program, it might insure efficient delivery and keep the United States out of international arms dealing. The impact of the two votes of the last week in October should convince the United States of the need for change.

623
Pahl-Rugenstein, Manfred. [NIXON, MAO AND THE EXIGENCIES OF DÉTENTE] Nixon, Mao und die Erfordernisse der Entspannung. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Aug. 1971: 785-792. D839.B57, v. 16

Recent disclosures in the United States demonstrate the gap between Washington's publicly stated policies and its covert intentions. The Pentagon papers reveal how poorly the vaunted American democracy really works and how American administrations flout the interests of their allies. President Nixon's announced visit to Peking reveals an attempt to postpone the end of the Vietnamese fighting until that visit and then to arrange with China an Indochina conference to win politically what the United States could not win on the battlefield. Nixon's failure to consult with Japan and his European allies before the announcement should teach the German Federal Republic not to rely on the United States. In the interests of European coexistence and cooperation, Bonn should recognize the German Democratic Republic and participate in the proposed European security conference.

624
Pavić, Radovan. SINO-US RELATIONS AND THE GEOSTRATEGICAL IMPORTANCE OF TAIWAN. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Sept. 20, 1971: 22-23. D839.R4, v. 22

"There must be no mistake about certain things--relaxation of tensions between the USA and the People's Republic of China does not mean that the United States has lost interest in Taiwan." However, China has an historically legitimate claim to Taiwan. China's acquisition of Taiwan will be delayed by the American desire to maintain Taiwan as a link in its defensive encirclement of China rather than by American amity with Nationalist China. The geostrategical importance of Taiwan in international politics lies in its roles as a refuge near the mainland that is yet far enough away for independent existence, as a potential offensive base against China, and as a locus for the political presence of the United States in Asia.

625
Peck, Joachim. THE GDR AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY. United Asia, v. 23, Mar./Apr. 1971: 88-89. DS1.U55, v. 23

Without recognition of the German Democratic Republic as a legitimate member of the international community, there is little hope or chance for security and a relaxation of tensions in Europe or the rest of the world. Nations must refrain from judging the attitudes of other states in setting up the criteria for acknowledging a state's existence. "Such behavior would only result in replacing general modern international law by anarchy and arbitrariness in the international arena."

626
Polianov, N. EUROPEAN REALITIES AND PROSPECTS. International affairs (Moscow) Sept. 1971: 3-10, 18. D839.I465, 1971

Discusses the implications of and reactions to the European foreign policy initiatives suggested by the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Polianov explains how the Soviet Union's initiation of a political dialog with the capitalist states of Europe makes Washington fear a loss of influence on European affairs. He thinks the U.S. position in Europe has slipped because European realities have changed since the formation of NATO, which prevents good relations from developing between its members and Socialist states. Polianov describes the agenda of the proposed European security conference, notes the American objections to such a conference and asserts that many European states favor a conference but are deterred by U.S. and NATO intransigence.

627
Ra'anan, Uri. SOVIET GLOBAL POLICY AND THE MIDDLE EAST. Naval War College review, v. 24, Sept. 1971: 19-29. illus. N&CPR

The Khrushchev strategy for extending Soviet influence into the Third World was based on the assumption that America would be reluctant to use

its great military power. While they were busy developing a first-strike capacity, the Soviets attempted to create the impression that the balance of world power was tipping to the East. Once they had achieved that position they thought that a "combination of international and domestic factors in the West could be expected to hamper or paralyze an already weakened Western will to the point at which American nuclear weapons would become practically irrelevant." Unlike earlier Soviet strategists, Khrushchev did not think in terms of appeasement or a permanent partition of the globe. He planned to win influence gradually with the emerging regimes in Afro-Asia that showed anti-Western tendencies. Although Soviet prestige has suffered occasional setbacks, the Kremlin still seeks "to change the world's perception of the Russo-American balance of power." It runs the risk, however, of miscalculating American will and determination with grave consequences.

628
Reischauer, Edwin O. FATEFUL TRIANGLE--THE UNITED STATES, JAPAN AND CHINA. New York times magazine, Sept. 19, 1971: 12-13, 46, 48, 55, 58. illus.
AP2.N6575, 1971

Any improvement in Sino-American relations should not be made at the cost of weakening the Japanese-American relationship that has been strained by recent U.S. economic and foreign policy announcements. The United States and Japan must continue to strengthen their friendship. The only promising approach to China for either Washington or Tokyo would be based on coordination and consultation between the two capitals. Despite their differences, Japan and the United States have similar views of the world, especially of international security, and "if two countries with such fundamentally compatible views of the world cannot cooperate fully and easily, the prospects for humanity are indeed bleak."

629
Reshetar, John S. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY. In his The Soviet polity; government and politics in the U.S.S.R. New York, Dodd, Mead, 1971: 298-335.
JN6515 1971.R47
Bibliography for chapter cited: p. 388-391.

Chapter on Soviet foreign policies and relations in a work intended "to provide a reasonably thorough but relatively brief general exposition and discussion of Soviet politics." Reshetar discusses objectives, motives, organization, and tactics of Soviet foreign policy, as well as the Soviet view of international law, international organizations, and peaceful coexistence.

630
REVOLUTIONARY RHETORIC AND PEOPLE'S DIPLOMACY. Current scene, v. 9, Aug. 7, 1971: 9-10.
DS701.C9, v. 9

Peking's new diplomacy has had no apparent effect on its public support of revolution, especially in Southeast Asia. While the Chinese met with national leaders, Chinese pronouncements almost simultaneously praised revolutionary activities in the same leaders' countries. This continuing rhetorical theme may be intended to reassure the North Vietnamese and North Koreans. But Peking has long differentiated the relations between governments from those between peoples, and the apparent change of policy is probably more dictated by expediency than by new attitudes.

631
Roberts, Frank. THE GERMAN-SOVIET TREATY AND ITS EFFECTS ON EUROPEAN AND ATLANTIC POLICIES: A BRITISH VIEW. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 9, summer 1971: 184-195.
D839.A85, v. 9
"From an article originally published in Affari Esteri, Rome." D839.E812

The chief significance of the Soviet-West German, or Moscow Treaty, is the opening it gives to an improvement in relations between the Federal Republic and Poland and the other countries of Eastern Europe. West Germany has not conceded anything to the Soviet Union that was not already irrevocably lost by World War II. In return, it has won Soviet acceptance of West Germany's position in NATO and Soviet renunciation of an alleged right to intervene in West Germany's domestic affairs, as well as the above-mentioned opening to the East. As for the other Western powers, the new Ostpolitik poses no danger "provided of course European and Atlantic policies continue to be pursued on present lines and Germany does not therefore risk isolation, either through the withdrawal of the U.S.A. from Europe and the consequent collapse of NATO, or through the failure of the present renewed attempts to complete and enlarge the European Community."

632
Robinson, Thomas W. CHOU EN-LAI: A STATEMENT OF HIS POLITICAL "STYLE," WITH COMPARISONS WITH MAO TSE-TUNG AND LIN PIAO. [Santa Monica, Calif.] Rand Corp., 1970. 22 p. ([Rand Corporation. Paper] P-4474) AS36.R28 no. 4474
Paper prepared for publication in The Asian Survey, Dec. 1970. DS1.A492, v. 10
Includes bibliographical references.

Describes Chou En-Lai's political style by generalizing from an analysis of his role in the first year of the Cultural Revolution, compares the political styles of Chou, Mao Tse-Tung and Lin Piao, and speculates on Chou's future after Mao.

633
Rogers, William P. U.S. SETS A NEW COURSE. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Nov. 22, 1971: 30-34. illus. JK1.U65, v. 71

An interview with Secretary of State William P. Rogers, who responds to questions concerning recent changes in U.S. foreign policy, especially in regard to world trade and relations with the People's Republic of China. Trade policy, foreign aid, relations with allies, the Soviet Union, and Communist China, the Indo-Pakistani and Arab-Israeli disputes, the Nixon Doctrine, and public opinion at home are among the matters discussed. Rogers warns that it can no longer be taken for granted that the United States automatically will assume additional economic and defense burdens in order to compensate for the failings of friends and allies. In the future, other nations will be expected to bear their fair share of the costs of international security and economic prosperity.

634
Rostow, Walt W. WILL WE SNATCH DEFEAT FROM THE JAWS OF VICTORY? Naval War College review, v. 24, Sept. 1971: 3-18. illus.
N&CPR
"A lecture delivered at the Naval War College."

Defines "victory" not in military terms but as a "stable peace," and asks what the United States can do to secure that goal. Rostow reviews the recent history of world politics, explores the arms race, and emphasizes advances in peace including the test ban treaty, the nonproliferation treaty and the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. He warns that progress towards peace could be dangerously set back by a rapid U.S. withdrawal from its Asian commitments. Oscillation is not a viable formula for world peace; firm, responsible commitments cannot be avoided. Rostow finds promising trends throughout the world but warns that the American people must get their domestic economy in order so that they will be prepared to play a "critical role at the margin of world affairs."

635
Šaranović, Mihailo. JAPAN AND THE SINO-AMERICAN DIALOGUE. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Sept. 20, 1971: 20-22.
D839.R4, v. 22

President Nixon's announced trip to China and recent changes in the conduct of American international finance and trade do not indicate a cooling off of Japanese-American relations. On the contrary, they involve "no more than a temporary setback" because Japan will become America's political representative in the Far East after the United States has withdrawn militarily. The President's trip caused Japan to intensify efforts to establish its own political contacts with China in order to avoid any surprise Sino-American agreements. In any case, Nixon's visit has already produced spectacular results simply by having been announced. China's refusal to advocate actively the political causes of other Asian nations in her negotiations with the United States is a progressive step that will stimulate the nonalinement movement.

636
Schenke, Wolf. [WILLY BRANDT'S OSTPOLITIK] Willy Brandts Ostpolitik. Neue Politik, v. 16, Oct. 2, 1971: 3-4. H5.N377, v. 16

Bonn's improving relations with the Soviet Union, stemming from Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, and the Soviet Union's desire for stability and détente in Europe, stemming from its fears of China, the Sino-American rapprochement, and the emergence of new superpower configurations, have strengthened the international political position of the German Federal Republic. In fact, the Soviets regard West Germany as the surrogate for the West European bloc. West Germany should exercise its newly-won political influence judiciously in defense of German interests, one of which is surely the establishment of diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China.

637
Schlegel, Dietrich. [ROMANIAN POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS MOSCOW] Rumänische Positionen gegenüber Moskau. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Sept. 1971: 541-552.
D839.A885, v. 22

Romania's renewal of its treaty of friendship and assistance with the Soviet Union and its participation in a meeting of Warsaw Pact defense ministers do not presage a reconciliation with Moscow. These gestures--part of Bucharest's precarious international balancing act--are offset by an exchange of high-level visits with Peking, acceptance of a $250 million credit from the Chinese, and continuing reaffirmations of Romanian independence. Romania owes its freedom of action to the prolonged Sino-Soviet conflict. Despite the Soviet policy of intimidation, the Romanians feel the repercussions of a direct attack against them sufficient to deter Soviet action. As insurance against application of the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Romanians follow a hard-line Communist domestic policy. Romania's independent foreign policy, however, may face a greater threat from within its borders than from across them, for foreign policy is no substitute for domestic policy. Many Romanians might prefer to follow the Hungarian example: less sovereignty and more personal freedom in daily life.

638
Schumann, Maurice. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 38, Nov. 1, 1971: 45-49.
PN6121.V52, v. 38
"Delivered to the 26th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, New York, October 4, 1971."

Clarifies the philosophy underlying French foreign policy by asserting that support for national independence of nations is "the manifestation of a profound solidarity" and resistance toward any hegemony contributes to the development of a true international community. Schumann suggests the

potential benefits to come from a European conference and emphasizes the link between security and cooperation. For its own security France has provided itself with the means of deterrence, and so has avoided being forced to join a power bloc. Schumann repeats that France stands for the "existence of national entities--that is, organized, sovereign and, lastly, equal nations," each having the right to form or reject alliances without compulsion and each taking its place in a true world community.

639
Seminar on Canadian-American Relations, 9th, University of Windsor, 1967. CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE WORLD OF THE SEVENTIES; PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH ANNUAL UNIVERSITY OF WINDSOR SEMINAR ON CANADIAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS 1967. Edited by R. H. Wagenberg. Windsor, Ont., University of Windsor Press [1970] 98 p.
E840.S38 1967

Deals with the still unresolved international problems of the late 1960's which affect the United States and Canada: the future of NATO and of the Atlantic political environment, the international monetary crisis, international trade arrangements, the Vietnam War, relations with China and the Third World, and the development of processes for the management of international conflict.

640
A SLOWER BOAT TO CHINA. Economist, v. 240, Sept. 11, 1971: 14-15. illus.
HG11.E2, v. 240

As the United States relaxes its attitude toward Communist China, Australia is forced to examine its position and to question its defense policy, economic program, and political role in the region. Preliminary steps towards negotiations with China have already been taken, although Australia must stay on friendly terms with Taiwan and Japan, the latter alliance being important economically. It is unlikely that Australia's "small but highly mobile" armed forces will be enlarged as long as the superpower balance seems fairly stable. Australia will seem to be more on its own, however, and "greater autonomy from the powers that used to hold the leading-reins also means greater risks."

641
Smirnov, N. AN IMPORTANT FACTOR OF PEACE AND SECURITY. International affairs (Moscow) Nov. 1971: 89-92.
D839.I465, 1971

Why is the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation between India and the Soviet Union of so much interest to other nations of the world? The Treaty is a natural step in the continuing consolidation of friendly ties between the two states. Indian foreign policy aims at a policy of peaceful coexistence and is commonly called "positive neutralism." Since both India and the Soviet Union seek the goals of peace and cooperation among the states, the Treaty is a logical affirmation of those goals. The Treaty in no way refutes the Indian policy of nonalinement but is instead an important step in strengthening that policy.

642
Ständiges Internationales Komitee für die Anerkennung der DDR. [GDR--RECOGNITION NOW] DDR--Anerkennung jetzt. [1971] 102 p. (Konferenz von Helsinki)
DD261.4.D18
"Published by the Standing Committee for the Recognition of the GDR."

Contents.--Introduction, by Stellan Arvidson.--European security and the recognition of the GDR, by Maurice Lambilliotte.--The antifascist GDR--a guarantee for peace in Europe, by Arialdo Banfi.--Recognition of the GDR--now! by William Wilson.--The neutral states and the German question, by Ulf Sundquist.--International law and security interests demand the prompt recognition of the GDR, by Gunnar Skaug.--Admitting the GDR into the U.N., by R. Charvin and R. Weyl.--The necessity for relations of friendly coexistence between the GDR and the FRG, by G. Füllberth and W. Abendroth.--Documents.

Articles demanding immediate international legal recognition of the German Democratic Republic and flailing the Federal Republic of Germany for not extending that recognition. Arvidson's introduction claims that the peace in Europe is endangered so long as Bonn retains any vestige of the Hallstein Doctrine. The easiest way to induce West Germany to recognize its sovereign neighbor to the East, the writer continues, is for other states to recognize the GDR and then pressure Bonn to do likewise.

643
Steel, Ronald. A SPHERES OF INFLUENCE POLICY. Foreign policy, winter 1971/72.
N&CPR

The United States must recognize other great powers' spheres of influence and reject the policy of maintaining the balance of power by achieving a preponderance of American power in every area in which it is exercised. The belief that America can insure world stability and intervene anywhere to prevent a nuclear holocaust is hard to take seriously in view of the Dominican invasion, the Cuban missile crisis, and the Vietnam War. A viable alternative to global interventionism could be a mature spheres of influence policy in which the world balance of power would rest on several relatively equal power groupings--the United States, Western Europe, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China. The guiding principles of such a policy would include: neutrality toward all revolutionary movements, cessation of military assistance to repressive governments, and avoidance of all military alliances. It is urgent that the United

States turn from the morally corrupting imperialism of Pax Americana to solving its own problems at home. It can do this if it pursues a policy of internationalism based on cooperation rather than force.

644
"SUPER-B" AND THE NEW SOVIET SURGE. Newsweek, v. 78, Nov. 1, 1971: 29-32. illus.
AP2.N6772, v. 78

Under the astute managerial direction of Leonid Brezhnev, the Soviet Union has "orchestrated a huge military buildup" and waged an activist foreign policy commensurate with a nuclear arsenal second to none. The two-fold purpose of this policy is to exploit every American weakness and to parry any threat from China. Yet Brezhnev has exercised restraint and sobriety. The Soviet Union cautiously avoided overreacting to the American involvement in Vietnam and has displayed no readiness to become directly embroiled in a conflict in the Middle East. "This blend of aggressiveness and accommodation could take Moscow far in the game of nations." Although Brezhnev has successfully guided his country to this new pinnacle of military and diplomatic power, he has had to sacrifice the Soviet economy, especially in the fields of civilian technology and trade. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, however, give the Soviet Union an opportunity to reduce the costs of the arms race and reallocate those resources to modernize its economy. Nevertheless, the huge Soviet nuclear capability is a source of great concern to American strategists. While there is no reason to believe that the Soviets are preparing for a first strike, there is apprehension that they might "invoke the danger of a 'Cuban missile crisis in reverse,'" blackmailing the West into concessions in some contested area. Increased Soviet self-confidence may result, however, in a greater willingness for negotiating on old stalemates.

645
TABLE TALK/REQUIEM FOR THE COLD WAR? Center magazine, v. 4, Sept./Oct. 1971: 51-57. illus.
N&CPR

Round table discussion sponsored by the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions that analyzes the cold war and its influence on American foreign policy. Among the issues discussed are the effect of the Nixon Doctrine on cold-war policies, West Germany's Ostpolitik in relation to the Mansfield Amendment, the Berlin question, arms control negotiations, and the future orientation of West Germany and Japan.

646
Terrill, Ross. THE 800,000,000, PART II: CHINA AND THE WORLD. Atlantic monthly, v. 229, Jan. 1972: 39-54, 57-62. illus.
AP2.A8, v. 229

Explores Chinese foreign policies and perceptions of the world and, in particular, describes talks between Chou En-lai and the Australian labor leader, E. Gough Whitlaw, with regard to three Chinese adversaries--Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Japan is apparently foremost in the thoughts of the Premier, who sees Japanese militarism as a rising threat that the superpowers are not controlling. Currently, however, the "military encirclement of China is by Russia," and Chou made veiled allusions to the deceitfulness of his "northern neighbor" and "ally." The United States may be a potential threat but, in the words of one Government strategist, "America no longer has the capacity to work its will in Asia" and its troops are too expensive to maintain as a controlling force. Nuclear power cannot effectively change the world unless it is feared. The Chinese do not fear, for they believe the "flagging will" of the United States would never actually permit the dropping of bombs. Terrill also reports that he was quizzed about American policies and the thought patterns of Henry Kissinger.

647
Thomas, John R. SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY AND THE MILITARY. Survey, v. 17, summer 1971: 129-156.
DK1.S549, v. 17

Illustrates by reference to major Soviet foreign policy problems with Czechoslovakia, China, the Middle East, and the Germanys "that while the Soviet military have of necessity been drawn into policy-making, because of the strategic and national security implications of the current major foreign policy problems confronting the Soviet Union, they not only do not have the decisive voice in formulating policy but in many instances have basic reservations about the external policies fashioned and executed by the current political leadership." Thomas concludes that Soviet foreign policy is made by the political leaders who have aroused military opposition because they have put the Soviet Union in a potentially dangerous situation from the military viewpoint. He suggests that the current Soviet political leadership might be replaced for this reason.

648
Tussing, A. Dale. EDUCATION, FOREIGN POLICY AND THE POPEYE SYNDROME. Change magazine, v. 3, Oct. 1971: 18-26. illus.
LB2300.C4, v. 3

Americans' basic attitudes toward conflict and violence can be explained by the Popeye myth. Popeye, the good guy, is attacked without provocation by a bad guy who, using unfair tactics, is a serious threat until Popeye manages to fortify himself with a can of spinach and assert himself by knocking out his opponent. "The Popeye syndrome translates readily and without significant alterations into foreign policy." The United States views itself as operating on high moral principles in a world where other governments are

less moral and often evil. The Soviet Union is a typical villain, "a dictatorship, aggressively expansionist, Communist, and godless." The Vietnam War followed the Popeye theme--the Tonkin Gulf incidents were called unprovoked attacks on the United States, and the bombing in response was designed to end the conflict quickly. The U.S. inability to bring about a quick end has led some critics to reverse their views and consider the United States the evil aggressor. It is not clear whether a reappraisal of American foreign philosophy will follow from this shift.

649
UNDERSTANDING U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS. Indiantown, Fla., Center for War/Peace Studies of the New York Friends Group, Inc., Nov. 1971. 72 p. (Intercom, Occasional paper no. 68)
Z7164.I8I48, no. 68

Contents.--A skeletal chronology of 20th-century China.--A new U.S. policy toward China; condensation of the book, by A. Doak Barnett.--Three high school teaching units on China.--Syllabi, curriculum guides, and resource units on China.--Annotated bibliography.--Audio-visual materials on China (annotated).--Organizational resources.--National Committee on United States-China relations.

A resource and program guide to Sino-American relations for teachers, community leaders, and others who have a responsibility for public education in international affairs. This issue was prepared to meet the demands that will be placed on educators by China's bid for U.N. membership, the U.S. President's visit to Peking, and other developments that will keep U.S.-China relations in the forefront of the news for some time to come.

650
Ushiba, Nobuhiko. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES: IMPACT ON THE ASIAN-PACIFIC REGION. Air University review, v. 22, Sept./Oct. 1971: 2-16. illus.
TL501.A5574, v. 22

Assessment of Japan's future role as a nonmilitary superpower in the maintenance of peace, centering upon Japanese-American relations and the future stability of the Asian Pacific region. The strategic environment in which Japan finds itself and certain assumptions held by the Japanese with respect to that environment are discussed. Ushiba asserts that since Japan does not have the military potential to influence the strategic equation in the Asian Pacific region in the 1970's, its acquisition of nuclear weapons would not add to the stability of the existing nuclear triangle of the United States, the Soviet Union, and Communist China. He concludes that Japan can make peace less precarious in the future and that Tokyo and Washington must never lose sight of the agreement of their interests, especially in a peaceful and stable international system.

651
Van Ness, Peter. REVOLUTION AND CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY; PEKING'S SUPPORT FOR WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1970. 266 p.
DS740.4.V34 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction: Chinese foreign policy, 1949-1969.--pt. 1. Revolution in theory; the ideology of the national liberation struggle: Peking's view of the world. Facing the enemy. China's program for revolution.--pt. 2. Revolution in practice; Chinese support for wars of national liberation, 1965: Endorsement of revolutions. Relations with revolutionary movements. Selection of targets for revolution. Support for wars of national liberation.--pt. 3. The great proletarian cultural revolution and Chinese foreign policy: The cultural revolution.--Conclusion.--Bibliographical note.--Index.

Examines China's revolutionary ideology and experience as expressed in its foreign policies and pronouncements about other nations. Van Ness first presents the Maoist theory of national liberation. He then surveys Chinese support for foreign national liberation movements and revolutionary activities during a single year, 1965, carrying his examination through the cultural revolution. Van Ness finds that the Chinese use support of revolutionary movements primarily as a way "to punish governments that do not prove amenable to adopting pro-Peking foreign policies and to serve as a threat to those governments that might waver or be undecided in their future foreign policy orientations," while the goal of seeking "to replicate the Chinese revolutionary experience and to help legitimate Mao Tse-tung's claim to having devised a revolutionary strategy suitable to conditions for all of the Third World" is given lip service only. During the cultural revolution, however, this goal was preeminent, at the cost of gravely damaging China's national interests and adversely affecting its longer-term and broader national goals of reducing U.S. global influence and achieving a radical new international order.

652
Vandenbosch, Amry. SOUTH AFRICA'S OUTWARD POLICY. Virginia quarterly review, v. 47, autumn 1971: 518-536.
AP2.V76, v. 47

South Africa has long been interested in acquiring additional territory, mainly the black-populated British protectorates, or in having some kind of control on the new black states placed in its hands prior to their independence. Prime Minister Vorster reversed his predecessor's policy of cold war with black Africa and began attempting to reach accommodations with the hostile states. In return for acceptance of South Africa as it is--including its apartheid policy--the black states are promised development aid and beneficial trade arrangements. Some African states have responded favorably, but others have reaffirmed their un-

yielding hostility. The black-ruled nations bordering and surrounded by South Africa are tied to Pretoria by economic necessity, but, because of their total economic dependency, may well prove to be major headaches for the Afrikaner regime. "The basic question is whether a prosperous economic community of southern African countries can be built within the context of profound political differences."

653
Varma, Shanti P. STRUGGLE FOR THE HIMALAYAS; A STUDY IN SINO-INDIAN RELATIONS. New Delhi, Sterling Publishers [1971] 316 p.
DS480.85.V3 1971
2d ed., completely revised and enlarged.
Bibliography: p. [308]-312.

Contents.--pt. 1. Historical background: India, China and Tibet. High tide of Sino-Indian friendship. The Bandung Conference. India's China policy.--pt. 2. The fateful years: China's thrust into the Himalayas. Dispute over frontiers. Military build-up and diplomatic alignments. India's consolidation of relations with neighbours.--pt. 3. The Chinese invasion and after: Tactics of confrontation. China's military invasion of India. Motives behind Chinese invasion. India's response to Chinese aggression. India's foreign policy: a review. Defence, development and diplomacy.--Index.

History of Sino-Indian relations that examines the events leading up to the 1962 border dispute and post-war Indian foreign policies and programs.

654
Vukadinović, Radovan. AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Sept. 20, 1971: 23-26.
D839.R4, v. 22

After World War I American trade unions became prominent and permanent factors in the formation of foreign policy. Since World War II trade union leaders have become a formidable conservative force in foreign policy formulation and have remained "faithful to traditional cold-war concepts." American trade unions involve themselves directly in foreign political activities and follow a precisely outlined political program which includes the education of thousands of foreign trade union leaders in the United States to fight communism and rival trade union movements. The trade unions alined themselves completely with the foreign policy of the American military-industrial complex--accepting the strong anti-Communist line, the cold war and the need to keep the American military engaged around the world. Until the position of trade unions in American capitalist society changes there will be no change in their cold war approach to international relations.

655
WAR IN ASIA--FAILURE OF U.S. DIPLOMACY? WHITE HOUSE ANSWERS CRITICS. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Dec. 1971: 68-70. JK1.U65, v. 71

Excerpts from a speech on the Senate floor by Senator Edward M. Kennedy criticizing Administration policy in handling the Indo-Pakistani crisis, together with a rebuttal to these and similar criticisms by an unidentified White House official. Kennedy accuses the Administration of having failed to act promptly and vigorously to avert the outbreak of war, of being far too sensitive to the viewpoint of the West Pakistani Government, and of ignoring the acts of military repression in East Pakistan that provoked the Indian intervention. The Administration spokesman defends Government efforts to find a solution to the crisis, and denies that the Government ever condoned political repression in East Pakistan. In regard to the war, the Government view is that India resorted to military action without sufficient cause in what amounted to "an attempt to dismember a sovereign state and a member of the United Nations."

656
Whiting, Allen S. WHAT NIXON MUST DO TO MAKE FRIENDS IN PEKING. New York review of books, v. 27, Oct. 7, 1971: 10-15.
AP2.N655, v. 27

President Nixon's forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China will accomplish little unless both sides are willing to make concrete concessions regarding the status of Taiwan and U.S. support for Chiang Kai-shek. U.S. military assistance to Taiwan is public knowledge, but evidence now available, much of it derived from the just-published Pentagon papers, indicates that the United States not only has approved and encouraged, but, through the use of air power, has actively assisted a clandestine Nationalist campaign of infiltration and sabotage on the Chinese mainland from the maritime provinces to Tibet. Understandably enough, Communist Chinese security concerns have been aroused. Until the United States makes clear that Taiwan lies outside the sphere of its security interests, neither Communist China nor Taiwan will be inclined to take seriously American hints that it wants to see the future of the island settled peacefully by the two Chinese antagonists themselves. After Taiwan, the most pressing issues lie in the critical Northeast area, where Korea is a focus of concern. An arrangement to stabilize the situation in that country--a four-power nonaggression pact, or, as the Chinese themselves have suggested, a nuclear-free zone--would, among other benefits, reduce the pressure on Japan to acquire nuclear weapons. If the U.S. Administration can find the courage to change longstanding policies, and "should the Chinese reciprocate by adjusting their own policies, the conversations in Peking could usher in the first decade of peace in the Pacific in the twentieth century."

657
Wolfe, James H. BONN'S STRUGGLE FOR DÉTENTE. Central Europe journal, v. 19, Nov. 1971: 355-357. DB200.7.S74, v. 19

Summarizes East-West German relations from 1961 to 1971 with special emphasis on Bonn's policy of détente. Wolfe iterates the secondary theme of Chancellor Brandt's Ostpolitik, that "of penetrating the barriers which divide the German nation," of supporting the rights of all Germans and improving the quality of life in the German Democratic Republic. The Chancellor has been rebuffed in these efforts, Wolfe thinks, and East Germany remains uncompromising, seeking only de jure recognition from the Federal Republic. Wolfe concludes that the "leadership across the Wall has only a dubious interest in détente."

658
Young, Kenneth T. THAILAND AND MULTIPOLARITY. Current history, v. 61, Dec. 1971: 327-331, 364-365. D410.C82, v. 61

Thailand already is actively anticipating the multipolarity now emerging in Asia. "Multiple diplomacy is as natural to Thailand as blades to a fan." The country suffers from insurgency and "pools of rebellion" that make the Thais increasingly sensitive to international shifts. In particular, current U.S. policy has been interpreted by Bangkok as a public insult. There are fears of eventual American disengagement and withdrawal and questions of how long its defense commitments will be honored. Recognition of the difficulties that will accompany major power shifts has sent the Thais to talk to Peking and Hanoi where their overtures have not been rejected. They are also cultivating economic dealings with the Soviets and contemplating the role the Soviets might play as a counterweight against China's growing power. Japan also is recognized in Thai diplomacy, since both countries suffer from uncertainty about American intentions, and Japan will probably become a major power. Thailand influences other Southeast Asian countries who watch its diplomatic strategy and whose attitudes and policies may well be affected by the accommodations Thailand works out.

659
Yu, Chong-yŏl. KOREA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN EAST ASIA DURING THE 1970S. Korea journal, v. 11, Apr. 1971: 11-12. DS901.K7, v. 11

The power of Communist China and the potential power of a rearmed Japan are significant factors in the development of Korean foreign policy. Because North Korea could not take over South Korea without Chinese assistance, the alliance and defense systems entered into were all aimed at checking China. The U.S. pullback from Asia is bringing an end to the old alliance system. South Korea, whose security policy was founded on the commanding American presence, must now seek regional defensive groupings on a basis of an equality of partners. South Korea "needs to formulate a foreign policy in such a way as to prevent its isolation, and to shift its foreign policy emphasis to co-operative diplomacy with Asian nations on an equal basis, withdrawing the priority given to relations with Japan and the United States."

660
Zagladin, Vadim. TURNING POINT. New times, Nov. 1971: 4-6. illus. D839.N483, 1971

The visit of Leonid Brezhnev to France marks a turning away in European history from postwar tension to an era of lasting peace and cooperation. The shift of balance of forces in favor of the Soviet Union and the increasing unity of the Socialist countries have paved the way to strengthen European security. Soviet-Franch relations have steadily improved since de Gaulle's 1966 visit to the Soviet Union. "The U.S.S.R. and France were the pathfinders of a new European policy as regards relations between states with different social systems." The Soviet-French Declaration of October 1971 stresses the importance of a conference on European security and embodies bilateral principles which if extended to all European relationships would bring European peace.

TENSION AREAS

661
Abramowitz, Morton. MOVING THE GLACIER: THE TWO KOREAS AND THE POWERS. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 26 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 80) U162.A3, no. 80

Contents.--Introduction.--The major changes.--Implications of change for policy makers.--North v. South--policies towards each other.--The policy choices.

Assesses the impact of some recent changes in international politics on the problem of the two Koreas, and offers recommendations to U.S. policymakers as to how best to meet the altered situation. The Korean problem has been changed profoundly by the emergence of a powerful South Korean state, the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the reestablishment of a Japanese presence in the peninsula, the partial withdrawal of U.S. military power, and the moves toward an accommodation between the United States and Communist China. The danger now is that further weakening of the U.S. deterrent will trigger a renewal of hostilities between the North and South, and both political and military means must be employed to avert this eventuality. Faced with a new situation, the United States can continue to act along present lines, place greater reliance on Japan, or, preferably, combine a diplomatic effort aimed at relieving tensions with a commitment to prolong its military presence.

662
Baldwin, David A. THINKING ABOUT THREATS. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, Mar. 1971: 71-78.
JX1901.J6, v. 15

Argues that "threats pervade human relations and should not be discussed solely in terms of nuclear deterrence or game theory." Baldwin focuses on the broader context within which threats are perceived. He discusses the basic concept of threat, threats versus promises, the coerciveness and the costs of threats, the role of ambiguity in threat relationships, and the relation of threats to deterrence policies. Baldwin concludes that bargaining theory is a useful instrument in international political analysis and that the lack of a science of threat systems is dangerous to world peace.

663
THE CHALLENGE OF BANGLA DESH; A SPECIAL DEBATE. Edited by Pran Chopra. New York, Humanities Press [1971] 159 p. (Popular books)
DS485.B492C47
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction: The stakes for India, by Pran Chopra.--Political confrontation: from the partition to Yahya Khan, by Sisir Gupta. From martial law to Bangla Desh, by Mohammed Ayoob.--Military conflict: Into battle--unarmed, by R. Rama Rao. The strategic fall-out, by Rathy Sawhny.--Internal colonialism: Planning for disparity, by Arjun Sengupta.--External frame: Shadow of the big powers, by V. P. Dutt.--Critical base: Tremors in West Pakistan, by Dewan Berindranath.--Appendix: Conflict in East Pakistan, by Edward S. Mason, Robert Dorfman, and Stephen A. Marglin.

Collection of articles chronicling the development of the East Pakistani crisis from the partition to the alleged repression of spring 1971, outlining the impact on India, and criticizing American preference for stable but nondemocratic Asian regimes. Although a cultural gap between the two wings of Pakistan may have contributed to the crisis, Chopra claims that "the more basic reason was the dictatorial nature of the ruling West Pakistani coterie and the power of the mailed fist which was given to it--in the name of democracy!--by the United States and Britain." Chopra concludes that the independence of East Pakistan is inevitable.

664
DAYAN'S NEW INITIATIVE. New Middle East, no. 37, Oct. 1971: 32-34. illus.
DS63.1.N48, 1971
Text of an address to the Israel Army Command and Staff College on Aug. 19, 1971 and explanatory comments from a broadcast interview reproduced by the Jerusalem Post, Aug. 27, 1971.

Stresses the need for administrative measures in such disputed territory as the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since Israel does not plan to get out of these areas, it must assume the role of a responsible and established government. In this governing position Israel must "devise a pattern of living and situations" which can at least be tolerated if not liked by the Arabs. The political status of the inhabitants will eventually be clarified, but the current situation is tolerable as a transitional phase. In a second explanatory interview Dayan reemphasized his belief that Israel must commence work on the problems besetting the territory it occupies. In the Gaza Strip Israel must take responsibility for security, transportation, housing, and other human needs. It must attempt to give housing and employment to the refugees that will provide them with some measure of human dignity regardless of their political status.

665
Eckardt, A. Roy. THE FANTASY OF RECONCILIATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Christian century, v. 88, Oct. 13, 1971: 1198-1202. illus.
BR1.C45, v. 88

Likens the Arab-Israeli conflict to a zero-sum game, "an encounter suffused by diametrical or categorical opposition." Eckardt fears that reconciliation of the warring factions is impossible, and warns that even hoping for such an outcome may have "consequences that are counterproductive." The Arab countries are committed absolutely to the obliteration of Zionism; border disputes are only token issues. Most American observers do not understand the intensity of the Arab-Israeli division and cling to the illusion that the "dispute" can be negotiated or resolved. It is fantasy to claim that Israeli withdrawal to its previous boundaries would win for the nation any acceptance by the Arabs. It would simply be a loss for Israel interpreted by the Arabs as the first of many before the Zionists are pushed out completely. There will be no peace or reconciliation, only temporary lulls in a fight to the death. Eckardt closes with a prayer that his "exposure of the fantasy of reconciliation in the Middle East is mistaken."

666
Frei Montalva, Eduardo. "LATIN AMERICA--NO LONGER A U.S. SPHERE OF INFLUENCE." U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Dec. 1971: 77-80.
JK1.U65, v. 71

An interview with former President of Chile Eduardo Frei Montalva, who responds to questions concerning the political and economic situation in Latin America. Frei discusses, among other things, the military dictatorships and their future, the Communist and Marxist threat, the prospects for violence, population control, the difficulties of encouraging foreign trade and capital investment, and other aspects of trade and economic policy. At the moment, he thinks that Latin America's greatest need is to expand its foreign trade. U.S.-Latin American relations are at their

lowest point in recent years, largely because the United States has no real policy for Latin America and is motivated principally by the desire not to get involved.

667
Haffner, Sebastian. BERLIN: A BREAK IN THE CLOUDS. New statesman, v. 82, Sept. 3, 1971: 291.
AP4.N64, v. 82

The Berlin Agreement is an "unqualified boon" for the West because of the unexpected reasonableness shown by the Soviet Union. Most of the protective ties between West Berlin and West Germany will remain and develop "with Russian blessing." The agreeability of the Soviets is attributed primarily to "the Brandt Government's policy of conciliation with the East as embodied in last year's Moscow and Warsaw Treaties." The successful negotiation of the Agreement has improved Brandt's chances for reelection. Only the East Germans are disappointed with the results and their reactions are hard to predict. The Brandt Government, however, would like to improve relations in the divided country and is "able to make such improvement worth East Germany's while."

668
Harries, Owen. THE GREAT POWERS AND SOUTH-EAST ASIA. Quest, no. 71, July/Aug. 1971: 35-42.
AP8.Q4, 1971

Conditions in Southeast Asia after the Vietnam War will favor an expansion of Chinese power. This projection is usually contradicted by the assertion that deployment of Chinese conventional forces in the area would bring about direct conflict with Washington and the retaliatory nuclear attack Peking fears. However, China has long regarded most of Southeast Asia as "lost territory" within its sphere of influence. It may be assumed that by 1975 the United States will be unable to fight an Asian ground war and that China will possess a nuclear force capable of withstanding a first strike. The Soviet Union will not become involved in an Asian war in view of America's experience in Vietnam and Moscow's own frustrating experience in the Middle East. As of now, Japan has neither the means nor the will to carry out military operations in the region. Unless something catastrophic were to happen in Southeast Asia, Japan will most likely continue its "incremental" and cautious growth. A successful Chinese expansion program in the area would probably cause Japan to rearm and cooperate with the United States and the Soviet Union to guarantee the security of Southeast Asia.

669
Hassner, Pierre. A NEW PHASE: HOPES AND EQUIVOCALITIES. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Aug. 5, 1971: 10-12.
D839.R4, v. 22

Though the cold war has waned in Europe in the last ten years, Europe will not soon become a region of collective security in which the differences between states, blocs and regional organizations are eliminated. Europe is the center of a continuing East-West dialog which will lead either to a retention or transcendance of the division of Europe. The problems and contradictions of the present European situation must be acknowledged candidly and no attempts made to solve them by abstract methods or by reliance on an automatic evolution toward collective European security. The hoped-for new Europe will be based on "the independence of states and the desire of societies for both integration and the retention of their diversities" and not on bloc politics. Relations between and within alliances and states will broaden by institutionalizing multilateral negotiations, by understanding the realities of existing European relations, and by establishing a political forum to resolve problems.

670
Henry, Ernst. [IS SECURITY IN EUROPE IMPOSSIBLE?] Ist Sicherheit in Europa unmöglich? Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Aug. 1971: 793-798. D839.B57, v. 16

Foresees the possibility of peace and security in Europe within the framework of different social systems despite Europe's poor peacekeeping record, NATO's aggressive designs, and the machinations of certain East Asian circles. To support this forecast, Henry points to the Soviet readiness to enter into security arrangements with Western Europe and to the encouraging implications of the Treaty of Moscow.

671
Hinterhoff, Eugène. [PROBLEMS ON NATO'S SOUTHERN FLANK] Die Probleme der Südflanke der NATO. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Oct. 1971: 505-506, 508-511.
U3.W396, v. 20

Reviews influences and developments along the Mediterranean periphery prejudicial to the maintenance of Western defense. Hinterhoff sees anti-American sentiment in Turkey as making that country an uncertain ally in a show-down between the United States and the Soviet Union. Western European and American opposition to the Greek military government runs the risk of driving this key ally out of NATO. The Soviet Union is actively nurturing Croatian dissidence and may intervene in Yugoslavia after Tito's death. The unpopularity of the NATO-oriented government in Rome and activity of the large Italian Communist party undermine the military effectiveness of Italy. Spain, on the other hand, could be an effective NATO partner, but the social-democratic governments of the NATO members oppose Spain's entry. Although cooperating in certain areas, France still pursues de Gaulle's dream of turning the Mediterranean into "a sea of peace" under French hegemony. Hinterhoff concludes that these problems and perils, quite aside from the Soviet naval presence, will not be easily overcome.

672
Hunter, Robert E. IN THE MIDDLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Foreign policy, winter 1971/72: 137-150.
N&CPR

The United States should review its policy objectives in the Middle East because of the likelihood that the Soviet Union will become a major and permanent outside power there. U.S. naval forces should continue to balance the Soviet presence, for by "maintaining this stand-off in Mediterranean seapower, we also maintain a diplomatic parity," setting the stage for some future understanding on reducing the military presence. In the immediate future the United States should exert diplomatic pressure on Israel and adopt a more equitable flexibility toward the Arabs. In the long run, the United States and the Soviet Union must learn to share responsibility for stability in the area. Gradually it may be possible for the two superpowers to replace the military emphasis by trade and development.

673
Jack, Homer A. REPERCUSSIONS FROM EAST PAKISTAN. War/peace report, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 17-18. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

The United Nations has done much to succor the victims of the East Pakistan tragedy, but its attempts to achieve a political solution have been unsuccessful. The American policy of continuing economic and military aid to West Pakistan has led to the deterioration of Indo-American relations and a Soviet-Indian treaty. Private American groups are now moving to give humanitarian and political support to the people of East Pakistan. The crisis has shown the need for an Indo-American friendship society. "The Pakistan situation also points to a lack of international procedures to determine the orderly secession of a people from a national government." Support for an independent Bangla Desh will grow in the United States with time, but it may well take a new American President to alter policy and welcome this new state into the community of nations.

674
Jha, D. C. ROOTS OF INDO-PAKISTANI DISCORD. Indian journal of political science, v. 32, Jan./Mar. 1971: 14-31. JA26.I5, v. 32

Hostility between India and Pakistan began before partition of British India, when the Muslim League claimed full parity with the Indian National Congress as the representative of all Moslems. Each country feels that the other constitutes the main threat to its security. Islam is the basis of the Pakistani state, which has tried to portray India as a Hindu polity, although India is organized as a secular state. Each country believes that the other bears it a deep-seated hatred. Its weakness vis-a-vis India has led Pakistan on a world-wide search for allies and friends to counterbalance India while strengthening itself. The great cultural, social, and ethnic differences between East and West Pakistan have meant that in their search for unity of the two halves, "the Government and the leaders of Pakistan have to harp on the only two common links between East and West Pakistan--Islam and hatred of India."

675
Kidd, Isaac C. A LOOK AT U.S.-SOVIET RIVALRY IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Nov. 15, 1971: 110-111.
JK1.U65, v. 71

An interview with Vice Adm. Isaac C. Kidd, Jr., who discusses various aspects of the U.S.-Soviet naval confrontation in the Mediterranean--the balance of forces, extent of the Soviet naval buildup, rival fleet tactics, Soviet submarine threat, and possibility of an accident's escalating into full-scale nuclear war. Kidd, who is completing a tour of duty as commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean, dismisses as groundless the fears of an accidental war. He is emphatic in his assurances that the Soviet Union will not succeed in pushing the U.S. Navy out of the Mediterranean. He warns, however, that the Soviet aim at sea is not parity but superiority.

676
Kuntze, Peter. [PEKING AGAINST MOSCOW; THE STRUGGLE FOR LENIN'S INHERITANCE] Peking contra Moskau; der Kampf um Lenins Erbe. München, Süddeutscher Verlag [c1971] 200 p. (SVM-Tatsachen)
HX518.R4K825
Bibliography: p. 197-[200].

Contents.--Peking--the new center of world revolution: The split in the communist movement.--"Fascism" here--"fascism" there: The opponents as seen by one another.--Struggle for unity: Origin and development of contention.--Comrade or criminal? Joseph Stalin and his legacy.--"The new Golden Horde": The background of the border conflict.--From Marx to Mao: The main theses of the Chinese Communist Party. Socialism--communism. Analysis of the world situation. Peaceful coexistence. War and peace. Transition from capitalism to socialism.--Bureaucrats in distress: The Chinese challenge.--Sources and bibliography.

Surveys the origin, development, and issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Kuntze focuses on the ideological differences between the two powers. He concludes that the Chinese challenge lies not in a "yellow peril" and its aggressiveness, "but in the 'spiritual atomic bomb,' the 'Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung.'"

677
LOOKING TOWARD PEACE. Midstream, v. 17, Nov. 1971: 3-19. DS149.A336, v. 17
Excerpted from Ha'aretz, Apr. 30, 1971.

A symposium on "the problems and opportunities" that confront Israel after peace with the Arabs,

dealing with postwar readjustments in regard to defense, international relations, economics, finance, industrial production, and society. Participating were representatives of the Israeli Government, the military, the Histadrut, the Israeli Communist Party, and Tel Aviv University.

678
Mahncke, Dieter. [THE FOUR-POWER AGREEMENT ON BERLIN: TALLY AND PROSPECTS] Das Viermächte-Abkommen über Berlin: Bilanz und Aussichten. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Oct. 25, 1971: 703-714.
D839.E86, v. 26

Sketches the bases, advantages, and significance of the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin for the parties concerned and the possible effects of the settlement for East-West relationships. Mahncke believes that even should difficulties arise in the current technical discussion between East and West Germany, the final outcome of the settlement is not in doubt. As a result of the settlement and their part in the negotiations with Bonn, the East Germans may find their status enhanced in intra-German questions. Their freedom of action will continue to be circumscribed by Soviet foreign policy, which perhaps was one of the Soviet goals. In the long term, the Berlin settlement will provide a modus vivendi in Europe and ease the burden of Europe's division. The effectiveness of the Agreement, however, Mahncke warns, rests on a continuing European détente and Pankow's willingness to recognize the realities of the Berlin situation. If tension should again set in, or if the Berlin Agreement means for the Soviets only the postponement of an unaltered goal, they and the East Germans can surely find a pretense to apply pressure despite the Agreement.

679
Marks, Donald M. THE USSURI RIVER INCIDENT AS A FACTOR IN CHINESE FOREIGN POLICY. Air University review, v. 22, July/Aug. 1971: 53-63. illus.
TL501.A5574, v. 22

Ponders the reasons for the Ussuri River incident, reconstructs the battle itself, and attributes it to international power politics. The Soviets and the Chinese agree that the border problem did not come about because of the presence of a mutual frontier, although the border issue later became a major point in the Sino-Soviet split. There really is little to settle as regards the border treaties, yet the Chinese have remained adamant. Marks explains that the deadlock is neither purely an ideological confrontation nor a clash of rival interests. Rather, he concludes, "it is a grinding fusion of both . . . a classic example of power politics between two leading world powers with the prize . . . control of the international Communist movement."

680
Mates, Leo. THE BERLIN QUESTION AND USA-USSR RELATIONS. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Oct. 5, 1971: 5-7. D839.R4, v. 22

The Berlin question is the central problem in intra-European relations and Soviet-American relations. It is an excellent example of how bargaining between the big powers cannot produce permanent solutions but does create instability. The only answer to the Berlin question lies in new solutions to the whole range of internal and external European relations. Since neither power will allow the unification or final division of Germany, the United States and the Soviet Union will remain in confrontation in Europe and Berlin will continue to be at the center of the controversy.

681
Michener, James A. A LAMENT FOR PAKISTAN. New York times magazine, Jan. 9, 1972: 11-13, 39, 41, 43-44; 46, 48, 56, 58.
AP2.N6575, 1972

Describes the cultural roots of the East Bengali secession movement and speculates on the prospects of Bangladesh and the remainder of truncated Pakistan. Religion, the only bond between the two halves of Pakistan, proved to be too weak a link to withstand the centrifugal forces of racial, linguistic, economic and cultural diversity. Of the alternatives now open to Bangladesh, incorporation into the Indian state of West Bengal, with which it forms a natural economic unit, would seem to be the most promising. As to Pakistan, its chief worries are not economic but geopolitical: surrounded by claimants to one piece or another of its territory, it lives, much like Poland for most of its existence, with the ever-present threat of partition by rapacious neighbors.

682
Nawrocki, Joachim. [FOCAL POINT BERLIN; POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REALITIES] Brennpunkt Berlin; politische und wirtschaftliche Realitäten. Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik [c1971] 153 p.
DD881.N33
Bibliography: p. 153.

Argues for a Berlin settlement that recognizes the legal, financial, and economic relationships of the city with the German Federal Republic, free and unhindered movement to and from the city, and the right of West Berliners to visit East Berlin and the German Democratic Republic on at least the same footing as West Germans. Nawrocki holds that the outcome of the current four-power negotiations will measure the sincerity of the Soviet Union in seeking détente with the West.

683
Oxtoby, Willard G. THE MIDDLE EAST: FROM POLEMIC TO ACCOMMODATION. Christian century, v. 88, Oct. 13, 1971: 1192-1197. illus.
BR1.C45, v. 88

Explains the position of Protestant biblical scholars who attempt to understand the Arab viewpoint and are sometimes critical of Israeli poli-

cies in Palestine. Oxtoby is skeptical of claims that Israel was in danger of destruction in 1967 and considers it an exaggeration to "interpret Israel's victory as a divine deliverance." Rather, the extensive invasion of the Sinai and the entire West Bank suggests that these territorial goals had been predefined. Oxtoby believes that the Palestinian viewpoint requires a more sympathetic hearing than it has received. He would like to see greater use of United Nations observers, refugee units, etc. "True peace in the Middle East will require Israel and its supporters to admit to a share of responsibility for what happened to the Palestinians, in place of the bald assertion that the Arabs brought it all on themselves."

684
Palmon, J. E. [BETWEEN ISLAM AND COMMUNISM] Zwischen Islam und Kommunismus. Zukunft, Sept. 1971: 14-15. H5.Z85, 1971

In the Arab Federation of Egypt, Syria, and Libya it is Colonel Gadafi of Tripoli who is the chief Arab ideological arbiter. Gadafi determines which Arab governments and which leaders are reactionary, progressive, or Communist. Colonel Gadafi is "a passionate enemy of the 'reactionary' kings but rejects Communist influence in the Arab world with like acerbity," for he sees his brand of socialism as deriving from the Koran. As a champion of a revolutionary pan-Arabism, he has decisively affected the political coloring of the Sudan. The Soviets, plying a double-tracked policy in the Middle East, would like to see Egypt divest itself of Gadafi's influence. Sadat cannot do so, however, for he is financially dependent on Libya and in his heart shares the Libyan leader's pan-Islamic radicalism. In the Israeli view Gadafi and his friends and foes collectively represent the instability of the Arab world and the impossibility of reaching agreements with Arab governments.

685
Prager, Hans G. [FOCAL POINT: THE PERSIAN GULF] Brennpunkt Persischer Golf. Marine Rundschau, v. 68, Oct. 1971: 590-604. illus. V3.M3, v. 68

Evaluates the significance of the Trucial States in light of the Soviet naval penetration of the Indian Ocean, the withdrawal of British forces, Western European and Japanese dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf area, and the revolutionary movements throughout the Arab world. Prager concludes that the emirates and the long coastline of Oman, from which passage to the Persian Gulf could be blocked, are of incalculable importance to Europe and the world.

686
Radovanović, Ljubomir. THE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Sept. 20, 1971: 9-11. D839.R4, v. 22

The first act in common of the four great powers since the end of World War II was the signing of the Berlin Agreement which, though it does not create a new legal status for Berlin, does indicate a change in the political attitudes of the four powers towards Berlin. The agreement acts as a modus vivendi for Berlin, the Germanys, and for East-West relations and creates a favorable climate for broader East-West negotiations to ease tensions. The signing will influence positively Berlin's ratification of the Soviet-German and Polish-German treaties and it is hoped will speed preparations for a European security conference.

687
Rauchensteiner, Manfried. [THE WAR IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE 1945] Der Krieg im Nahen Osten seit 1945. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, Sept./Oct. 1971: 284-295. illus. U3.034, v. 9

Sketches the background and major actions of the Arab-Israeli War, including the 1948 Palestine, 1956 Sinai, and 1967 June campaigns, illustrating each campaign with an operational map. Rauchensteiner describes the war as one for national unity. Ideological and religious motivations play only a subordinate role, he contends, but social and racial considerations are gaining in significance. The 1971 Soviet-Egyptian Treaty may have a decisive influence on the outcome of the war, for it marks the first time that one of the superpowers has openly and officially identified its interests with those of a participant.

688
Ronk, D. E. THE DISTORTED WAR IN LAOS. War/peace report, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 19-20. illus. JX1901.W38, v. 11

The ruggedness of the terrain and the hazards, difficulties, and expense of travel all combine to prevent an accurate account of the obscure ground war in the mountainous country of northern Laos. Western reporters are restricted in effect to reporting the conflict from Vientiane, the capital, 50 miles south of the fighting. "The northern war remains a guerrilla war with small units of soldiers at isolated, hardly recognizable outposts." Despite this murky situation, the northern war is being described by journalists in the standardized language of their profession. This situation differs from that in southern Laos, which "has become an important base area to North Vietnamese military operations in South Vietnam, and can be covered by the traditional terms of war reporting."

689
Scheel, Walter. [THE FOUR-POWER BERLIN AGREEMENTS] Die Berlin-Vereinbarungen der Vier Mächte. Neue Gesellschaft, v. 18, Sept. 1971: 605-607. illus. H5.N36, v. 18

The recently concluded Berlin Agreement should be regarded from the point of view of what the

four powers set out to accomplish and not of what differences remain unresolved. The negotiations were guided by the recognized need to ease the life and safeguard the future of the Berliners and to end international crises. For the German Federal Republic it is significant that the four-power status of all Berlin remains unaffected, the rights of the three powers in West Berlin are confirmed and secured, and the four powers assume overall responsibility for the execution of the Agreement, including the responsibilities assumed by the German Democratic Republic. The fact must not be overlooked, however, that while the Agreement makes possible an improvement in the Berlin environment, the realization of that improvement depends on the implementing measures to be worked out by the two Germanys.

690
Schmidt-Jortzig, Edzard. [THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTENT OF THE WARSAW TREATY OF DECEMBER 7, 1970 AND ITS REFERENCES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] Der verfassungsrechtliche Gehalt des Warschauer Vertrages vom 7. 12. 1970 und seine völkerrechtlichen Bezüge. Staat, v. 10, no. 3, 1971: 311-338.
LL

Probes the compatibility of the German federal constitution and the text and intent of the Warsaw Treaty in terms of the identity of the Federal Republic with the German boundaries of 1937, the constitutional goal of German reunification, Polish "acquisition" of territories within the 1937 boundaries, the presence and options of Germans living within those boundaries, and the right of self-determination. Schmidt-Jortzig concludes that the treaty's text does not contradict the West German constitution, but this non-contradiction does not invalidate the right of political parties to argue against the treaty.

691
Sheehan, Edward R. F. THE UNITED STATES, THE SOVIET UNION, AND STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. Naval War College review, v. 23, June 1971: 22-30. illus. N&CPR
"A lecture, subsequently edited by the author, delivered at the Naval War College."

Recalls history of American involvement in the Middle East and suggests that "things were not nearly as bad in 1961 as they are today." Sheehan doubts that Israel will move willingly out of its occupied territory, but he believes that the Arabs may fantasize that they are strong enough to drive the Israelis out. The Soviet Union, seemingly more realistic, supplies defensive weapons systems to the Egyptians, while at the same time the American Phantoms intended for Israel "possess great offensive capabilities." Sheehan also notes that Arab fear of Israeli power is heightened by the absence of leadership ability in the Egyptian Army. United States partiality for Israel is unwise, for failure to maintain some semblance of balance could have economic implications. In conclusion, Sheehan considers the place of Jordan's internal strife in the ultimate solution of the Middle East's problems.

692
Smirnov, K. [PEACE PROGRAM AND INTRIGUES AGAINST PEACE] Programm des Friedens und Intrigen gegen den Frieden. Sowjetunion heute (Vienna) v. 17, Sept. 16, 1971: 9. DK266.A2S784, v. 17

The commitment of the Soviet Union to détente in Europe, so amply demonstrated by its call for a European security conference and for a reduction of troops in Central Europe, was shown once again by its constructive participation in finding a solution to the Berlin problem. Yet there are forces in the West that while no longer daring to acknowledge their anti-Communist motives actively oppose détente through intrigue and provocation. They seek to draw attention away from the U.S. Sixth Fleet and its threat to the Arab States by conjuring up myths regarding Soviet intentions in the Mediterranean. More recently Western propagandists have found kindred spirits in Peking and now seek with the Maoists to splinter Socialist unity in the Balkans. In view of these intrigues Socialist policy must be directed toward securing peace not only in Northern and Central Europe but in the Mediterranean and Balkans as well.

693
Stone, Julius. THE NOVEMBER RESOLUTION ON THE MIDDLE EAST, PITFALL OR GUIDEPOST? TEXT OF A LECTURE GIVEN IN JERUSALEM. [Jerusalem, Israel Academic Committee on the Middle East, 1971?] 17 p.
DS119.7.S73

Presents the conflicting Arab and Israeli interpretations of the U.N. November Resolution on the Middle East as an example of the role of ambiguity in the diplomacy of international conflict. While the ambiguity of the resolution could provide a broad framework for later accommodation of more specific agreements, it can also be used as an unyielding instrument of political warfare. Stone thinks the Arab position is riddled with legal errors.

694
Terzibaschitsch, Stefan. [SOUTH AFRICA'S NAVY IS BEING MODERNIZED] Südafrikas Marine wird modernisiert. Marine Rundschau, v. 68, Sept. 1971: 563-567. illus. V3.M3, v. 68

The Republic of South Africa is modernizing its modest Navy for antisubmarine warfare. The country's apartheid program and the consequent arms embargo have created some difficulties for this modernization project. Nonetheless, South Africa has managed to acquire some American naval weapons and electronic equipment. There is also reason to believe that the new Conservative Government in London may permit South African naval acquisitions. In view of the Soviet penetration of the

Indian Ocean and the growing importance of the sea lanes around the Cape of Good Hope, efforts should be made to convince the NATO countries of the urgency of South Africa's naval needs, entirely apart from the issue of apartheid.

695
Töpelmann, Gerhard. NATO TANKS IN THE BEDROOM? GDR review, v. 16, no. 9, 1971: 9-11. illus.
DD261.G2, v. 16

Uses excerpts from the American and West German press to portray the "aggressive intentions" of NATO and more particularly of the "ruling circles" in the United States and the German Federal Republic. In view of these intentions, Töpelmann says the Socialist community must carry a bigger stick and keep its powder dry. These NATO circles dread the relaxation of tensions that would ensue from an acceptance of the disarmament and détente proposals of the 24th Soviet Communist Party Congress, Töpelmann claims, for peaceful coexistence would explode the myth of Socialist designs to take the world by force.

696
THE TRANSFORMATION OF PALESTINE; ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT. Edited by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod. Evanston [Ill.] Northwestern University Press, 1971. 522 p. illus. DS119.7.T7
Bibliography: p. 487-505.

Contents.--Foreword, by Arnold J. Toynbee.--Preface, by Ibrahim Abu-Lughod.--pt. 1. Palestine and the Zionist movement: Vision and intent in Zionist thought, by Alan R. Taylor. Zionism as a phase of Western imperialism, by Richard P. Stevens. The Balfour Declaration: an appraisal in international law, by W. T. Mallison, Jr.--pt. 2. Land and people: Dynamics of land alienation, by John Ruedy. The demographic transformation of Palestine, by Janet L. Abu-Lughod. The wordless wish: from citizens to refugees, by Erskine B. Childers.--pt. 3. Palestinian resistance under the mandate: The failure of the nationalist resistance, by David Waines. The revolt of 1936: a chronicle of events, by Barbara Kalkas. Arab "disturbances" and the commissions of inquiry, by Richard N. Verdery.--pt. 4. Sovereign conflicts: The Arab states' policies toward Israel, by Michael C. Hudson. Israel's policy toward the Arab states, by Janice Terry. The changing political status of Jerusalem, by Malcolm H. Kerr.--pt. 5. International perspectives: The United States and Palestine, by Richard Cottam. The Soviet Union and the Palestine conflict, by Ivar Spector. The Palestine conflict in Asian perspective, by M. S. Agwani. Zionism and race in Afro-Semitic relations, by Ali A. Mazrui.

Essays presenting the underlying causes of the Arab-Israeli dispute and focusing in particular on the Palestinian question. Abu-Lughod postulates that political events have transformed the original Palestinian question into one between nation-states, that is, Israel and three adjacent Arab states. These events must be understood, he continues, to prevent the spread of the conflict and to end it. In the foreword, Toynbee claims the "world has condoned the wrong that has been done to the Palestinian Arabs by Zionists."

697
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Armed Services. THE MIDDLE EAST AND AMERICAN SECURITY POLICY, REPORT OF SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1970. 23 p. (91st Congress, 2d session. Committee print)
JX1428.N37J3

A report on Senator Henry Jackson's trip to Israel in November 1970 in which he assesses the degree of Soviet penetration of the Middle East, the attitudes and concerns of high Israeli officials, and the military-political measures the United States should take to secure the stability of Israel and of the entire region.

698
Volskii, D. MIDDLE EAST PROSPECTS. New times, no. 44, Oct. 1971: 7-9.
D839.N483, 1971

American mediation in the Middle East conflict is "a move calculated to foil the U.N. efforts and torpedo the Jarring mission." Washington's role as mediator is not supported by its deeds and is therefore a fiction. Anti-American and anti-imperialist sentiment is growing among Arab states as American maneuvers prove fraudulent. President Sadat's recent visit to Moscow reaffirmed the spirit and letter of the Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. "Cooperation with the Soviet Union is one of the principal factors in strengthening the position of Egypt and other Arab countries in international affairs."

699
Wagner, Wolfgang. THROUGH DIFFERENT EYES. Survival, v. 13, July 1971: 244-247.
U162.S9, v. 13
"Hannoversche Allgemeine Zeitung. 28 April 1971. Reprinted by permission."
"An ISS translation."

Presumed Soviet and Western position papers in the Berlin negotiations would be quite similar at first glance. The Soviet paper, however, rearranges and recategorizes the issues, hampering detailed comparison. Most important, in the Soviet version the four powers share no responsibility to guarantee the settlement's provisions effected by agreements between the two Germanys and between the Berlin Senate and East Germany. The Western powers wish to preserve Western rights in regulating the West Berlin-West German relationship, but offer major concessions on particulars. The Soviet position recognizes some existing relation-

ships, but would severely limit them. The Western paper makes detailed proposals for unimpeded transit of goods and people on all surface transportation, while the Soviet plan would offer opportunities for harrassment and delay, with East Germany, instead of the Soviet Union, assuming full responsibility for access. The Soviet proposals would establish a complicated, three-tiered system for handling West Berlin's foreign contacts. The West would allow open access to East Germany by West Berliners; the Soviet Union calls for restricted access controlled by East Germany. Appendix V of the Soviet position paper has no corresponding section in the Western paper and would establish broad new special Soviet rights in West Berlin.

700
Wallach, Jehuda L. [THE ARAB GUERRILLA WAR] Der arabische Guerillakrieg. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, Sept./Oct. 1971: 295-297.
U3.034, v. 9

The guerrilla war of attrition against Israel has failed because the Arabs have ignored the principles of Mao Tse-tung, the very man on whose teachings they rely. The Arab terror organizations have been unable to achieve, much less exploit, a single victory, set up operating bases within Israel, win the support of the local Arab population, or find unity of purpose and action within their own ranks. Instead, they have suffered enormous losses, alienated indigenous Arabs, and become dependent on third parties for arms and equipment. The result of Arab failure to adapt theory to social and geographic realities and the excellence of Israeli security measures is that not once during the last four years has Israel been endangered by the Arab guerrillas operating on its periphery.

701
Zador, Heinrich. [ISRAEL AT SEA] Israel zur See. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Oct. 1971: 511-513.
U3.W396, v. 20

Evaluates Israeli naval capabilities vis-a-vis Egypt and the overall strategic relationship of forces in the Mediterranean. Egyptian naval forces have been strengthened considerably since the Six-Day War. Israeli Navy units, although numerically inferior, could cope with the Egyptian forces, Zador believes, were it not for the near-dominating Soviet presence. The strengthening of this fleet by bases along the North African coast, the ever more obvious American tendency to forsake commitments in the area, and British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf are sources of grave concern for Israel, Zador warns, as they should be for Europe.

THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT

MODERN WAR

702
Alexander, Yonah, and Miriam L. Sweet. THE "JUST WAR" CONCEPT AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE 1967 ARAB-ISRAELI WAR. International problems, v. 9, Nov. 1970: 34-39. Hebr

Traces the development of the "just war" doctrine, from the Romans to the present, and applies it to the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The authors reason that Israel was legally justified in launching a preventive attack against Egypt in response to the Arab resumption of a state of belligerency and their preparatory acts of war.

703
Barsegov, E., and S. Khaprov. CAUSES OF WAR. XX century and peace, no. 8, Aug. 1971: 18-21. N&CPR

Western analysis of the causes of war centers on the so-called "science" of peace research. Because the science of peace lacks a uniform methodology, peace researchers utilize the methods of sciences like psychology, biology, history and diplomacy. Western theorists ascribe the causes and remedies to four concepts; human nature, the evils of society, the will of God, and certain political, geopolitical and demographic situations. These theories usually ignore the role of the socioeconomic system in causing war. None adequately explains how wars occur or can be averted because wars are "studied on the basis of derivative events . . . which are . . . secondary, and frequently using non-scientific or quasi-scientific methods." The scientific explanation of the nature of war is based on Lenin's analysis of the development of society and the history of economic and political interaction between classes and states.

704
Blainey, Geoffrey. THE SCAPEGOAT THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL WAR. Historical studies, v. 15, Oct. 1971: 72-87. illus. DU80.H5, v. 15

Probes the theory of many social scientists that internal tensions and conflict may drive a country to international war. Blainey points out that the theory has a "universal glow" that suggests validity. Members of one discipline think those of another have verified it, while in fact there is little supporting evidence. He constructs a list of international wars which can be correlated with preceding internal disturbances and also suggests supporting examples. He notes that while "the expansionist aims of Germany and Italy and Japan in the 1930's have been widely interpreted as conscious or unconscious attempts to quell internal tensions by setting up external enemies," these countries had actually achieved far greater unity than their enemies. Blainey concludes that scapegoat theories, despite their plausibility, are simplistic and probably erroneous because they ignore many other factors that contribute to war. Under some conditions, he adds, civil strife could invite international war, particularly if one of the conflicting factions had strong allegiance to a foreign state.

705
Cuthbert, Ronald, comp. WAR. Consulting ed.: Norman Sheffe. Toronto, Ryerson Educational Division, McGraw-Hill Co. of Canada [1971] 116 p. (Issues for the seventies) U21.2.C86

Essays, articles, statements, addresses, and speeches by students, decisionmakers, philosophers, historians, evolutionists, and writers on war, its causes, byproducts, and consequences, selected for high-school reading.

706
Gray, Colin S. STRATEGIC "SUPERIORITY" IN SUPERPOWER RELATIONS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Dec. 1971: 8-21. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

The evidence refutes those who argue that qualitative and quantitative deficiencies in strategic armaments bring no political disadvantages so long as a second-strike capability is maintained. Strategic inequities do make a difference, and have done so in the past. Thus, Soviet caution in the 1960's was a clear reflection of U.S. superiority. The Soviet arms buildup of recent years indicates that the Soviet leadership recognizes and accepts this truth. Then what political benefits does the West forgo in eschewing an unrestricted arms competition? To argue that a nuclear arms race is the best hope for Western security would be irresponsible. On the other hand, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks may be on the verge of ratifying a condition of "strategic parity" that would give the Soviet Union unprecedented strategic opportunities in the 1970's and tempt it into a more adventurous foreign policy. All this suggests that the United States may have abandoned the advantages of "superiority" too hastily, and that more attention ought to be paid to the relationship between the strategic balance and foreign policy.

707
Haas, Gerhard. [NUCLEAR WEAPONS STRATEGY AND IDEOLOGY] Kernwaffenstrategie und Ideologie. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Sept. 1971: 458-461.
U3.W396, v. 20

Contends that ideological conviction might restrain a President of the United States or a Secretary-General of the Soviet Communist Party from ordering a second strike. Haas reasons that an American President dedicated to the human values of truth and private initiative might well not elect to doom these values to perpetual extinction through nuclear exchange. Similarly a devoted Marxist Secretary-General might be unwilling to set communism back by destroying the capitalist base necessary for the emergence of socialism. Haas sees an optimistic view of the opportunities for reconstruction as a factor militating against retaliation.

708
Kossok, Manfred. [STUDIES ON REVOLUTION] Studien über die Revolution. In Verbindung mit Abdel Malek Audah [u.a.] hrsg. von Manfred Kossok. Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1969. 617 p.
JC491.K625
Includes bibliographical references.
"Walter Markov bibliographie, 1932-1968": p. [593]-617.

Contents.--pt. 1. Evolution and revolution in antiquity.--pt. 2. Revolution and revolutionary patterns in the transition from feudalism to bourgeois society.--pt. 3. Revolution and revolutionary movements in the transition from capitalism to socialism.

Thirty-four essays in English, French, German, and Russian on revolutions and revolutionary movements from the Communist viewpoint. Spanning revolutions from antiquity to the current national liberation struggles, the authors deal with the questions of typology, relationships between political and social revolution, theory, alliance politics, and the dialectics of war and revolution. The concluding bibliography lists almost 300 studies on various aspects of revolution, particularly the French Revolution and the national liberation movement, written by the East German scholar Walter Markov.

709
Legler, Anton, and Frieda Bauer. [THE WAR IN VIETNAM; REPORT AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (OCTOBER 1968-SEPTEMBER 1969)] Der Krieg in Vietnam; Bericht und Bibliographie (Oktober 1968-September 1969). Frankfurt am Main, Bernard & Graefe, 1971. 146 p. (Schriften der Bibliothek für Zeitgeschichte, Heft 11)
DS557.A6L323

Contents.--pt. 1. Overview and the course of the war: Political and strategic situation. Armed forces. Combat arms. Weapons-equipment. War situation. Vietnam war tally.--pt. 2. Bibliography: Classification outline. General. Political and strategic situation. Armed forces. Combat arms and services/weapons and equipment. War situation and combat actions. Miscellaneous. --pt. 3. Alphabetical author index.

Latest in an ongoing series of report-bibliographies on the Vietnam War. The first part presents a summary of the war from October 1968 to September 1969. The second part is a 650-entry bibliography on the same period.

710
Milsom, John. RUSSIAN TANKS, 1900-1970: THE COMPLETE ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF SOVIET ARMOURED THEORY AND DESIGN. London, Arms and Armour Press, 1970. 192 p. illus.
UG446.5.M5 1970
Bibliography: p. [185]-188.

Survey of Soviet armored fighting vehicles from prerevolutionary times to the present. Appendixes include data tables giving dimensions, weight, and overall performance ratings of light, medium, and heavy tanks.

711
Moss, Robert. URBAN GUERRILLA WARFARE. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 42 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 79)
U162.A3, no. 79
"With an appendix: minimanual of the urban guerrilla, by Carlos Marighella."

Partial contents.--Terrorism as a political weapon.--The varieties of urban militancy.--The arsenal of the urban guerrilla.--The limits of urban violence.

Observes that the phrase "urban guerrilla" is an anachronism, but terrorist violence, as reported regularly from such distant points as Latin America, India, and Northern Ireland, is very real. Terrorists seek to reach political goals through intimidation, employing techniques like political kidnapping, armed propaganda, "stiffening" riots and strikes, and subversion of security forces. Moss emphasizes that the tactics of urban guerrillas are not simply an urban-domestic menace, but "pose a direct threat to the international order." When foreign diplomats are kidnapped the relationships between two countries become taut, as guerrillas try to manuever one country into pressuring another to act on an internal matter. Prolonged internal disruption can also disturb an economy, reduce efficiency of government, undermine public confidence in the government, and increase the likelihood of repressive restrictions on the population. A country thus preoccupied cannot operate effectively on the international scene.

712
REVOLUTIONARY WAR: WESTERN RESPONSE. Journal of international affairs, v. 25, no. 1, 1971: 1-141. JX1.C6, v. 25

Entire issue is devoted to revolutionary war. Republished later as Revolutionary War: Western Response, edited by David S. Sullivan and Martin J. Sattler. JC328.5.R46

Contents.--Editor's foreword, by David S. Sullivan.--Revolutionary war and counter-insurgency, by Eqbal Ahmad.--Impact of pacification on insurgency in South Vietnam, by Robert W. Komer.--Revolutionary and counter-revolutionary war: some political and strategic lessons from the first Indochina war and Algeria, by Jean Baechler.--The American political system and the next Vietnam, by Walter Goldstein.--Changing patterns of insurgency and American response, by John H. Hoagland.

Essays dealing with the nature of revolutionary war, its dynamics and its international repercussions. Walter Goldstein argues that the United States did not learn from the Vietnam War and that "the refusal to change the basic structures and procedures of the American political system will lead almost inevitably to another Vietnam-style war" possibly in Thailand, the Philippines or Greece.

713
Reznichenko, Vasilii G., and others. [TACTICS OF BASIC COMBAT IN NUCLEAR WAR] Taktik des allgemeinen Gefechts im Kernwaffenkrieg. [Übertragung ins Deutsche besorgten S. Weidlich und H. Wolter] Berlin, Deutscher Militärverlag, 1971. 431 p. illus. U165.R49515

Contents.--Introduction.--The subject of tactics.--Elements of basic combat.--Conduct of field operations.--Securing combat operations.--Movement of troops.--The encounter engagement.--The offensive engagement.--Defense.--Withdrawal.--Quartering and securing troops.--Conclusion.

General text on the principles of basic combat tactics in a war in which nuclear weapons are the chief means for destruction. Writing from the premise that tactical nuclear weapons have changed the character of ground combat, the authors stress the high degree of coordination of time, place, and objective necessary. Appreciation of the need for rapid movement must permeate military thought at all levels.

714
Sobik, Erich. [WARSAW PACT AND SOVIET MANEUVERS. COMPILATION AND ANALYSIS OF MILITARY EXERCISES WITHIN THE LAST 10 YEARS] Warschaupakt- und Sowjetmanöver. Zusammenfassung und Analyse militärischer Demonstrationen innerhalb von 10 Jahren. Soldat und Technik, v. 14, Oct. 1971: 560-564. illus. U3.S58, v. 14

Description and evaluation of Warsaw Pact and Soviet military maneuvers. These maneuvers are always based on the same scenario: Socialist forces halt a surprise attack from the West, seize the initiative, and launch an offensive deep into the enemy's rear. The maneuvers usually end with a water-crossing exercise. Warsaw Pact maneuvers, Sobik explains, have the additional purpose of promoting military and political solidarity among the member states. Sobik warns that growing Soviet superiority could become one of those "realities," the acceptance of which by the West would be tantamount to capitulation.

715
Struckmeyer, Frederick R. THE "JUST WAR" AND THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENSE. Ethics, v. 82, Oct. 1971: 48-55. BJ1.I6, v. 82

Contrary to Donald A. Wells' assertion in "How Much Can the 'Just War' Justify?" (Journal of Philosophy, December 4, 1969: 819-829), not all wars are immoral. Aggressive war is futile and not a reasonable way to solve international conflicts. However, nations have the right and even the duty to defend themselves from attack. To fight in self-defense and to fight to destroy the enemy are two very different things, a point overlooked by Wells. "To resist when one's life or country is threatened is not the same as to kill out of personal (or collective) hatred or vindictiveness." Since it is not realistic to accept Wells' position that nations when threatened with attack will capitulate rather than fight, nations should seek to establish a position between absolute pacifism and jingoistic militarism by working for disarmament while still maintaining a limited defense budget. Wells' pacifism is admirable but not a realistic response to war.

WEAPONRY AND TECHNOLOGY

716
Bender, Hans. [DEATH RAYS FROM LASER WEAPONS? UTOPIA ON THE WAY TO REALITY/DECISIVE TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN THE LAST TEN YEARS] Todesstrahlen aus Laserwaffen? Eine Utopie auf dem Wege zur Wirklichkeit/Entscheidende technische Fortschritte seit zehn Jahren. Soldat und Technik, v. 14, Sept. 1971: 508-512. illus. U3.S58, v. 14

Presentation of the prospects for the development of a laser cannon. The enormous technical and financial difficulties of intercepting fast-moving nuclear warheads have brought the United States and the Soviet Union to seek in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks an agreement to spare themselves those difficulties. Since the technical difficulties are associated with the insufficiency of missile speeds, "it is understandable that the wish for a laser cannon is as old as the laser itself." Laser research has made great progress in the last decade, Bender reports, but there are many problems to be solved and financial outlays to be made before a laser weapon becomes a

reality. It is not too early, Bender warns, for the West to begin studying defense measures against the enemy's use of laser cannons.

717
Braun, Dieter. [THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A SUBJECT OF POLITICAL SECURITY] Der Indische Ozean in der sicherheitspolitischen Diskussion. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Sept. 25, 1971: 645-658. illus.
D839.E86, v. 26

In spite of its increased presence on the high seas and its new global activism, the Soviet Union is not in a position to exercise undisputed control of the Indian Ocean. The economic strains that accompany expansion, the not inconsiderable although reduced Western naval presence, and the opposition of the bordering states to any new imperium in their area rule out Soviet dominance in the near future. What is occurring is a shift in force relationships in favor of the Soviet Union as it seeks to replace Anglo-American naval supremacy and to thwart Chinese ambitions in South Asia. A possible alternative to the power vacuum or to a superpower clash in the Indian Ocean, many nonalined peripheral states think, is an extension of the economic and developmental interests of middle powers like Japan, Canada, and the Western European countries into the area.

718
Breyer, Siegfried. [SOVIET WARSHIP CONSTRUCTION 1970/1971] Der sowjetische Kriegsschiffbau 1970/1971. Soldat und Technik, v. 14, Oct. 1971: 582-589. illus.
U3.S58, v. 14

Description of new developments in the Soviet naval inventory with special attention to Krivak class missile ships and ocean-going supply vessels. Soviet warships are no longer copies of their Western counterparts, Breyer comments, but represent new and advanced designs. The ambitious construction program is intended to assure that the Soviet Navy can exercise superior political influence on Third World states and on those countries with which the United States has mutual assistance pacts. In the event of a conventional war, the Soviet Navy will interdict American support for its overseas allies, isolate Europe, and cripple European defense capabilities.

719
Burnell, Bates C. SAFEGUARD--1971. Military engineer, v. 63, Nov./Dec. 1971: 386-388. illus.
TA1.P85, v. 63

Discusses aspects of the construction of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar, the Missile Site Radar, and the Sprint Missile Remote Launch Site--the three major components of a deployment area of the Safeguard ABM system. The facility at Grand Forks, North Dakota, which is scheduled for completion in the fall of 1971, is used as an illustration. A map of the Grand Forks deployment area and a table of private and Government contractors and agencies that have contributed to the project are included. Burnell gives a brief history of the planning and construction phases of the project and analyzes certain of the more significant or technically interesting problems.

720
Dickey, D. D. STRAIN ACCOMPANYING THE JORUM UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSION AND ITS RELATION TO GEOLOGY. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 1971: 1571-1581. illus.
QE531.S3, v. 61

Precise geodetic surveys were made before and after the JORUM underground nuclear explosion, which was detonated September 16, 1969, at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's Nevada Test Site. Strains calculated from these surveys show a relationship of the strain directions and magnitudes to the volcanic caldera collapse system of this area. (Abstract supplied, modified)

721
Fairhall, David. RUSSIA LOOKS TO THE SEA: A STUDY OF THE EXPANSION OF SOVIET MARITIME POWER. London, Deutsch, 1971. 287 p. illus.
VA573.F33
Bibliography: p. 273-275.

Partial contents.--Oceanography and fish--and submarines.--The evolution of naval strategy.--The Red fleet in blue waters.--Military aid and political influence.--East of Suez.--Anticlimax.--The hardware.--Soviet naval strategy today.--Who gets hurt?--Appendix I The Montreux Convention.--Appendix II Fleets of NATO and Warsaw Pact compared.--Select bibliography.

Examines Soviet commercial and military seapower, its operations and its historic and geographical expansion, assessing the threat posed to Western commerce and defense by the Soviet expansion and making comparisons with American and British maritime power. A table in the appendix compares the fleets of the NATO and Warsaw Pact member states.

722
FIGHTING THE GREAT ABM BATTLE AGAIN, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 233, Oct. 15, 1971: 442-443.
Q1.N2, v. 233

Discusses the controversy surrounding publication of the report by the Operations Research Society of America criticizing the professional competence and ethics of scientists who opposed funding the ABM in the 1969 debate in Congress. The chief criticisms found in the report, together with counterarguments from the most prominent of its targets, are summarized, and a warning is sounded that recriminations of this kind from

within the scientific community may undermine the credibility of all scientists who testify before Congress.

723
FRENCH AND SOVIET PAPERS PRESENTED AT THE SECOND PANEL ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS, VIENNA, AUSTRIA, 18-22 JANUARY 1971. U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1971. 116 p. illus. (Translation series. TID-4500)
Sci RR
Microfiche UCRL-Trans-10543

Translations of papers presented to the Second Panel of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions that investigate research for industrial use in stimulating, extracting and storing petroleum and minerals. P. Therené announced that the French Atomic Energy Commissariat in cooperation with private industry will soon initiate a pilot project to explore industrial uses for nuclear explosives and within five years will actually test devices for industrial use. O. L. Kedrovskii discusses the problems of using contained nuclear explosions to stop two runaway gas gushers.

724
[FRENCH ARMY WEAPONS DISPLAY 1971. TANKS AND MISSILE LAUNCHERS IN THE FOREFRONT AT SATORY] Die französische Heereswaffenschau 1971. In Satory standen Panzerfahrzeuge und Raketenwerfer im Vordergrund. Soldat und Technik, v. 14, Sept. 1971: 498-505. illus. U3.S58, v. 14

Descriptions, technical data, and photographs of new or improved French Army weapons and equipment exhibited by the Technical Directorate for Army Materiel of the French Ministry of Defense. "The scope of the French exhibit . . . ranges from infantry weapons to electronic gear to the new tactical nuclear weapons system 'Pluton,' on which France relies to close the defense gap which has become especially critical in view of the obviously powerful capability of Soviet units in this area." This weapons exhibit at Satory was, among other things, intended to support France's sale of weapons abroad. The article notes that France has nearly tripled its export of arms since last year and is now in third place behind the United States and the Soviet Union.

725
Geddes, J. Philip. PROGRESS ON THE B-1 BOMBER. International defense review, v. 4, Aug. 1971: 344-346. illus. N&CPR

Progress report on the development of the B-1 bomber including a description of the aircraft's design, capabilities, and engines. The B-1 bomber, which will use variable geometry to achieve low-level penetration speeds of just under Mach 1 and which will be powered by four 30,000-pound thrust turbofan engines mounted in pairs beneath the wings, is designed to replace the aging B-52. Congress has yet to approve a request for $370.3 million to fund the B-1 for 1972, "and while the outcome at this point is unpredictable, the virulence of the debate is sure."

726
GENEVA IV. Nuclear news, v. 14, Oct. 15, 1971: 4-132. QC770.N75, v. 14

Partial contents.--Introduction, by Glenn T. Seaborg.--Energy resources and requirements, by I. S. Zheludev.--Safeguards systems and techniques, by Wolf Häfele.--Developments in breeder reactors, by Georges Vendryes, Guy Denielou, and Louis Vautrey.--Uranium and thorium resources, by William Gilchrist.--Uranium enrichment, by Clarence E. Larson.--Fuel manufacture and development, by William E. Roake.--Nuclear energy in developing countries, by Vikram A. Sarabhai and Karit S. Parikh. --Nuclear explosives applications, by Glenn C. Werth.

Summary reports on papers presented to the 4th United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which met at Geneva, Switzerland, from Sept. 6 to 16, 1971. Each report summarizes or assesses the contribution of a number of papers presented on the topic in question. The papers on Safeguards systems dealt with various subjects of interest in that area, including the Euratom system, Japanese safeguards experience, compatibility of national and international systems, procedural problems, applications of systems analysis and game theory, program efficiency, and instrumentation.

727
Gosztony, Peter. [THE CHINESE PEOPLE'S LIBERATION ARMY] Die Chinesische Volksbefreiungsarmee. Schweizer Soldat, v. 46, Oct. 1971: 11-15. illus. U3.S23, v. 46

Outlines the history and modernization of the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA), its organization, troop strength and equipment inventory. The deployment of the PLA reflects, Gosztony declares, China's national concerns: 83 divisions and all its six armored divisions oppose Soviet revisionism and 33 divisions face Western imperialism (United States, Taiwan). The Chinese nuclear arsenal is estimated at 80 atomic warheads and includes some hydrogen bombs. An accelerated program for the production of medium-range missiles is underway. Gosztony concludes that the Chinese cannot challenge Soviet and American nuclear preeminence before 1980.

728
Holloway, Bruce K. "SURVIVAL AS A FREE COUNTRY" DEPENDS ON MODERN WEAPONS. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Dec. 27, 1971: 52-55. illus. JK1.U65, v. 71

An interview with Gen. Bruce K. Holloway concerning the role of the manned bomber in U.S. defense policy. Holloway, who is Commander of the Strategic Air Command, makes a case for retention of the manned bomber along with the land- and sea-based missile. More specifically, he argues for completion of the B-1 bomber program in replacement of the B-52. Holloway also discusses some other strategic weapons proposals, command and control problems, trends in public opinion on the U.S. military, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks--"they are not going to have an instant, magical effect" and the United States must remain strong to back up the negotiations--Soviet air defenses, overseas bases, and personnel problems.

729
Holme, Thomas T. THE SOVIET SUBMARINE THREAT--PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Aug. 1971: 60-62. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97

Before and immediately after World War II, the Soviets heavily emphasized quantity, but U.S. advances in nuclear-powered submarines caused a switch to quality after 1958. The Soviet expansion and modernization which began in 1964 have created the world's best submarine construction facilities, capable of producing three vessels to every one built by the United States. Some numerical decline in the Soviet force can be expected, however, as large quantities of obsolete craft are phased out. Present trends indicate that the U.S. lead in numbers of nuclear submarines is only temporary. One-third of the Soviet force is missile-equipped, including guided cruise missiles unique to the Soviet Navy and constituting "the greatest tactical threat to the U.S. Navy today." Beginning in 1958, the Soviets built a wide variety of submarine classes. In the four- or five-year hiatus in the mid-1960's no new designs were built although construction of most existing classes was continued. The long period of reevaluation and review ended recently with the simultaneous introduction of several new classes of both conventional and nuclear submarines. "Clearly, the present and future Soviet submarine threat is significant, credible, and growing."

730
Hymoff, Edward. TECHNOLOGY VS. GUERRILLAS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Nov. 1971: 27-30. illus.
TK9145.A84, v. 27

The development and testing of new combat technologies has become a matter of prime concern to military professionals. The appointment of a Science Advisor to the Commanding General in Vietnam is one reflection of that concern. The war itself has become a laboratory for the testing of new weapons and supporting equipment under combat conditions. As a contest between modern technology and primitive guerrillas, the Vietnam experience has been most instructive. Many of the new weapons introduced by the United States in the course of the war have not done especially well. Though the U.S. failure in Vietnam is rooted in errors of political and military judgment, and not in technology, it is certainly true that the capacity of modern weaponry--in particular, airpower--to break the will of a crudely armed but determined adversary was vastly overestimated. Against the best that U.S. technology could muster, the Asian coolie--the strongest force in Asia--has more than held his own. Still, the contributions the war has made to the U.S. weapons program cannot be gainsaid. To test the effectiveness of new military hardware, there is no substitute for the real thing--the combat environment.

731
Kalisch, Robert B. AIR FORCE TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE. Air University review, v. 22, July/Aug. 1971: 2-11. illus.
TL501.A5574, v. 22

As the United States cuts back spending on military technology, American technical intelligence will be called upon to play an increasingly greater role in preventing a major technical surprise by a foreign power. Technical intelligence has a four-fold mission: preclude technological surprise, promote American technology by using foreign technological achievements, identify weaknesses in foreign weapons systems, and assess foreign strategic intent by studying design features of foreign weapons systems. This mission is complicated by changing relationships in technological strength, which in turn influence strategic priorities and foreign policy. For example, the United States does not possess an operationally deployed antiballistic missile system, to which the Soviet Union is very much committed. The deterrence of nuclear war is a primary American objective, and "assured destruction" is part of that objective. Thus, the American intelligence effort assigns high priority to any information affecting that destruction capability. The changes in the nature of the technical threat to this country "will have a profound influence on the growth of technical intelligence in the seventies."

732
Kennedy, T. E., and M. M. Dembo. MODEL TEST FOR SAFEGUARD. Military engineer, v. 63, Nov./Dec. 1971: 389-391. illus.
TA1.P85, v. 63

Reports the results of an experiment to test the resistance to atomic attack of the Perimeter Acquisition Radar Building, a major component of the Safeguard ABM system. Two models of the building were subjected to the air blast and ground shock of a simulated nuclear burst. The test produced negligible permanent displacement in the structures and no structural damage. It appears, therefore, that the prototype building is adequate to withstand blast and shock at the levels postulated for the Safeguard environment.

733
Kreilkamp, Karl. HINDSIGHT AND THE REAL WORLD OF SCIENCE POLICY. Science studies, v. 1, Jan. 1971: 43-66. Q1.S812, v. 1

Methodological myopia severely flawed Project Hindsight, the most notable examination yet of the cost-effectiveness of defense research and development. From study of 710 basic and applied "Research Events" (research-produced technological innovations), Hindsight concluded that the returns of Defense Department-supported basic scientific research were negligible, amounting to a disturbingly low 0.3 percent of all "Events." Hindsight used teams of scientists and engineers in evaluation, so no consideration was given to managerial or administrative contributions to cost-effectiveness. Biases were built into the events approach. The twenty-year cut-off for considering the time from research to utilization limited historical evaluation of science policy. Only "hardware" research was chosen, so that the cost-effectiveness of a weapons system in relation to national security policies was not investigated. Only successful "Research Events" were studied, not failures or dead ends, and all "Events" were tacitly assumed to be equal in value for defense purposes. The final Hindsight report assumes that basic research is in competition with applied research, instead of being in support of it. Results of applied "Research Events" appeared more fruitful for Defense Department ends than basic "Events" because the former were undertaken precisely for those ends. Hindsight's "Events" methodology ignores the real world of science policy in which research is actually carried out.

734
Layno, Salvador B. A MODEL OF THE ABM-VS.-RV ENGAGEMENT WITH IMPERFECT RV DISCRIMINATION. Operations research, v. 19, Oct. 1971: 1502-1517. illus. Q175.063, v. 19

This paper formulates an expected-value model of the ABM-vs.-RV engagement in which the defense is credited with an imperfect RV-discrimination capability expressed in terms of the Type I and Type II errors familiar in statistics. Since it is further assumed that the defense is conducted optimally within the limits of its resources and RV-discrimination capability, the results obtained from this model tend to be offense-conservative. Calculations made with this model support the final conclusion that the acquisition of even a modest RV-discrimination capability can result in considerable payoffs to the defender in terms of RV-leakage reduction. (Abstract supplied)

735
Macioti, Manfredo. SCIENTISTS GO BAREFOOT. Survival, v. 13, July 1971: 232-238. illus. U162.S9, v. 13
"Successo. January 1971. Reprinted by permission."

It is often forgotten that China has an old scientific and technological tradition. Since the advent of the People's Republic, China's technical manpower has grown to an estimated 500,000 engineers and 100,000 scientists. Probably 1.5 percent of China's gross national product is being invested in research and development. China's ambitious nuclear program, which bypassed plutonium production to concentrate on direct production of U^{235}, developed an initial nuclear device more sophisticated than the first Soviet, British, or French efforts. This emphasis on immediate quality continued with the rapid development of a thermonuclear weapon. Compared to Western nations, China has shortened the time required to reach succeeding stages of nuclear development. China's strategic missile program has already reached the point where the testing of an ICBM, possibly solid-fueled, is imminent. The Chinese achievement is accentuated by the fact that China's first orbital satellite weighed more than all the other nations' first satellites combined. China has made remarkable gains in development of modern, supersonic jet aircraft and engines and Chinese computer technology is nearly comparable with that of the Soviet Union. China has concentrated the necessary resources on attainment of its scientific goals, even isolating and protecting the research community during the cultural revolution. Simultaneously, a massive effort has been made to disseminate technology to the Chinese people. The intention is to modernize the country from the bottom up, and not, as is generally the case elsewhere, from the top down. This approach could well be the most effective method for an underdeveloped country.

736
MRCA--DEVELOPMENT GOES AHEAD. International defense review, v. 4, Feb. 1971: 84-86. illus. N&CPR

Narrates the development of the proposed Panavia 200 swing-wing multirole combat aircraft (MRCA), the largest military procurement program in Western Europe, by outlining the project's history to date and the activities of the governmental authorities and the organizations set up by the industry. Illustrations include a three-wing drawing of the current configuration of the aircraft and a table listing the major requirements of the German, British, and Italian air forces that have determined the MRCA's performance range. The first series MRCA are to be delivered to the German Air Force in 1977 for training, and the Luftwaffe plans to equip 12 wings with the Panavia 200 by 1981 or 1982.

737
NATO AGREEMENT ON THE COMMUNICATION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY; TECHNICAL INFORMATION FOR DEFENSE PURPOSES. AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS, DONE AT BRUSSELS OCTOBER 19, 1970. [Washington, For sale by the Supt.

of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] 16 p. (Treaties and other international acts series, 7064) JX235.9.A32 no. 7064
In French and English.

The multilateral North Atlantic Treaty Organization Agreement on the Communication of Technical Information for Defense Purposes states that the member states will maintain the capacity to resist armed attack by means of "the communication among Governments Parties and NATO Organizations of proprietary technical information to assist in defence research, development and production of military equipment and material." "Proprietary technical information" is defined as technical information like inventions, drawings, know-how and data, which is sufficiently explicit for use in industry and not available to the public.

738
NEXT U.S. SUPERWEAPON--THE PENTAGON'S "LIGHT RAY." U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Oct. 18, 1971: 85-87. illus. JK1.U65, v. 71

Reports on progress in the U.S. research and development program to produce a laser weapon or death ray. Defense scientists claim that laser weapons technology is now "at a point comparable to that of space-rocket research in the 1950's, just before the first satellites were fired into orbit." Strategic uses of the laser--for example, as an antiballistic missile weapon--are still considered "futuristic," but the device is already operational in some combat roles and tactical applications in bomber, ship, and antihelicopter defense and in air-to-air attack lie just ahead.

739
NOW, INSTANT WARNING IF U.S. IS ATTACKED. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Nov. 15, 1971: 108-109. illus. JK1.U65, v. 71

Describes the Satellite Early Warning System deployed by the United States to detect Soviet and Chinese missile firings at the point of launch. When fully operational, the system will give the United States sufficient warning to get strategic bombers and missiles into the air, thus eliminating the possibility of a crippling Soviet first strike. The system could also be used in conjunction with an ABM. It will be matched with a backup warning system to guard against false alarms.

740
Ramsden, J. M. FRANCE'S AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY. Flight international, v. 100, Oct. 28, 1971: 685-700a. illus. TL501.F5, v. 100

A general survey of the French aviation industry. The place of aviation in French overseas trade; the Mirage series of multi-purpose aircraft and its manufacturer, Dassault-Breguet; construction details and performance characteristics of the Mirage series follow-on, the new F-1; helicopter and strategic and tactical missile design and production; and French efforts in space are among the topics discussed. Dassault is a leading supplier of combat aircraft all over the world; its overseas Mirage sales dominate the French foreign trade picture.

741
Rice, Berkeley. THE B-1 BOMBER: THE VERY MODEL OF A MODERN MAJOR MISCONCEPTION. Saturday review, v. 54, Dec. 11, 1971: 20-22, 25, 59. illus. Z1219.S25, v. 54

On the basis of either cost effectiveness or strategic capability, defense of the $370 million budget sought this year for development of the B-1 bomber is difficult. In terms of expense, each of the 240 bombers projected "will cost four times as much as the annual budget of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency," which may be indicative of Congressional priorities. It is estimated that development and production of the planes will cost at least $11 billion before the bombs, decoys, and penetrating devices are added and a fleet of supporting tankers developed. Advocates of the bomber claim that it will update the triad which deters the Soviet first strike, force the Soviets to spend heavily for competitive bombers or bomber defense, and give American negotiators at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks a big bargaining chip. Opponents argue that the B-1 will almost certainly be made obsolete before its completion date by improved Soviet interceptors and point to its slowness in comparison with missiles. They favor an airborne "stand-off missile platform" utilizing B-52's, which could be updated economically, or the new B-111 bombers cruising in readiness outside the enemy's radar perimeters to launch short- or long-range nuclear missiles on order.

742
Scoville, Herbert. UPGRADING SOVIET SAM. New republic, v. 165, Oct. 9, 1971: 19-20. illus. AP2.N624, v. 165

Helping to retard progress at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks is the fear that the Soviets will convert their antiaircraft defense missile (SAM) system into an antimissile defense (ABM) system, a measure tagged "SAM Upgrade" by strategic planners and first applied to the Tallinn SAM system. The SAM Upgrade has been used to justify deployment of U.S. multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRV) and to justify reluctance to seek a U.S.-Soviet MIRV limitation agreement, even though a Soviet MIRV offers a greater threat to the U.S. deterrent than a SAM Upgrade ever could. Why is it necessary for the United States to undertake the expense of building an ABM which the Administration admits cannot protect U.S. cities, when the Soviets can readily upgrade its SAMs? "Why not simply convert the US Nike-Hercules aircraft defense missile system, which is being dismantled even though it compares favorably with

the Soviet SAMs?" Complex, sophisticated radars, requiring years to build, are required for any ABM system. These easily detectable radars are absent from Soviet SAM sites. A SAM Upgrade system hooked up to existing early-warning radars would be highly inefficient and easily blinded. It would be easier to build a new system than to make a converted SAM system effective.

743
Senger und Etterlin, Ferdinand M. von. [WEAPONS PLANNING FOR THE ARMY. NEW FOCUS ON PROCEDURES AND CRITICAL AREAS] Die Rüstungsplanung des Heeres. Neue Akzente für Verfahren und Schwerpunkte. Soldat und Technik, v. 14, Sept. 1971: 491-492. U3.S58, v. 14

New armaments planning procedures introduced by the West German Ministry of Defense assure that only those weapons and equipment will be developed that meet the Army's long-range planning objectives and that can be covered through mid-term financing. "Since the costs for weapons systems increase progressively with each generation, it is in the interest of all [North Atlantic] Alliance partners to set the quantity of weapons to be massed-produced as high as possible." A rule of thumb is that mass-produced units of less than 400 are disproportionately costly. Long-range weapons planning for the period 1985-2000 is concentrated on armored vehicles, combat helicopters, and command and communications systems. Mid-range programs look to the introduction of second-generation antitank weapons and the complete replacement of first-generation combat vehicles. The M48A2 is to be replaced by the LEOPARD 2, the HS30 by the MARDER, and the Hotchkiss by reconnaissance and observation tanks. The existing gap in defense against low-flying aircraft will also be closed in this period.

744
SMALL WARSHIPS, 1971. International defense review, v. 4, June 1971: 239-247. illus. N&CPR

Surveys recent trends in the design and construction of small warships. These smaller naval vessels--the torpedo boat, coastal patrol boat, and fast gunboat are earlier representatives of the type--offer one answer to the skyrocketing and already almost prohibitive cost of modern warship construction and maintenance, the modern warship being "unquestionably the most complex and most expensive weapon systems in the inventory of the armed forces today." Electronic miniaturization and the development of reliable propulsion units of low weight and high shaft horsepower have led to great progress in the design of small vessels. Equipped with guided missiles, they can be quite effective.

745
Steinbuch, K. [NECESSITY FOR A MORALITY OF THE BUSINESS OF TECHNOLOGY] Notwendigkeit einer Moral technischen Handelns. Physikalische Blätter, v. 27, no. 9, 1971: 392-398. QC1.D415, v. 27

Urges a new value system for the control of technology, foreseeing otherwise the destruction of society or the emergence of a world dictatorship ostensibly to control a run-away technology. Steinbuch attributes today's concern with short-term goals and the serious lack of progress in health, education, and environment to the prevailing economic value system that demands prompt returns on investment. A noneconomic value system, he explains, must be based on human experience, oriented toward long-term human requirements, and possible of fulfillment historically.

746
Taylor, John W. R. WORLD MISSILES, 1971. Flight international, v. 99, Mar. 18, 1971: 374-393. illus. TL501.F5, v. 99

Surveys the current state of national missile development. The material is organized under six headings--strategic, tactical, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, air-to-air, and anti-tank missiles--with the weapons systems in each category arranged alphabetically by country. The descriptions of each missile include performance characteristics and information on development and deployment. Tables list physical and engineering characteristics and diagrams illustrate comparative dimensions.

747
Toffel, Norbert. [SOVIET RUSSIAN MEDIUM-RANGE ROCKETS] Die sowjetrussischen Raketen mittlerer Reichweiten. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, July/Aug. 1971: 233-236. illus. U3.034, v. 9

Overview of Soviet intermediate-range (1000-3000 km.) missiles including ground-to-ground, submarine-launched, and anti-missile missiles. Toffel explains that the actual range of a missile does not always indicate its use, a point not overlooked at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It is doubtful that the Soviets will try again to set up intermediate-range missile bases in North America, for their submarine-launched missile capability precludes their repeating the Cuban fiasco. Unless there is a SALT agreement encompassing intermediate-range missiles, Toffel contends, the Soviets will deploy these missiles in Europe to the level at which they will take on strategic significance.

748
U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group. PROJECT PRE-GONDOLA II SUMMARY REPORT. [W. C. Day, editor] Livermore, Calif., Feb. 1971. 116 p. illus. (Plowshare--civil, industrial and scientific uses for nuclear explosives. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
Sci RR
Microfiche PNE 1112

This report presents the design concept, the objectives, the technical programs and the summarized results of Project Pre-Gondola II. Project Pre-Gondola II resulted in the first of a series of three interconnected, linear, explosively excavated craters. It was performed as an experiment in explosive excavation in a saturated clay shale, adjacent to the Fort Peck Reservoir, Fort Peck, Montana on 28 June 1967. The site medium, the project layout, the explosive charge design, and the emplacement are described. (Abstract supplied, modified)

749
Wells, Robert D. THE SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Aug. 1971: 63-79. illus.
V1.U8, v. 97
"Unless specified otherwise, the data given is from Weyer's Warships of the World, 1971."
V10.W47, 1971

Surveys the 17 classes of conventional and nuclear-powered vessels which comprise the modern Soviet submarine fleet of 380 units deployed in four fleet areas. For each class, Wells gives physical and performance characteristics, including missile armament, and the number of ships in the fleet. Brief annotations supplement this data, together with photographs of all but one class.

DEFENSE POLICIES AND STRATEGIES

750
Austin, Anthony. THE PRESIDENT'S WAR; THE STORY OF THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION AND HOW THE NATION WAS TRAPPED IN VIETNAM. Philadephia, Lippincott [1971] 368 p. DS557.A63A87
"A New York Times book."
Includes bibliographical references.

Exposition of the escalation process by which the United States became increasingly involved in the Vietnam War. Austin is particularly concerned with the Presidential assumption of power that traditionally has belonged to the Congress. Congress considered the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to be a "statement of national unity and resolve," but President Johnson used it as his "legal underpinning for the war." Austin also probes the suspicions and speculations that the Congress may have been deceived or misled about the Tonkin Gulf events.

751
Baldwin, Hanson W. "KEYS TO THE PACIFIC." Reader's digest, v. 99, Dec. 1971: 164-165.
AP2.R255, v. 99

The strategic proximity to Asia of the islands of Micronesia make them "absolutely vital to the long-range security of the United States." Important U.S. military installations are located there. Soviet pressures in the U.N. Trusteeship Council are aimed at forcing out the United States. The United States has made mistakes in Micronesia, and more attention should be paid to long-range military and economic development of the islands.

752
Barber, James A. THE NIXON DOCTRINE AND THE NAVY. Naval War College review, v. 23, June 1971: 5-15. illus. N&CPR

The Nixon Doctrine is shaped by the needs of the seventies, a period marked by economic growth for Europe and Asia, decreasing threat from monolithic communism, and nuclear deterrence rather than monopoly. Thus, the friends and allies of the United States are being expected to take more responsibility for their own defense. Still, the United States intends to fulfill its commitments, "act vigorously" in support of its interests, and provide support for its friends. The best way of upholding this policy "is to place greater reliance upon a mobile sea-based strategy." A carrier task force with Marines would have flexibility of movement, independent support systems, and a low probability of inadvertent involvement in military action. Combining strategic weapons systems and sea forces makes good deterrent sense. Sea-based systems are mobile, have great viability, and are remote from civilian-inhabited land masses. The Navy must be kept strong so it can fill its important roles.

753
Barnett, Frank R. OVERVIEW OF SOVIET STRATEGY. Naval War College review, v. 23, June 1971: 16-21. illus. N&CPR
"A speech given to the Proceedings of the Navy League Seminar on Soviet Seapower at New York."

Anticipates increased Soviet military activity as a function of the Soviet Union's "newly acquired global mobility." Barnett interprets Soviet strategy as seeking to "discredit and isolate" the United States, to break the "capitalist encirclement" and to maintain conflict short of nuclear confrontation, in line with basic Leninist dogma. The ideological conflict is great; the United States seeks stability and parity, but the Leninist Government is geared to progress through conflict. This is reflected in the Soviet buildup of weapons systems. Barnett concludes with a warning on the dangers of misinterpreting Russian strategy and a call for the maintenance of the "shield of American military strength."

754
Bazelon, David T. REVISIONS IN COLD WAR STRATEGY. Humanist (Buffalo) v. 31, Nov./Dec. 1971: 28.
B821.A1H8, v. 31

The United States could reduce its political and economic dependence on the military by revising cold war assumptions. The current cold war posture depends on a show of strength, "avoiding war by all-out preparation to fight it." That posture of determination led to the disaster in Vietnam. An alternative posture is to avoid nuclear war by "preparing not to fight one," thus negotiating realistically from current strengths and weaknesses. The first posture invites the risk of nuclear holocaust; the second might permit Soviet ascendancy. "The latter is clearly the preferred risk."

755
Beecher, William. WATCH ON THE SUEZ: EGYPT'S NOISY SILENT PARTNER. Army, v. 21, Nov. 1971: 10-13. illus.
U1.A893, v. 21

The Soviet Union is becoming more engaged militarily with Egypt, but it is unlikely that Moscow wants to get involved in a major war against Israel and as a possible consequence against the United States. The Soviet military presence in Egypt, which began with only a small number of military advisers, has recently increased considerably. However, an openly aggressive combat role for the Russians could, among other things, undermine Soviet efforts in the fields of strategic arms limitations and mutual force reductions in Europe. Although it is difficult to determine just what Soviet policy would be in case of another war in the area, most experts agree that another round in the fighting would exact a heavy toll in Israeli men and equipment. "It is apprehension over such heavy tolls that Egyptian--and presumably Russian--planners hope will convince Israel to be more flexible in peace negotiations."

756
BRITISH PUBLIC WAKES UP AT LAST, by our London correspondent. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Aug./Sept. 1971: 12-16. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 16

Reports on various aspects of British foreign and military policy. Relations with the Republic of South Africa, including the recent decision to resume the sale of arms to that country; implications of the Soviet naval buildup in the Indian Ocean; proceedings of the London SEATO conference; European defense issues and the question of U.S. troop withdrawals; the growing danger of internal subversion; and the Common Market negotiations are among the matters discussed. The writer concludes that Great Britain has reached a critical juncture in more than one area of its foreign relations. He thinks that while not everything the Heath Government has done can be condoned, its decisiveness--a new thing in British politics--is an encouraging development.

757
Brown, Neville. CHINA'S STRATEGIC WEAKNESS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 3-9.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

It is important not to exaggerate the significance of Communist China's recent achievements in strategic weapons technology. The Chinese program suffers from serious deficiencies and the conclusion is inescapable that 10 to 15 years must elapse before China acquires a reliable nuclear deterrent. This does not preclude an active Chinese foreign policy, but the possession of nuclear weapons on a small but expanding scale does tend to breed caution. It is perhaps no coincidence that expectations of a breakthrough in the Chinese missile program are accompanied by a decline in overt Chinese hostility toward the United Nations and certain Western countries. China's verbal support for insurgency must be seen in this context: it is essentially a deterrent threat to offset the nuclear superiority of the United States and is unlikely to be followed by more concrete forms of support. The Soviet Union will not be much bothered by Chinese military pressures over the next decade. It may feel compelled to deploy an ABM, but the important question is whether Moscow will also be pushed into a genuine détente with the West. This is the expectation in Washington, but one may doubt that the Chinese will be so adventurous as to push the Russians that far.

758
Buckley, James L. THE EROSION OF U.S. MILITARY STRENGTH: CAN THERE BE PEACE WITHOUT POWER? Signal, v. 26, Oct. 1971: 18-21. illus.
UG1.M65, v. 26

In view of the Soviet buildup in strategic offensive weapons, the United States must restore the balance of nuclear forces existing at the outset of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The Soviet buildup in the Mediterranean should alert the United States to the consequences of poorly equipped conventional forces: unless it modernizes the Sixth Fleet America might find its Middle East options foreclosed. Arms limitation negotiations with the Soviet Union, while not futile, cannot be successful unless the United States provides adequately for its own defense, so that it can negotiate from a position of strength. As long as there are nations that seek to dominate others, America must possess adequate military forces to ensure its survival. There can be no peace in this world unless the United States has the power and will to defend it.

759
Chao, Chia. A PERSPECTIVE REVIEW OF THE MAOIST REGIME'S REARMAMENT AND WAR PREPARATIONS. [Taipei] World Anti-communist League, China Chapter, 1970. 82 p. (Publications of the APACLROC: pamphlets, no. 145)
UA839.3.C482

Partial contents.--The Maoist regime's military thinking and strategic objectives.--A perspective of the Maoist regime's preparations for war.--The Maoist regime's armed forces and combat training. --The PLA Air Force, Navy, production-construction corps.--The national defense industries of the Maoist regime.

Discusses Communist China's defense policies and programs, emphasizing the influence of Mao Tse-tung's works on military thinking and policy. China's two main objectives are world domination and revolution. Among the strategies designed to support these objectives are Communist-directed liberation wars, development of nuclear weapons, and exploitation of the social and economic unrest in developing countries. Chao contends that the U.S. decision to deploy the ABM was well-taken in view of the Chinese nuclear threat.

760
Chopra, Maharaj K. EAST GERMAN SECURITY. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 12-20. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

A survey of East German defense and security policies. The overriding objective of all East German policy is political, that is, to win international recognition as a full-fledged, independent state. By means of alliances in the East, internal discipline, and economic progress, the regime has made considerable progress toward this goal. Nevertheless, insecurities in this regard remain, and East German support of Soviet demands for a European security conference is predicated on the belief that participation in such a gathering will further its claims to a separate identity and independent existence.

761
Coffey, Joseph I. DETERRENCE IN THE 1970'S. Denver, University of Denver [1971] 54 p. (University of Denver. Social Science Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies. Monograph series in world affairs, v. 8, monograph no. 3) U162.6.C64
Includes bibliographical references.

Examines whether or not strategic superiority is essential to American security. Coffey argues that a posture of strategic sufficiency would enable the United States to maintain an assured-destruction capability and that a superiority in numbers of launch vehicles would not preclude heavy damage from a retaliatory Soviet strike: one percent of the projected Soviet strategic force could kill up to 50 million Americans. "The great lesson of the current debate over U.S. defense policy should be that efforts to achieve militarily significant advantages are likely to have more impact on levels of armament . . . than on the strategic balance between the U.S. and the USSR." Coffey concludes that deterrence in the next decade will rest more upon the mutual reluctance of the superpowers to take risks than upon either power's possession of a significant strategic advantage.

762
Coffey, Joseph I. STRATEGIC POWER AND NATIONAL SECURITY. [Pittsburgh] University of Pittsburgh Press [1971] 214 p.
UA23.C577
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--Introduction.--The backdrop.--Strategic power and nuclear war.--Strategic power and deterrence.--Strategic power and Communist behavior.--Strategy, strategic power, and alliance relations.--Arms control and strategic power.--Power and security in the nuclear age.--Appendix tables.

Delineates the role of U.S. strategic nuclear forces in support of American strategic power and national security by discussing the nature of deterrence, characteristic Communist behavior, interests of the Western allies, probable international reactions to changing American defense programs, "military-technical factors which affect the size and the composition of U.S. strategic nuclear forces . . ., the political and psychological impacts of different levels of strategic power; and . . . their implications for national security." Tables of the 1970 strength of American, Soviet and Communist Chinese intercontinental strategic strike forces are included in the appendix. A table in the text shows hypothetical U.S. and Soviet force postures under arms control, circa 1975.

763
Connell, Lewis E. ECONOMIC IMPERATIVES INFLUENCING JAPAN'S MILITARY FORCE LEVELS. Naval War College review, v. 24, Nov. 1971: 49-54. illus.
N&CPR

Although Japan has little interest in immediately increasing its military budget, the actions of the United States may force it to do so. The past decade has made Japan the "economic giant" it is today. New problems--labor shortages, increased labor costs, and the "ecological evils" of industrialization--have appeared and may lead to some decline in Japan's economic growth, thus making increased military spending even more undesirable. However, if Sino-American rapprochement should take down the nuclear umbrella, then rearmament would be essential for survival, although costly and perhaps unconstitutional. Japan hopes that China and the United States "remain aloof" for it would prefer to emphasize its economic rather than its military capacity. The outcome depends largely on the actions of the United States.

764
Correll, John T. THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE--POSSIBLE OR PROBABLE? Air Force magazine, v. 54, Nov. 1971: 70-75. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 54

Reports on a symposium on "The Military Manpower Challenge," held at the Air Force Association's 25th Anniversary National Convention in Washington, D.C., on September 21, 1971. Panelists were Congressman F. Edward Hébert, House Armed Services Committee chairman, Dr. Curtis W. Tarr, Selective Service Director, Lt. Gen. Robert J. Dixon, Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, and Lt. Gen. George G. Simler, Air Training Commander. Hébert believes that while a zero draft is entirely possible, an all-volunteer force is doubtfully possible or practicable. Dr. Tarr presented data which showed that the figure for true volunteers as a proportion of all volunteers was increasing in almost all the services. However, he noted that the percentage of troops in the highest mental categories had dropped and was unsure of the effect of the draft on volunteering. General Dixon discussed the Air Force's manpower problems, while General Simler focused on skills training as an enlistment incentive and as a benefit to the national economy.

765
Elliott, James D. DETERRENCE AND THE ART OF WAR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 48-51. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Offers "some general guidelines for deterrence and shows how the theory and practice of deterrence affect planning, in both the structure and the implementation of strategic policy contingency planning." Deterrence is applicable at any level of conflict, strategic nuclear deterrence being only the ultimate or limiting case. The Nixon Administration's policy of "realistic deterrence" will require that a mixed force of single and multipurpose weapon systems be maintained.

766
Fulbright, J. William. CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE WAR POWER. Arkansas law review, v. 25, spring 1971: 71-84. LL

Notes current tendency to ignore the traditional separation of governmental powers and deplores the Nixon Administration's belief that war can be waged without explicit Congressional authorization. Fulbright sees the result as damaging incursions on the foreign policy responsibility of the Congress which is losing its war powers, its treaty-making and interpreting powers, and ultimately will lose its function of "advise and consent." He views these losses as contrary to constitutional procedures and cites evidence to explain proposed restrictions on executive war power. President Nixon, however, apparently justifies his orders for military escalation by asserting that he is the Commander in Chief. In Fulbright's opinion the Congress must reassert its war power. Future war authorizations should follow careful guidelines, that is, required debate, specific statement of type and location of military activity, and time limits.

767
Gelber, Harry G., comp. PROBLEMS OF AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE. Melbourne, New York, Oxford University Press, 1970. 359 p. illus.
UA870.G46
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction.--Abbreviations.--Relationships: Australia and China, by John M. H. Lindbeck. India--a distant but important neighbour, by Sisir K. Gupta. Indonesia and Australia, by J. A. C. Mackie. Australia and Japan, by Makoto Momoi.--Alliances: Great Britain and Australia, by Peter Lyon. The U.S.A. and Australia, by Harry G. Gelber.--Some area problems: Malaysia and Singapore--their strategic implications for Australia, by Robert O'Neill. An Australian maritime strategy, by David Hamer. Anti-submarine warfare--a comment, by Arleigh Burke. Controlling small wars, by Charles Wolf, Jr. Australia and the nuclear balance, by A. L. Burns.--Some economic and technical considerations: Oil and defence, by Alex Hunter. The transformation in Australia's foreign trade, by Peter Drysdale. Capital inflow and Australia's defence commitment, by Ian Potter. Australian capabilities--telecommunications and space, by A. J. Seyler. Australian defense procurement, by Ian Bellany and James Richardson. The administration of defence, by D. E. Kennedy.--Appendixes.--Tables.--Maps.

Depicts problems and prospects of Australian defense policies for the next decade concentrating on Australia's relations with the great powers and the effect technical and economic considerations will have on the formulation of these policies. The probable rise of Japan, the new foreign and defense policies of China, and the American disengagement from Asia are among the topics that are discussed.

768
Gordon, Colin. EUROPEAN DEFENSE: A RETURN TO BRUSSELS? Foreign service journal, v. 48, Nov. 1971: 19-21, 36-37. illus.
JX1.A53, v. 48

The debate over British entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) and the threatened reduction of American troops in Europe drew attention to the need to establish an integrated defense policy for Europe. The European Economic Community is being suggested as the best instrument for defense integration. However, the political integration requisite for harmonization of European defense is not likely to be achieved in the EEC. The Davignon proposals for harmonization of foreign policies have no greater chance for implementation than the Werner proposals for full economic

and monetary union. The Western European Union (WEU) which has existed since 1948 as an organization for the harmonization of defense policies should be considered. Western Europe must realize that since an American troop withdrawal in the context of mutual balanced force reductions is more desirable than unilateral withdrawal, it is advisable to direct political attention from the EEC to the WEU. The WEU Arms Control Agency already has systematic experience gained by supervising the rearming of Germany and verifying the force levels maintained by its members.

769
Halperin, Morton H. THE PRESIDENT AND THE MILITARY. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 310-324.
D410.F6, v. 50

Explores the Presidential dilemma with regard to military information, that is, the Chief Executive's inability to get opinions on military matters from civilian sources because of military control of the access to this type of information. Halperin surveys the strategies past Presidents have employed. The Nixon Administration has attempted reorganization emphasizing panels and committees within the National Security Council system set up to consider the views of many Government agencies. Several Presidents have taken a military and/or civilian adviser into the White House. Under Kennedy, McGeorge Bundy sought to draw in "raw material directly from the field." Halperin recommends a reorientation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff altering the role of the Secretary of Defense, in the hope that the President can be given a full range of imaginative and conflicting viewpoints.

770
Hauser, William L. FIREPOWER BATTLEFIELD. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 21-27. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

According to one school of thought, future wars will repeat the Vietnam experience, except that the United States will confine its participation to support and advisory roles. In another view, U.S. involvement in counterinsurgency in any way is a thing of the past, and the contingency that must be prepared for is overt aggression in Europe. Neither view is based on a realistic appreciation of the tactical lessons of the Vietnam War. Advances in military technology have resulted in a style of ground combat that is truly three-dimensional, in a shift in the relative contributions of maneuver and firepower, and in the breakdown of battlefield linearity. As a result, future engagements will have many of the characteristics of naval warfare, the combat units striking at a distance with artillery and airpower and only rarely making direct contact. Of course, no one can be certain what the next war will be like in all its details. The Army service schools continue to teach the tactics of World War II. This failure to think through the implications of the new technology and communicate the result to the men in the field could bring disaster in the next conflict.

771
Heezlet, Sir Arthur. THE SUBMARINE IN NAVAL WARFARE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Oct./Nov. 1971: 42-46. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 16

Describes the impact of the submarine, and particularly the nuclear-powered submarine, on naval warfare. With the practical application of nuclear energy to marine propulsion, the submarine became, for the first time, a true submersible and the new capital ship of the world's navies, the "unit of seapower," the key to command of the seas, replacing the aircraft carrier as the carrier had replaced the battleship. Nuclear warheads and guided missiles have added yet another dimension to the submarine's effectiveness, the combination of invulnerability and enormous firepower making it especially attractive as a deterrent weapon. The navy team of the future will consist of nuclear submarines and landbased aircraft, the latter available to do the one job that the nuclear submarine cannot do--provide aircover for convoys and other ship concentrations.

772
Heymont, Irving. THE US ARMY AND FOREIGN NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 17-23. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Countering insurgency has become a primary mission of the U.S. Army. Military civic action, or "nation-building," is an integral part of the counterinsurgency effort. There is no evidence, however, that military organizations are suited to this nation-building role. In Vietnam and Latin America, where the United States has invested lavishly in military civic action, the payoff has been nil. With the exception of Israel, other sponsors of military civic action programs have obtained no better results. One difficulty is that these programs simply do not come to grips with the really fundamental problems of underdevelopment--inequities in the distribution of power, land ownership, taxes, and economic reward. To do so, of course, would be politically dangerous in the extreme. The truth is, however, that military men just do not have the right kind of expertise for this work, not even in the technical areas, where their capacity to contribute is supposed to be greatest. Another point is worth considering: given the present reduced manning levels in the Army, is it wise to use scarce military manpower in nonmilitary roles? It should be evident by now that the whole military civic action program needs further study and evaluation.

773
Hofmann, Ronald A. AUSTRIA'S DEFENSE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 52-62. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Assesses Austrian defense capabilities. The Austrian defense budget, and hence the Austrian defense force itself, reflect "the lukewarm support the military establishment enjoys from the population and from the leadership of virtually all political factions." In this situation, the view that the Government should make the Army a viable force or abolish it altogether is gaining in popularity. There is an outside chance that the upcoming national elections will produce a change of attitude on these matters, but otherwise there is little indication that more funds for defense will be forthcoming at any time in the near future.

774
Horowitz, Dan. FLEXIBLE RESPONSIVENESS AND MILITARY STRATEGY: THE CASE OF THE ISRAELI ARMY. Policy sciences, v. 1, summer 1970: 191-205. H1.P7, v. 1

The mode of operation and military strategy of the Israeli army provide an example of an effective utilization of the potential military advantage of a relatively modernized society over a less modernized rival. The Israeli command communication and control system is characterized by a built in operational flexibility in attaining its objectives. Each component formation has the capacity for "on the spot" utilization of feedbacks in responding to emergent situations while coordination is ensured by optional headquarters control. The effect of superior flexible responsiveness is maximized by the adoption of military strategies which are likely to result in increasing the complexity and uncertainty of battlefield conditions such as "blitzkrieg" and "indirect approach". The rationalle of such a strategic approach lies in the assumption that, given the approximately "zero sum" characteristics of warfare, the more flexible of two rival military command systems is likely to benefit from an extra pressure put on both. (Abstract supplied)

775
Hutter, Clemens M. [GUERRILLA AND NATIONAL DEFENSE] Guerilla und Landesverteidigung. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, July/Aug. 1971: 206-209. U3.034, v. 9

Argues that the mobilization of public will is prerequisite to national defense in general and to irregular warfare in particular since aggression is best deterred not solely by military capabilities but by the civilian will to resist. In Austria this will is eroded by a neutrality philosophy that some think assigns the country's national defense to foreign powers. Hutter asks whether Austrians are willing to come to grips with the issues of national defense irrespective of historical associations and to draw the necessary conclusions. "Preventive capitulation--and for that we need no army--is no maxim for Austrian state policy," he concludes.

776
Kahan, J. H. STABLE DETERRENCE: A STRATEGIC POLICY FOR THE 1970'S. Orbis, v. 15, summer 1971: 528-543. D839.068, v. 15

"Article is based on a study of U.S. strategic arms policy being conducted by the author under the joint sponsorship of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Brookings Institution."

U.S. strategic nuclear policy in the coming decade should emphasize the maintenance of a multiple and invulnerable strategic posture deterrent that can provide a high degree of confidence in the U.S. assured destruction capability and avoid systems or strategies that might threaten Soviet deterrent capabilities. A multiple force, capable of ensuring stable deterrence, could be composed of mobile sea-based missiles and strategic bombers. This force would be consistent with the objective of stability because of the bomber's lack of counterforce capabilities against Soviet land-based forces and would be more reliable than a deterrent composed of land- and sea-based missiles in view of the buildup of improved Soviet strategic offensive missiles. The principles of this stable deterrence policy are consistent with arms control and can be used as a guide for designing a strategic arms limitation agreement.

777
Katzner, Kenneth. PLAIN TALK ABOUT VIETNAM. New leader, v. 54, Nov. 1, 1971: 12-13. HX1.N37, v. 54

Sets up propositions condemning the United States objectives in Vietnam and the effect of the war on U.S. foreign policy in order to reject them. Katzner asserts that the purpose of the U.S. intervention in Vietnam was not to establish democracy, but "to prevent a forcible Communist takeover." In response to the proposition that because the Communist powers are sharply divided against each other "the doctrine of containment has become an anachronism," Katzner emphasizes that the surface differences would be put away in "any sort of confrontation with the non-Communist world." In conclusion, he points out that it is too early to make a final judgment of the American action in Vietnam, for positive accomplishments may not yet be apparent.

778
Kolko, Gabriel. VIETNAMIZATION: THE ILLUSION OF WITHDRAWAL. New republic, v. 165, Oct. 2, 1971: 19-21. AP2.N624, v. 165

"In my judgment, the cultivated illusion that the President has a 'plan' for which he requires public and congressional patience is belied by what the record shows to be a quite deliberate policy of protracted US military activity in Indochina and a will to sustain the war and the US presence there indefinitely." Administration statements made in 1969 clearly reveal that the whole purpose of Vietnamization has been to enable the United States to carry on the war in a manner which avoids the wrath of public opinion. Budget figures show that only a fraction of the funds to fight the war is going to Saigon; most of the money is actually expended in support of high levels of U.S. air, naval, and artillery activities and manpower in and around Vietnam. In short, the Vietnam War remains and will remain a largely American war, paid for and fought by Americans.

779
Kuzmack, Arnold M. NAVAL FORCE LEVELS AND MODERNIZATION; AN ANALYSIS OF SHIPBUILDING REQUIREMENTS. Washington, Brookings Institution [c1971] 47 p. (Studies in defense policies)
VA50.K88

Partial contents.--Introduction.--Naval force levels and modernization: The problem of obsolescence. Structure of the analysis. The three force level alternatives. Resulting shipbuilding requirements.--Appendixes.--Tables.

Examines the Navy's needs for modernization as a function of its overall force levels, emphasizing the problem of "block obsolescence," which is urgent in view of the fact that "more than a third of the Navy's ships were built during World War II and will have to be retired in the next five to ten years." Kuzmack contends that the inconsistency between force levels and shipbuilding programs may create growing problems of obsolescence and a structural imbalance within the Navy. Although he does not recommend any given level of shipbuilding, Kuzmack illustrates how that level will vary according to the force levels chosen. To this end, he outlines three alternative force structures and calculates budget appropriations and shipbuilding programs for each alternative.

780
Liu, Leo Y. A NUCLEAR CHINA AND WORLD ORDER. Dalhousie review, v. 51, summer 1971: 228-239.
AP5.D3, v. 51

The nuclear power balance between the United States and the Soviet Union has achieved general stability. There is an unwritten understanding that nuclear threats are made only to support the status quo, while an actual nuclear war is to be avoided. China, however, is less predictable. Observers are divided as to whether or not the Chinese have sufficient respect for the horrors of thermonuclear war. "However, it is one thing to say that China does not want a world nuclear war, . . . and it is quite another to say that she will not pursue her major foreign policy objectives such as the establishment of her hegemony in at least Southeast Asia." China's nonnuclear neighbors are experiencing considerable anxiety, and Japan and India might try to develop their own nuclear capacity, which in turn might inspire smaller countries like Taiwan and Australia to pursue atomic development. With this proliferation the threat of anonymous nuclear attacks would increase. The probability of atomic war will be greater once China becomes a major nuclear power.

781
Luns, Joseph. ["MUCH MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN TWO YEARS AGO"] "Viel optimistischer als vor zwei Jahren." Spiegel, v. 25, Sept. 20, 1971: 122, 124, 126. illus.
AP30.S66, v. 25

An interview with the next NATO Secretary-General, Joseph Luns, touching upon the Berlin Agreement, the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR), American airlift potential, and the need for Europe to keep up its conventional forces. More optimistic than he was two years ago, Luns regards the Berlin Agreement and the imminent ratification of the Treaties of Moscow and Warsaw as giving a "real chance" for a European security conference. Should the Americans withdraw some of their troops as part of MBFR, they could be rapidly returned by airlift to convince the Soviets of American determination. Western Europe must take care not to neglect its conventional forces. The Soviets might otherwise be tempted to overrun the western half of the continent, seize its industrial areas and hold them hostage against U.S. nuclear reprisal. As for the Warsaw Pact, Luns concludes, some of its members are more skeptical of it than are NATO members of their own pact.

782
McCain, John S. COLLECTIVE SECURITY IN ASIA. Vital speeches of the day, v. 37, Oct. 1, 1971: 749-757.
PN6121.V52, v. 37

"Delivered at the American Legion National Convention, Houston, Texas, August 31, 1971."

Describes the concept of realistic deterrence as a middle position for the United States between global guardianship and isolationism. McCain emphasizes "measured, meaningful involvement and vigorous negotiation from a position of strength." Deterrent strength will come from a partnership of nations, not from the United States alone. In order to explain the operation of deterrence in the Pacific, McCain covers three major developments in considerable detail. First is the range of weapons currently available, from the sophisticated, the nuclear missile, to the elementary, the man with the gun. Second is the "rapid segmentation of the world's people in more and ever more independent nations," anyone of which might set off a crisis while their unstable alinements are shifting. The last is the persistence of Communist efforts to gain influence by any means available.

McCain concludes that while the Nixon Doctrine may eventually reduce the American presence in Southeast Asia, the United States will continue to consider its relationships in Asia as vital to its national interests.

783
MccGwire, Michael. RUSSIAN MARITIME REQUIREMENTS. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Oct./Nov. 1971: 22-27. illus. UA646.F5, v. 16

An analysis of postwar Soviet maritime policy and the factors that have shaped it. MccGwire chronicles the major shifts in Soviet maritime policy from 1945 to the conclusion of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 and then examines the strategic, materiel, and economic considerations that went into the making of this policy. He concludes that Soviet aims and intentions at sea are still in the traditional mold, which was largely defensive. However, the introduction of nuclear power and surface-to-surface missiles enormously increased the potential of the naval arm, with the consequence that the Soviet Navy, almost despite itself, finds that it now possesses an offensive capacity and options never before dreamed of.

784
McGaurr, Darcy. CONSCRIPTION AND AUSTRALIAN MILITARY CAPABILITY. Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1971. 32 p. (Canberra papers on strategy and defence, no. 11)
UB345.A8M27

"A publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre."
Includes bibliographical references.

"Focuses on a post-Vietnam situation and, in that context, [deals] with the cost and effectiveness of conscription as a factor in Australian military capability." Among the conclusions reached are that "conscription is the most expensive system of military manpower procurement" and that it has very little value in terms of long-range defense planning.

785
Marriott, John. THE SITUATION IN THE MEDITERRANEAN. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Oct./Nov. 1971: 82-89. illus. UA646.F5, v. 16

Compares Soviet and Western naval strength in the Mediterranean area. Marriott compares the capabilities of the rival fleets in terms of ships, missiles, and aircraft. He notes the problems that would be faced by the two sides, but especially the Soviet Union, should it ever be necessary to reinforce deployed forces in the Mediterranean from home bases. He describes the special role of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, and looks into some of the problems of marine reconnaissance in dealing with the Soviet submarine threat. The strategic value of Malta is also considered. He suggests that NATO forces are numerically superior to those of the Soviet Union, but the Soviet fleet has the edge in modernization. The Soviet Union has no true aircraft carrier, but the cruise missile and airfields in North Africa may offer serviceable substitutes.

786
Meister, Jürg. RISKS OF THE SOVIET NAVAL BUILDUP. Swiss review of world affairs, v. 21, Nov. 1971: 7-9. illus. D839.S9, v. 21

Although the originality of organization and shipbuilding which characterizes the Soviet naval buildup alarms NATO, there is some question as to the Soviet Navy's effectiveness in distant regions like the Mediterranean, the North and Middle Atlantic, and the Indian Ocean. In the Atlantic, Western naval domination will continue if the Iceland bases remain firmly in NATO's hands as it will in the Middle Atlantic, if the theoretically available air and marine bases are improved and better supported. Since the Soviet Navy is vulnerable to air attack once outside the operating radius of land-based Soviet aircraft, in a war against NATO it could protect only the Soviet coast and sea lanes near the motherland and support land operations within the range of Soviet combat jets. Its greatest weakness "lies in the linking of political and military ideas which is immanent to Communism." Strategic considerations and tactical actions are in effect subordinated to ideological dogmas that do not reflect reality. Although the Soviet fleet continues to be a tool more of political than military pressure, its strength grows with each foreign policy victory recorded by Moscow.

787
[THE MILITARY IN AFRICA] Militär in Afrika. Afrika Spektrum, no. 1, 1971: 1-112. illus.
DT1.A285, 1971

Issue devoted to the military in Africa. Articles in German and English.
Bibliography: p. 78-88.

Partial contents.--Preface.--Military coups d'état and military regimes in Africa south of the Sahara, by Volker Matthies.--The Army and social change in North Africa, by Bassam Tibi.--Mali--a military government seeks abstinence from politics, by Franz Ansprenger.--Foreign military assistance to African states, by William Gutteridge.--Bibliographical review: recent selected literature on the military in Africa, by Barbara Bergatt.

Articles to assist in answering the questions of how the military came to intervene in African politics, the possible consequences of government by the military, and whether revolution is a perennial feature of African development or a transitory phase in its political growth. The answers, the editor avers, are relevant to problems of political theory, social change, military sociology, and conflict and peace research.

788
THE MILITARY UNBALANCE; IS THE U.S. BECOMING A SECOND-CLASS POWER? New York, National Strategy Information Center [1971] 65 p. (Strategy papers, no. 9) UA23.M563

Contents.--The shifting balance of military power (supplemental statement to report of Blue Ribbon Defense Panel submitted to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the shifting balance of military power).--Two perspectives on Soviet foreign policy: Statement by Dr. Richard E. Pipes. Statement by Professor Leonard Schapiro.--The case for interdisciplinary education in national security affairs, by F. R. Barnett.--Appendix: recent statistical data on the military balance.

Collection of reprinted documents supporting the contention that the Soviet Union may soon surpass the United States in military and missile strengths. The authors decry the apparent attitudes of boredom and neoisolationism pervading the United States and warn that the Soviets would not hesitate to use military superiority to attain their goal of world domination.

789
Moulton, J. L. STRATEGIC MOBILITY AND EUROPEAN NATO. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Oct./Nov. 1971: 34-40. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 16

Demonstrates the need for a mobile strategic reserve in the NATO force structure and describes the form that such a force ought to take. The Alliance is overly dependent on the United States for its present very limited strategic mobility. The innate conservatism of a multinational military establishment, coupled with the erroneous, but nevertheless widespread, belief that a strengthened reserve must be paid for by a weakened central front, has prevented the creation of an adequate European reserve force with good strategic mobility. If this mobile strategic reserve cannot be formed in the near future, the outlook for NATO will be bleak indeed.

790
1971 GREENBOOK: A STATUS REPORT ON THE U.S. ARMY. Army, v. 21, Oct. 1971: 15-144. illus.
U1.A893, v. 21

Presents status reports by U.S. Army commanders, a special section on Vietnam in 1971, the 1971 command and staff directory, and a report on Army weapons and equipment in the 1970's.

791
Niu, Sien-chong. THE RESURGENCE OF JAPANESE SEA POWER. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Oct./Nov. 1971: 70-75. illus.
UA646.F5, v. 16

Recent years have witnessed the reemergence of Japan as a major seapower. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force is still of moderate size, the aim being, for the Navy as for the other two services, to acquire an "autonomous defense" capability, defined as the capacity to make a successful conventional defense of the home islands, while relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella to deter nuclear war. But seapower cannot be measured in terms of naval forces alone. Japan is an industrial giant, with the largest shipbuilding industry in the world, and Japanese seapower is already a major factor in the security of Asia. If this fact is overlooked, it is only because its manifestations are economic rather than military. In peacetime, however, economics is the crucial dimension of national power. The Japanese are already under increasing pressure from abroad to assume a more active role in world affairs, one more commensurate with their great and ever-growing economic strength.

792
O'Neill, Robert J. THE ARMY IN PAPUA-NEW GUINEA; CURRENT ROLE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR INDEPENDENCE. Canberra, Australian National University Press, 1971. 31 p. (Canberra papers on strategy and defence, no. 10) UA872.053
"A publication of the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre."
Bibliography: p. [32].

Examines the present role and speculates on the future of the Australian Army in Papua-New Guinea. The author concludes that "Australia ought to continue to support the New Guinea armed forces for a considerable period--more from the point of view of smooth political development than from that of Australia's future defence interests in New Guinea."

793
Oppenheimer, Martin, comp. THE AMERICAN MILITARY. [Chicago] Distributed by Aldine Pub. Co. [1971] 180 p. illus. (Transaction books, TA19)
U766.066
Essays originally appeared in the May 1966-Mar. 1970 issues of Trans-action magazine.
H1.T72
Includes bibliographies.

Collection of essays dealing with what the American military is and does. Specific topics range from an examination of the attitudes of American fighting men in Vietnam and a study in paratroop training to case studies of draft resisters and peace demonstrators. In the editor's opinion the collection is "dedicated not to highlighting social problems alone, but to establishing guidelines for social solutions based on the social sciences."

794
ORSA Ad Hoc Committee on Professional Standards. GUIDELINES FOR THE PRACTICE OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH. Operations research, v. 19, Sept. 1971: 1123-1258. Q175.063, v. 19

Contents.--Foreword.--Introduction.--Guidelines for professional practice.--The operations analyst in an adversary process.--Conclusions and recommendations.--Appendix I: the nature of operations research.--Appendix II: planning--programming--budgeting.--Appendix III: treatment of operations-research questions in the 1969 Safeguard debate.--Appendix IV: correspondence and comments.

Reports the findings of an Ad Hoc Committee of the Operations Research Society of America appointed to investigate the professional conduct of participants in the 1969 public debate over the Safeguard antiballistic missile system. The final report, with appendixes, establishes guidelines for the professional practice of operations research; describes the nature of operations research itself--its history, methodology, public role, problems and prospects; and examines in detail the 1969 confrontation between supporters and opponents of the Safeguard system. The Committee found that contributions to the debate of an operations research nature "were often inappropriate, misleading, or factually in error," and ignored "elementary standards for proper presentation of results" and the distinction between "the roles of the analyst and the advocate." Opponents of the Government proposals were the principal offenders, according to the Committee.

795
Parry-Davies, E. Malcolm. BRITISH DEFENSE POLICIES. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 10-16. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

The Conservative Government in Great Britain is determined to assume a fair share of responsibility for world peace and security, and, in that regard, to strengthen and broaden the capabilities of its armed forces and put its defense program on a sound fiscal footing. That the North Atlantic Alliance is the key to British security and that the Western defense posture rests and must continue to rest on the twin pillars of defense and détente are taken for granted, but it is also assumed that the problems of peace and security extend well beyond the North Atlantic area. At home, steps have already been taken to rectify inherited deficiencies in material and manpower; abroad, international cooperation in research and development is being continued; and in the East military plans and a political framework have been adopted for a five-power defense arrangement linking Great Britain with Malaysia, Singapore, New Zealand, and Australia. Joint exercises have demonstrated the feasibility of rapidly deploying British reinforcements to the defense of this region. Discussions are now under way as to how best to secure peace and stability in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean. These actions speak for themselves: the British Conservatives put a high value on defense and the maintenance of world peace.

796
Pitt, William M. THE USE OF SEAPOWER IN COUNTERING THE STRATEGY OF INTERPOSITION. Naval War College review, v. 24, Sept. 1971: 47-68. illus. N&CPR

Suggests that the heightened naval power of the Soviet Union might lend itself to the strategy of interposition, the placing of one's own forces "between the opponent and the opponent's objective" in order to deny the objective to the opponent "without actual use of force." However, interposition is likely to lead to escalation, being basically a sequential strategy "designed to eliminate an opponent's available courses of action until the opponent is placed in the position of having only two options"--to attack or to back down. Depending on his evaluation of the value of the objective to the interposer, the opponent might decide to define the interposition as a bluff and to face it at the level of force offered, which could also lead to escalation. Pitt suggests that the sequentially escalating strategy of interposition might be countered by a cumulative strategy of bargaining, a series of "incremental and discrete steps," each one a "little strategy" in itself giving the interposer a chance to reconsider, thus perhaps to negotiate or compromise on new terms short of further escalation.

797
Porath, Reuben. THE ISRAELI NAVY. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Sept. 1971: 31-39. illus. V1.U8, v. 97

Traces the growth of the Israeli Navy from 1948 to the present-day force that includes the Saars, which are equipped with eight Israeli-built Gabriel surface-to-surface missiles. Of the Israeli defense forces, the Navy has undergone the greatest change since the 1967 war. Porath concludes that the Israeli Navy, although small, is a "dynamic force with a wide base of civil maritime activity . . . [that] is finally coming into its own."

798
Remington, Robin A. THE WARSAW PACT; CASE STUDIES IN COMMUNIST CONFLICT RESOLUTION. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press [c1971] xix, 268 p. D847.2.R45 1971
Includes bibliographical footnotes.
Bibliography: p. 251-262.

Partial contents.--Origin of the Warsaw Pact.--Hungary and Albania: invasion versus exclusion.--Rumania: a case for containment.--Czechoslovakia:

multilateral intervention.--Postinvasion normalization: 1969.--East Germany: the politics of persuasion.--Conclusions.--Documents.

Studies the changing role of the Warsaw Pact from 1955 to the early part of 1969, concentrating on conflict situations and challenges to Soviet authority, especially from Romania and Czechoslovakia. Remington explores the pact's role in Soviet policy toward other Communist states in Eastern Europe and Western Europe and its importance as an instrument for containing intrablock conflict. She contends that Moscow has become dependent on the pact as a device to legitimize the application of the Brezhnev Doctrine.

799
Roberts, Jack L. THE GROWING SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE IN THE CARIBBEAN: ITS POLITICO-MILITARY IMPACT UPON THE UNITED STATES. Naval War College review, v. 23, June 1971: 31-41. illus.
N&CPR

Reviews the history and geography of the Caribbean area, emphasizing its importance to the United States as reflected in the Monroe Doctrine. Roberts suggests that the current presence of Soviet ships, planes, and submarines in the area weakens the Doctrine's effectiveness. He suspects that the Soviets seek to establish a permanent base near Cuba from which they can promote political objectives. Such a foothold would also have serious military implications, for the Soviet Union would then be able "to intervene militarily in the countries of Latin America or to deny such an option to the United States." To meet this threat the United States must resist any reduction of its Caribbean defenses and must pursue vigorously the friendship and loyalty of the Latin American countries.

800
Ryan, John D. USAF'S ROLE IN REALISTIC DETERRENCE. Air Force magazine, v. 54, Nov. 1971: 66-69. illus.
UG633.A65, v. 54

Address delivered at the Air Force Association's 25th Anniversary National Convention, held in Washington, D.C., Sept. 19-23, 1971.

Current discussion of defense spending, strategic forces, and military basing, areas on which American security depends, reflects a basic confusion. The conflicting criticisms of the defense budget are legitimate insofar as they describe its size but they say nothing about what must be prescribed for defense. Defense policy and spending ought to be predicated not on previous budgets or domestic spending but on the strategic threat from potential aggressors. To meet the threat the United States maintains the "Triad" defense of manned bombers and strategic missiles based on land and at sea. This strategic mix "compounds and complicates enemy offensive and defensive problems." The existence of near strategic parity conditions make the Triad even more important for its added assurance against uncertainty. U.S. overseas bases are essential elements in deterring war, for a physical presence is sometimes necessary to make visible the seriousness of American resolve.

801
Sawhny, Rathy. [THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AS SEEN BY INDIA] Die strategische Lage im Indischen Ozean mit indischen Augen gesehen. Marine Rundschau, v. 68, Nov. 1971: 645-655. illus.
V3.M3, v. 68

India's security is affected inevitably by developments in the Indian Ocean area. American efforts to counterbalance India's natural superiority in land, people, and resources by arms shipments to Pakistan have resulted in India's acceptance of Soviet weapons systems. Although India would be pleased to see both Americans and Soviets withdraw from the Indian Ocean, their limited presence is not necessarily a disadvantage so long as neither power erects military bases in the area. Geography makes India the natural center and logical guardian of the Indian Ocean and national security requires that India take the necessary naval measures to assure protection of its long, exposed coastline, secure its vital sealanes, and monitor vast areas, if not all, of the Indian Ocean.

802
Scharndorff, Werner. [MILITARY ASPECTS OF THE 24TH PARTY CONGRESS OF THE CPSU] Militärische Aspekte des XXIV. Parteitages der KPdSU. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, July/Aug. 1971: 228-231. illus.
U3.034, v. 9

Effective management of Western press coverage of the 24th Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union assured that Soviet plans to raise living standards would exclude military and geopolitical policies and plans from the headlines. The Congress resolution "to support vigorously all national liberation movements and anti-imperialist forces throughout the world" reflects Soviet interests of a decidedly nondomestic nature. Soviet leaders called for a reduction of troops and armaments in Central Europe and for agreements on the renunciation of force. At the same time they elevated representatives of the armaments industry and armed forces to high leadership positions in the Party and conducted military discussions with representatives of the developing states.

803
Schützsack, Axel. [NEUTRALITY AND POWER BALANCE IN NORTHERN EUROPE] Neutralität und Machtbalance in Nordeuropa. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Sept. 1971: 553-562.
D839.A885, v. 22

Since the Second World War, the armed and credible neutrality of Sweden, the participation of

Denmark and Norway in NATO, and Finland's mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union have maintained the power balance in northern Europe. That equilibrium has been dangerously upset by Soviet fleet reinforcements in the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. In the Baltic Sea alone the Soviets have a five-to-one naval superiority over NATO units. In muscle-flexing operations, Soviet warships and aircraft have repeatedly violated Iceland's territorial sovereignty and they have operated intimidatingly close to the Norwegian coast. The massive Soviet naval penetration of northern Europe, complementing a similar maneuver in the Mediterranean, is part of a global strategy to outflank NATO. Control of northern Europe and the Atlantic Ocean as far west as Iceland also establishes an ever wider buffer zone that protects the industrialized areas of European Russia. Sweden's switch from armed neutrality to a finger-pointing moralistic neutrality has cooled Swedish-American relations and may also contribute to weakening the northern European balance for which Sweden was the fulcrum.

804
Scoville, Herbert. A SOVIET FIRST STRIKE? New republic, v. 165, Oct. 2, 1971: 17-19.
AP2.N624, v. 165

A letter taking issue with this article and a reply by the author appear in New Republic, v. 165, Dec. 25, 1971: 32-33.
AP2.N624, v. 165

A Soviet first strike against the U.S. strategic deterrent is a specter which has handicapped the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and aided the arms race. Any Soviet first strike launched without neutralizing the American sea-based or overseas deterrent would be suicidal, and the Soviets do not have the antisubmarine warfare capability or the nationwide antimissile defense system to knock out these forces. Deployment of the SS-9 missile, far from heralding an attempt to achieve a first-strike capability, is in line with the Soviet military's fondness for big weapons and may well be a response to the 1967 U.S. decision to deploy the Sentinel antimissile defense system or a desire to obtain a second-strike counterforce capability. The United States has used the same justification for development and deployment of its multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV) system. The Soviets have not been testing the MIRV that would be essential for a first-strike capability. The recently detected mysterious holes are quite likely intended for hardening, and no new missiles have been tested which could fill these shafts. "In sum, it would appear that the thesis that the Soviets are seeking to acquire a first-strike capability is unsupported by any evidence and is a pretext composed to justify Safeguard and other weapons systems."

805
Smith, Donald F. PAWN IN THE PACIFIC. Progressive, v. 35, Dec. 1971: 19-23. illus.
AP2.P8655, v. 35

The United States sees its trust territory in Micronesia as a possible site for military facilities displaced by the 1972 reversion of Okinawa to Japan and Philippine demands for renegotiation of current base agreements. Because the island chain is within striking range "of almost every point in the Pacific and Asia," it has an attractive strategic position. However, American bases are not likely to be welcomed by the inhabitants. In previous nuclear testing exercises there, the United States alienated the native population by thoughtless practices of moving people by deception, confiscating land for test sites, and failing to provide adequate substitute facilities. For the future Micronesians would seemingly prefer a free association status allowing them to manage their own affairs with U.S. economic support in exchange for military base leases. The State Department tends to support this self-determination, while "the Pentagon continues to press the argument that our national defense requirements preclude any hope of Micronesian independence."

806
Smith, Perry M. THE AIR FORCE PLANS FOR PEACE, 1943-1945. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins Press [1970] 132 p. UG633.S57
Bibliography: p. 117-124.

Shows how the U.S. Air Force perceived and prepared for the great transformation of the American military establishment at the end of World War II from "a small professional force of almost negligible political significance either domestically or internationally, except in time of war" to a force of "enormously important political and economic influence domestically and internationally, in time of peace and in time of war," by focusing on the methods and processes of military planning for postwar aviation policy.

807
SOLDIERS OF PEACE. [Dresden, Press Dept. of the Ministry of National Defence of the German Democratic Republic, 1970?] 47 p. illus.
UA719.3.S63

"Interesting and instructive facts on the character, role and tasks of the National People's Army of the German Democratic Republic." This account of the East German soldier describes his day-to-day life, training and equipment, motivation, and role in the state and community.

808
Sozialwissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft. [AUSTRIA'S SECURITY] Österreichs Sicherheit. [Wien, Sozialwissenschaftliche Arbeitsgemeinschaft, 1971?] 71 p. DB99.2.S67
Bibliography: p. 62-65.

Contents.--Preface.--The security of Austria as the political goal of the state.--General prerequisites of security.--Situation analysis.--Propositions for an Austrian security policy.--Bibliography.

Criticizes Austrian security policy as resting solely on foreign policy to the neglect of the armed forces and argues for greater emphasis on the military as the main support of any security policy. This social-science study group calls for the recognition of geopolitics as a factor in Austria's security and of the inseparable relationship between foreign policy and military preparedness, a credible policy of neutrality based on military forces ready to defend that neutrality, and popular understanding of the crises to which Austria may be exposed and of the need for an overall defense plan including all available military and nonmilitary means.

809
Stanford University. Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace. INTERNATIONAL AND ENGLISH-LANGUAGE COLLECTIONS; A SURVEY OF HOLDINGS AT THE HOOVER INSTITUTION ON WAR, REVOLUTION, AND PEACE, by Kenneth M. Glazier and James R. Hobson. Stanford, Calif. [1971] 20 p. (Its Hoover Institution survey of holdings, 3)
Z6204.S72

Description of the Hoover Institution's international collection (antiwar movements, international communism, multinational organizations, and Paris Peace Conference) and English-language collection (Great Britain, Canada, Ireland, and the United States from World War I to 1970).

810
Taubinger, Laszlo M. von. [THE CHINESE NAVY] Die chinesische Marine. Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift, v. 137, Oct. 1971: 697-698.
U3.A43, v. 137

Outlines the ship inventory, organization, personnel strength and leadership, and programs of the Communist Chinese Navy. Peking is increasingly concerned, Taubinger states, with the Soviet naval penetration into the Indian Ocean and the reinforcement of the Soviet Pacific fleet. Long dependent on the Soviet Union and foreign sources for its naval units, China has begun a crash program to expand and modernize its small and obsolescent fleet. While Chinese-made vessels are beginning to be launched, Taubinger thinks that a decade must pass before the Chinese will be able to build, in significant numbers, modern submarines capable of firing nuclear weapons.

811
Thomson, George G. PROBLEMS OF STRATEGY IN THE PACIFIC AND INDIAN OCEANS. New York, National Strategy Information Center [1970] 42 p. (Strategy papers, no. 5) DS33.3.T47
Includes bibliographical references.

Examines the strategic problems of American interests in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Thomson contends that the "center of gravity of world power has now moved from Europe . . . to Asia." He interprets the American involvement and responsibilities there as no less permanent than the interests of the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, India and Japan. In analyzing the geopolitics of the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins, Thomson concludes that American withdrawal from the area is not a desirable policy.

812
THE THREATENED STRATEGIC BALANCE OF POWER [editorial] East West digest, v. 7, Sept. 1971: 257-263.
N&CPR

The West's strategic political policies or lack of them are causing its destruction. America's permissiveness toward subversion and its unilateral withdrawal from defense commitments are a manifestation of a lack of will to survive. President Nixon's policy of mutual restraint and accommodation with the Soviet Union comes at a time when Moscow is directing a huge nuclear weapons buildup that is threatening the strategic balance. Current U.S. policies have caused many people to believe wrongly that the Soviet Union is not an expansionist power and that deterrence and détente are mutually exclusive. In view of the expansion of Soviet maritime activity in and around the Mediterranean and the buildup of the Soviet nuclear arsenal, the abandonment of deterrence in favor of détente could mean defeat for the West. Faced with a crumbling strategic balance and a decline in political resolve in the United States, Western Europe must begin to assume the burden of its own defense. It can do this and redress the strategic balance of power "by the creation of a powerful supranational Euro Group within the North Atlantic Alliance." No nation would dare attack a united Western Europe that has a credible nuclear force.

813
Uhlmann, Ernst. [MILITARY REVIEW] Militärische Umschau. Schweizer Monatshefte, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 539-542. AP32.S47, v. 51

Argues for the use of foreign training areas by the Swiss Armed Forces whose training facilities are inadequate, Uhlmann asserts, adding that the interests of tourism and environmental protection further complicate the problem. The use of foreign training areas, he claims, would not jeopardize Swiss neutrality any more than its purchases of foreign tanks and aircraft. Uhlmann suggests an armament pool of neutrals including Sweden, Austria and Switzerland. This arrangement would solve the critical training area problem, he concludes, and facilitate and enrich Switzerland's own defense research efforts.

814
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. WAR POWERS LEGISLATION.

Hearings, Ninety-second Congress, first session. June 1 and 2, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 145 p.

KF27.F6483 1971a
Supt. of Docs. no.: Y4.F76/1: W19/8.

Testimony and statements of members of Congress, academicians and representatives of the Departments of State and Justice.

815
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. SIXTEENTH MEETING OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY; report of the United States Delegation to the Sixteenth Meeting of Members of Parliaments from the North Atlantic Assembly Countries held at The Hague, Nov. 6 through Nov. 11, 1970 (Pursuant to Public Law 689--84th Congress.) Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., Aug. 1971. 201 p.

DLC

Activity reports and texts adopted by committees of the North Atlantic Assembly. After listening to speeches by NATO officials the delegates met for discussion and debate that led to recommendations and resolutions. In the fashion of last year's meeting "debate centered upon the possibility of reduced U.S. contributions to NATO conventional forces and the requirement that European countries do more to improve and enlarge their own contributions." Member countries were urged to contribute at least 5 percent of each gross national product to mutual defense. The Political Committee heard a report on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which identified two major elements of discussion--quantitative increases in nuclear weapons systems and qualitative alterations in the current nuclear balance.

816
Ushiba, Nobuhiko. JAPAN: HER ROLE IN WORLD AFFAIRS. Naval War College review, v. 23, Apr. 1971: 14-21. illus.

N&CPR

"A lecture delivered at the Naval War College."

The reversion of Okinawa means that Japan will assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Japanese defense expenditures will double over the next five years, with the emphasis on improving the quality of the forces rather than increasing their quantity. "To the question, 'Should Japan herself have nuclear arms?' our answer is a definite 'No.'" Japan's national interests and its people's temper exclude war as an instrument of national policy. The security treaty with the United States remains the foundation of Japanese defense policy. Japan contributes to Asian security through economic assistance and participation in regional development associations. Economic differences should not be allowed to harm U.S.-Japanese relations. These are short-term difficulties, while the long-term aims of both nations are compatible.

817
Vernant, Jacques. [MALTA, INDEPENDENCE AND NATO] Malte, l'indépendence et l'OTAN. Revue de défense nationale, v. 27, Aug./Sept. 1971: 1321-1325. illus.

D410.R45, v. 27

Discusses developments in the rift between Malta and Great Britain that began after the British Government announced its intention to reduce the level of forces East of Suez. The 1966 White Paper calling for the reduction contravened, according to the Maltese Government, the 1964 defense agreement with Great Britain. Vernant traces the evolution of postwar relations between Malta and Great Britain on the one hand and between Malta and NATO on the other, noting Malta's strategic role during World War II and its continued politicomilitary importance in view of the Soviet naval buildup in the region. He concludes that despite the differences between the two countries, given its economic situation Malta can hardly "turn its nose up at" the resources furnished by Great Britain in return for naval and air bases.

818
Weeks, Albert L. THE GROWTH OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER. American Legion magazine, v. 91, Nov. 1971: 6-11. illus.

D570.A1A32, v. 91

The growth of Soviet military power has upset the world balance of power and threatens to make the Soviet Union number one during the 1970's. Already behind the Soviet Union in the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, combat aircraft, submarines, manpower, atomic megatonnage and advanced strategic weapons in development, the United States by the mid-1970's will fall behind the Soviet Union in strategic bombers, submarine-launched missiles, and surface navy. Although voicing peaceful intentions, the Soviets are girding for offensive warfare. "Hawkish" leaders have been appointed to high posts, while Soviet economic planning and resource allocation have given priority to development of new weapons systems. The West has done nothing to provoke a massive defensive Soviet arms buildup. If the United States is not to become a second-rate power, it must not cut back dangerously on military expenditures in the wake of the Vietnam War.

819
Wensauer, Horst. [FRENCH CONCEPTS OF THE STRATEGY OF BALANCE IN EUROPE] Französische Vorstellungen zur Strategie des Gleichgewichts in Europa. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Sept. 1971: 454-458.

U3.W396, v. 20

Reasoning that the United States might not always be willing to employ its nuclear arsenal to defend Western Europe, France decided in 1958--before de Gaulle--to develop its own strategic nuclear force as a deterrent against a direct Soviet threat to France. The bases and goals of French military strategy are reduction of the threat to

France, rejection of the American flexible response strategy, precaution against future contingencies, adherence to the defensive aspects of NATO, independence from outside forces, and the opportunity to play the leading role in Europe. The French nuclear arsenal is vastly inferior to that of the Soviet Union, but its deterrent effect is plausible. The chief disadvantages of France's "go-it-alone" policy are that its cost has precluded needed development of a conventional capability and that its exclusiveness has deprived NATO of valuable in-depth infrastructure. The general advantage is that by establishing a nuclear force at the expense of a conventional one France has reduced the possibility of a limited war in Europe. Should the United States withdraw its nuclear guarantee, the question for the Germans is how much of the Federal Republic would have to be sacrificed in the event of a Soviet move before the French would invoke their deterrent.

820
Wettern, Desmond. THE ROYAL NAVY AND THE CONTINUING COMMITMENTS. In United States Naval Institute, Annapolis. Proceedings, v. 97, Aug. 1971: 18-25. illus. V1.U8, v. 97

The Royal Navy, though contracted, has had a stabilizing influence in the world out of proportion to its size. Economic necessity compelled naval cutbacks by successive governments, but not until the Labour Party came to power were commitments themselves disavowed as a means of saving. With the Conservative victory in 1970, many retrenchments were halted. Singapore will be garisoned, the carrier Ark Royal retained, and the Exocet surface-to-surface missile purchased. Provision of new ships and weapons systems for the fleet is likely. But most of the ships now under construction are defensive in nature, and almost every vessel in the fleet has been designed for work in air support. The Labour Government invited a serious support gap by maintaining that a surface-to-surface missile system would be deployed by the time the aircraft carriers were phased out. Air support is crucial, for without it the Navy will have far less than a world-wide capability, and shore-based aircraft are not the answer. If the Royal Navy is to carry out a global role for Britain, it must be equipped for its responsibility.

821
Whetten, Lawrence L. THE MILITARY CONSEQUENCES OF MEDITERRANEAN SUPER POWER PARITY. New Middle East, no, 38, Nov. 1971: 14-25. illus. DS63.1.N48, 1971

Describes the Soviet Union's continued buildup in conventional air and naval forces and analyzes its significance in the Mediterranean. Whetten observes that "this concentration of sea and airpower is by far the strongest force the U.S. Navy has faced since the Second World War." He then examines Soviet long-range support capability, global naval capability, revised strategy emphasizing the Indian Ocean, and specific equipment--planes, missiles, and submarines. After a review of NATO capabilities and the constraints that affect both countries, he asserts that in the Mediterranean the Soviet Union has achieved considerable deterrent power against the United States. "Thus the broad aim of Moscow's new viable overseas strategy in the Mediterranean is to deter the US, reduce Western influence and provide staying power for its own political influence among local clients that is becoming increasingly independent of the East-West challenge."

822
WHO NOW RULES THE WAVES?, from our London correspondent. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Oct./Nov. 1971: 12-15, 17-18. illus. UA646.F5, v. 16

Examines recent developments in British foreign and defense policy. Particular attention is given to the competition between East and West for control of the seas. The Soviet Union continues to augment its naval and maritime power at a time when Western strength in both categories is on the decline. Perhaps the only hopeful sign is that the public is at last waking up to the danger and may even be preparing to do something about it. The great harm that could be done by the loss of NATO naval bases in Malta and Iceland, kinks in the European air defense system, British intentions in the Persian Gulf, and Great Britain's prospective entry into the Common Market are discussed.

823
Woller, Rudolf. [THE IMPLAUSIBLE WAR; A REALISTIC DEFENSE CONCEPT] Der unwahrscheinliche Krieg; eine realistische Wehrkonzeption. [2., durchges. Aufl.] Stuttgart, Seewald [1971] 318 p. UA11.W65 1971

Contents.--pt. 1. Starting positions.--pt. 2. Imbalances.--pt. 3. Beneath the threshold.--pt. 4. Consequences.--pt. 5. Conclusions.

Enunciates a defense concept for Western Europe based on a reduced American nuclear presence in Europe and a smaller German force, professionally staffed and bolstered by a more elaborate reserve system and a national militia. German defense policy must continue to be based on the American nuclear arsenal, Woller states. He thinks that the Soviets will not consent at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks to freezing existing nuclear armaments or to any considerable reduction of weapons systems.

824
YUGOSLAV DEFENSE. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 28-35. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Based on an article which appeared in L'Armée, June 1970. N&CPR

Though the rapid collapse of the Czech Army during the Warsaw Pact invasion of 1968 shocked Yugoslav officials, they were not slow to draw the appropriate conclusions with regard to their own situation and to act accordingly. A new National Defense Law, based on the two principles that "any defensive war will be fought by a people in arms" and "no surrender will be planned or permitted under any circumstances by anyone," was promulgated in February 1969. As these principles suggest, new emphasis is being put on guerrilla warfare and the role of territorial defense forces. Defense organization under the new law is modeled on Yugoslavia's decentralized "social self-administration" system, according to which power is shared between the Federal Government and the local communes. All in all, the system seems to exploit the advantages of Yugoslavia's unique demography and terrain while compensating for its disadvantages and "a cheap, bloodless takeover of Yugoslavia by an outside power seems remote."

CONSEQUENCES OF DEFENSE POLICIES AND WAR

825
AFTER THE PENTAGON PAPERS: TALK WITH KISTIAKOWSKY, WIESNER. Science, v. 174, Nov. 26, 1971: 923-928. illus. Q1.S35, v. 174

"The interview [conducted by Elinor Langer] took place in mid-August at Woods Hole, Massachusetts, in the offices of the National Academy of Sciences."

An interview with Drs. George Kistiakowsky and Jerome Wiesner, science advisers to Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy respectively, occasioned by publication of the Pentagon Papers. Kistiakowsky and Wiesner discuss their personal experiences, successes, and frustrations as members of the scientific community in attempting to influence the course of national decision and security policy. Both men express themselves as disillusioned with the Government and as questioning its receptiveness to expert advice.

826
Australia. National Radiation Advisory Committee. BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FALLOUT IN AUSTRALIA FROM FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXPLOSIONS IN THE PACIFIC, JULY-SEPTEMBER 1968; REPORT TO THE PRIME MINISTER. Canberra, Govt. Pr., 1969. 13 p. illus. RA1231.R2A9

"F. C. Courtice . . . (Chairman)"
Bibliography: p. 13.

Assessment of the biological significance for Australia of five French nuclear weapons tests conducted in 1965 from July to September. The National Radiation Advisory Committee's (NRAC) report is based on data collected and analyzed by the Australian Atomic Weapons Tests Safety Committee. The Advisory Committee concludes that the fallout over Australia from these tests has had no detrimental effect on the health of the Australian population. The appendix includes graphs and tables summarizing the findings of the NRAC.

827
Barnet, Richard J. THE WAR PLANNERS: THE TROUBLE WITH "THE BRIGHTEST AND THE BEST." Progressive, v. 35, Dec. 1971: 14-18. illus. AP2.P8655, v. 35

The question of American guilt for war crimes in Vietnam arises with increasing frequency and must be faced squarely. If a lieutenant is found guilty, one must ask if men of greater status, Dean Rusk, Walt Rostow, Robert McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, and others, ought to be held accountable for their actions in escalating the Vietnam War. Evidence is accumulating that shows the United States guilty of aggression and provocation in initiating the war as well as in large-scale battlefield crimes of the type outlawed by the Geneva Convention of 1949 and the Nuremberg Principles. The fact that the war planners were not pathological personalities but were among America's "brightest and best" makes even more critical the question of whether they should be tried for planning and executing the policy that led to death and injury for more than a million people in Indochina. Their trial will almost certainly not occur. If it did, it would probably not convince the war planners that they were guilty of anything but mistakes without moral or legal implications. However, if any one of these men should be presented to the Senate as a candidate for high office, the possibility of his "personal complicity in barbarous war crimes" should be thoroughly investigated. A climate of respect for international law must be created.

828
Black, Stuart C., and others. RADIOIODINE STUDIES IN DAIRY COWS FOLLOWING PROJECT PALANQUIN. Southwestern Radiological Health Lab., Environmental Protection Agency, Las Vegas, Nev., May 1971. 60 p. illus. Sci RR
Microfiche PNE-914F

"This study performed under Memorandum of Understanding (No. SF 54 373) for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission."

A study was conducted during Project Palanquin in which seven dairy cows were exposed directly to the effluent cloud. Three of the cows were sacrificed for tissue distribution studies. The secretion of radioiodine in milk from the other four cows was measured for several weeks. Fifteen lactating cows were divided into three groups and were fed either fresh green chop or spread hay contaminated by the Palanquin effluent. The secretion of ^{131}I was measured in the milk of these latter cows for several weeks also. The peak milk

concentration of ^{131}I was higher in the cows exposed directly to the effluent than it was in the cows eating contaminated forage. The possible reasons for this unexpected result are discussed and they indicate the problems encountered in conducting inhalation experiments in the field. The peak ^{131}I concentration appeared in 2-3 days in the milk of cows fed contaminated forage, and the peak milk concentration to peak forage concentration ratio was approximately 0.03. The peak ^{131}I concentration in forage or vegetation or the integrated air concentration was more accurate for predicting the peak milk concentration as compared to other surveillance data collected during this event. The tissue distribution study indicated that the peak thyroid concentration occurred at 76 hours after exposure, that 33.6% of the estimated intake was present in the cow 56 hours after exposure, and that the ^{131}I concentration in fetal thyroids was 2.4 times the maternal thyroid concentration. (Abstract supplied)

829
Bowles, Chester. FIVE MAJOR BLUNDERS BY THE U.S. IN ASIA. Saturday review, v. 54, Nov. 6, 1971: 28-31. illus. Z1219.S25, v. 54

American mistakes in Asia can be attributed to a frequent misinterpretation of the political and social climate and an insistence that military capacity is the key to success. The United States blundered in China by choosing to support Chiang Kai-shek and "the old regime dominated by war lords, landlords, and monopolists who had been exploiting the Chinese people for centuries." In Korea American insistence on pushing the North Korean invaders back to the Chinese border extended the war for two years and ten months and cost an additional $45 billion and 25,000 U.S. dead. In Taiwan the U.S. Government agreed to re-equip and train the Nationalist Army until it was ready to conquer the mainland. In Southeast Asia the "Vietnam debacle" was escalated at a cost of $120 billion, 45,000 American dead, and "the destruction of the country and the people we had set out to 'save.'" In South Asia U.S. military supplies for West Pakistan have been used not to deter Chinese or Soviet aggression, but to subdue the East Pakistan uprising and to threaten India. Unless the United States can temper its military-oriented policies with an appreciation of the political, economic, and social forces at work in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, it will find itself increasingly "at odds with a sizable majority of mankind."

830
Bredow, Wilfried von. [INFORMATION AS A MEANS OF COMMAND, PROMOTION, AND ENLIGHTENMENT. THE PRESS AND PUBLICITY WORK OF THE BUNDESWEHR] Information als Führungs-, Werbungs- und Aufklärungsmittel. Die Presse- und Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Bundeswehr. Publizistik, v. 16, no. 3, 1971: 238-249. PN4703.P8, v. 16

Attributes to the multifunctional role of the Bundeswehr Information Office conflicts of interest inconsistent with the place of objective information in a democratic society. The office is responsible at once for public information, command information, and promotional publicity. The requirements for an effective promotional program, Bredow relates, have led at times to image polishing and the suppression of information unfavorable to the West German armed forces. A recent reorganization of informational activities better separates programs and facilitates greater political coordination. How effective the new structure will be Bredow does not predict, but he feels that the opposition will call political coordination a disguise for partisan collusion.

831
CAMPUS RESEARCH: A GIANT IN TROUBLE. U.S. news & world report, v. 71, Dec. 20, 1971: 33-37. illus. JK1.U65, v. 71

American universities are beginning to suffer the consequences of a sharp decline in the growth rate of Federal, state and private financing of university research. Economic recession, Government economy moves, and exasperation with student radicalism are major causes of the decline. A shift in emphasis from basic research, most of which was done on campus, to applied research, which in large part is done elsewhere, and from the hard sciences to the life and social sciences has added to the problem. As might be expected, defense-related research has been the hardest hit; this is in line with the new concern to find solutions to pressing social problems. Some schools are now on the edge of financial crisis; nearly all are experiencing some degree of discomfort. Sooner or later, society too is bound to feel the pinch of this slowdown. Scientists are hoping that the situation will improve, but few expect, and many do not want, a return to the "golden age" of the 1950's and 1960's. Most now agree that the universities overextended themselves in those years and fell too much under the influence of the Government. But the nation cannot forgo the benefits of the scientific enterprise for long, and new, better-safeguarded methods of channeling research funds to the university community will have to be devised.

832
Chain, Sir Ernst. DEFENCE AND THE SCIENTIST. Listener, v. 86, Aug. 26, 1971: 267-268. illus. AP4.L4165, v. 86

"'Controversy' (BBC 2). Sir Ernst Chain's remarks are based on his Robert Waley-Cohen Memorial Lecture, 1970."

The scientist directly engaged in defense research and development is not responsible for the uses to which his discoveries are put. He can be a most valuable element in ensuring the continued existence of the nation, and the decision whether to fight is not his to make. In war scientists

should be expected to contribute to the fullest extent of their talents, like all other citizens. The immense destructiveness of modern weapons ensures against their use, and scientists must keep these weapons technologically advanced to preserve their credibility. Were scientists to abandon their research in the hope of preventing war, their action would almost certainly enhance the likelihood of hostilities.

833
Dickson, Thomas I. MILITARY INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Dec. 1971: 29-35. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

The assumption made by critics of the military-industrial complex that "size-is-influence-is-power-is-control" does not stand up to the realities of American political life. As big business and big labor have discovered already, countervailing forces at work in American society seem always to prevent the conversion of size into control. Any influence of the military-industrial complex is due not to its size but to the circumstance that it advocates views concerning world politics and American security that are widely shared by the rest of the American community. The truth is that attacks on the complex are just one more manifestation of a recurrent phenomenon in U.S. politics--the resort to the "devil theory" to explain why things went wrong. Reforms were needed, but in many cases they have already been undertaken by military men themselves. Further, whatever the merits of particular criticisms, the question whether the interests pursued by the complex are the interests of the community at large is always a legitimate matter of concern. What the nation needs from the critics, however, is more facts and logic and less emotion.

834
THE FEAR THAT FUELS THE ARMS RACE. I. F. Stone's bi-weekly, v. 19, Oct. 4, 1971: 1, 4. E740.I2, v. 19

Fear of unemployment is one factor that keeps the arms race going at its "costly and insane" pace. Critics of arms spending suggest that job-creating alternatives could be devised, but these critics are too tactful to point out that "arms spending is a form of welfare for the rich; it may be a poor creator of jobs but it is a major producer of profits." A "gap" scare is often evoked to rally support for the defense budget. This year one gap threat was caused by a Soviet swing-wing bomber which, it was claimed, would "put the U.S. five years behind in strategic bomber development," unless development of the new U.S. B-1 bomber moved ahead. Later this claim was generally disproved and some senators questioned the logic of building a strategic bomber if Soviet ABMs were capable of hitting faster flying missiles. Nevertheless, proposals to cut the B-1 budget have received little support.

835
Fleckenstein, Bernhard. [BUNDESWEHR AND INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY] Bundeswehr und Industriegesellschaft. Boppard am Rhein, H. Boldt [c1971] 290 p. (Wehrwissenschaftliche Forschungen. Abteilung: Militär, Staat und Gesellschaft, Bd. 2) UA710.F45

Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Preface of the military deputy.--Editor's preliminary remark.--pt. 1. The underlying principles of the Bundeswehr.--pt. 2. Bundeswehr in society.--pt. 3. Bundeswehr and institutions. --pt. 4. The internal realm of the Bundeswehr.--Short biography of the authors.

Articles by military officers, lawyers, and sociologists on the many-faceted problems associated with the presence of modern military forces in the highly developed industrial society of the German Federal Republic.

836
Garrett, Banning. THE STRANGE ECONOMICS OF THE VIETNAM WAR. Ramparts, v. 10, Nov. 1971: 34-39. illus. AP2.R19, v. 10

The Pacific Studies Center's journal, Pacific Research and World Empire Telegram, will publish "a more detailed and documented version of this article."

Argues that the Vietnam War "has been a war to create economic opportunity rather than merely to seize existing resources and treasure." Garrett reviews the years of the French colonization of Vietnam to explain the economic situation inherited by the United States. Bombing and defoliation have "forced urbanization" by driving refugees to the cities where, despite problems, they provide cheap labor and a mass market of future consumers. It is generally agreed that if Vietnam can be kept from the Communists, it can attract investment in such projects as the propagation of miracle grain rice. However, "the environment for economic development will not derive from a negotiated settlement but rather from a 'continued' winding down of the war" to provide adequate protection for investments made so far. Garrett finds no reason to expect American disengagement from Vietnam.

837
Gault, William B. SOME REMARKS ON SLAUGHTER. American journal of psychiatry, v. 128, Oct. 1971: 450-454. RC321.A52, v. 128

"This paper was one of the winners of the Essay Prize on Aggression and Violence awarded at the 124th annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, Washington, D.C., May 3-7, 1971."

Offers an explanation of how otherwise normal men, when caught up in the combat experience, are capable of participating actively in the slaughter of defenseless civilians. Gault bases his discussion on experience gained as a psychiatrist with the U.S. Army in Vietnam. He suggests that six

factors may be involved in the metamorphosis of the citizen soldier into a killer of innocents--the ubiquity of the threat and the consequent universalization of the enemy; the dehumanization of the enemy; the dilution of personal responsibility; the intensity of the pressures to act; the movement of psychopaths into positions of dominance; and the ready availability of massive firepower.

838
Gresham, Paul A., and others. USE OF A SUSTAINED-RELEASE MULTIPLE EMULSION TO EXTEND THE PERIOD OF RADIOPROTECTION CONFERRED BY CYSTEAMINE. Nature (London) v. 234, Nov. 19, 1971: 149-150.
QL1.N2, v. 234

Claims some success in the use of a sustained-release multiple emulsion to extend the radioprotective period of cysteamine. Heretofore, the effectiveness of radioprotective chemicals has been limited by the fact that "they are often metabolized so rapidly that they give protection only for a short time." In the experiment reported here, in which mice were administered the radioprotective chemical cysteamine (mercaptoethylamine, MEA) in a sustained-release multiple emulsion and then exposed to X-irradiations at a dose rate of 200 rads/minute, it was found that use of the emulsion not only extended the radioprotective period, but it increased the dose reduction factor as well. Protection against the lethal effects of X-irradiation was quite evident.

839
Hoffmann, Stanley. WAR CRIMES: POLITICAL & LEGAL ISSUES. Dissent, v. 18, Dec. 1971: 530-534.
HX1.D58, v. 18

Argues that in a counter-guerrilla activity, specifically the Vietnam War, war crimes may occur because of the "obliteration of any clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants." This assumption leads to a second question: who, if anyone, should be held responsible and punished for these crimes? Hoffmann suggests that some battlefield crimes can be attributed to individuals who should be so tried. More general crimes of aggression and genocide committed because of overwhelming demands for victory or military priorities deserve wider attribution. The political and military leaders implicated should be retired as should be the lawyers, moralists, and politicians who argued for the wrong goals. The general citizenry that allowed its leaders to behave criminally must be "made aware of its own responsibilities." Hoffmann concludes that the problems are very complex and that discussion on the ethical and philosophical level may be more productive than circular charges of criminality.

840
Kaufman, Richard F. MILITARY BUDGET: DOUBLE-TALK BOOKKEEPING. Nation, v. 213, Nov. 1, 1971: 429-432. illus.
AP2.N2, v. 213

Budgetary distortion intensifies the difficulty of obtaining an accurate picture of current military spending. For example, the budget for the Military Assistance Program was cut severely, but the funds for this purpose were included in the "Support of Other Nations" section of the Pentagon's budget where they increased from $100 million in 1964 to $2.3 billion in 1970. The Food for Peace program is a well-known case of concealment through mislabeling. When hidden costs are retrieved and added together, it becomes clear that the national security budget has gone down only very slightly, and that Administration claims that a peacetime economy has been achieved are baseless. "The New Economic Policy, with its strong resemblance to wartime economic controls, should dispel any remaining doubts about the kind of system we live under."

841
Krylov, Konstantin K. SOVIET MILITARY-ECONOMIC COMPLEX. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 89-97. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

From the beginning, Soviet economic planning has stressed the maximization of state power. Military industries are grouped with those that produce the means of production and given the highest development priority. This has begun to bother some Soviet economists. An overemphasis on military production heavily burdens the Soviet economy and often frustrates economic rationality. Furthermore, it is now generally realized that a broad and balanced industrial base offers the surest support for national defense. Nevertheless, military and economic planning continue to go hand in hand, and, as one result, it is impossible to determine how much the Soviet Union actually spends on defense. Supplementary expenditures in other parts of the state budget account for a large share of defense spending and are less subject to fluctuations than the basic military budget. A change in the size of this military budget does not carry the weight it would in the West. Despite its advantages, the Soviet military-economic complex is unable to give full support to the strategic aspirations of the Soviet leadership. Military industries seem to suffer from many of the same problems that afflict the Soviet economy as a whole. In any case, industrial weakness goes far to explain the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence.

842
Melman, Seymour, comp. THE WAR ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES; READINGS ON MILITARY INDUSTRY AND ECONOMY. New York, St. Martin's Press [1971] 247 p. illus.
HC110.D4M42
Bibliography: p. 243-244.

Partial contents.--The scale of military economy: World military expenditures, 1969, by U.S.

Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The war machine under Nixon, by I. F. Stone. Arms sales and foreign policy, by U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations. Cost and status of major weapons systems. Toward a permanent war economy? by Walter J. Oakes.--The military-industrial firm: A theory of the military-industrial firm, by John F. Gorgol. Weapons systems: a story of failure, by Bernard D. Nossiter.--Economic consequences of military industry for the economy as a whole: The defense sector: an evaluation of its economic and social impact, by Arthur F. Burns. The balance of military payments among states, by James R. Anderson. The price of war, by Bruce M. Russett. What the Vietnam War has cost, by Terence McCarthy.--Convertibility of military industry to civilian economy: Characteristics of the industrial conversion problem, by Seymour Melman. Arms firms see postwar spurt, by Bernard D. Nossiter. Economic and social consequences of disarmament, by United Nations.--Index.

Collection of popular and specialist readings considering the impact of the military industry on the national economy. The order of presentation is "first, the characteristics of the military-industrial firm; second, the nature of its impact on the economy as a whole; and, finally, the problem of conversion from military to civilian economy." The United Nations report on the consequences of disarmament notes that the present level of military expenditures absorbs a large part of the human and material resources that could otherwise be used to improve the world's socioeconomic status.

843
Menzel, Paul T., comp. MORAL ARGUMENT AND THE WAR IN VIETNAM; A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS. Nashville, Aurora [1971] 281 p.
DS557.A6M435
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. A just war?: Is the war in Vietnam just? by David Little. Mister Little--the answer is "no!" by Arthur B. Ogle. A just war or just a war? by David Little. Charlie's long march, by Jean Lacouture. Crisis manager, by John McDermott.--pt. 2. Genocide?: On genocide, by Jean-Paul Sartre. After Pinkville, by Noam Chomsky. How shall counter-insurgency war be conducted justly? by Paul Ramsey.--pt. 3. Solutions?: Vietnam: the case for extrication, by David Schoenbrun. Solutions, by Mary McCarthy. Vietnam: the bloodbath argument, by D. Gareth Porter and Len E. Ackland. The Vietnam negotiations, by Henry A. Kissinger. The official United States position in negotiations: address by President Nixon; press conference with Secretary Rogers; statement at Paris by negotiator Walsh. The official National Liberation Front position in negotiations: introduction, by Gabriel Kolko; the ten points, by the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam. How not to negotiate, by Theodore Draper. The bases of accommodation, by Samuel P. Huntington. They call it a "third solution," by Alfred Hassler.--pt. 4. Can ethics, ideology, and history meet?: The cold warrior's story of Vietnam, by Carl Oglesby. We cannot accept a Communist seizure of Vietnam, by Robert A. Scalapino. The Vietnamese and their revolution, by John T. McAlister, Jr. and Paul Mus.

Collected reprinted essays dealing with various aspects of the American involvement in Vietnam. Menzel recognizes his own opposition to the American presence there but asserts that he has attempted to present a range of viewpoints. The problems of defining morality are discussed. The book's unifying theme is the question of what the United States ought or ought not to do.

844
Morokhov, I. D., comp. NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES; A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES. [Translated for Univ. of California Lawrence Radiation Lab., from Atomnye vzryvy v mirnykh tselyakh, Atomizdat, Moscow, 1970] Livermore, Feb. 1971. 190 p. Sci RR
Microfiche UCRL-Trans-10517

Several articles by Russian authors on industrial uses of underground nuclear explosions and phenomena associated with underground nuclear explosions are presented. These include: studies of single and multiple nuclear excavation explosions; the influence of the surrounding media on the effects of underground nuclear explosions; long range contamination from underground nuclear explosion fallout; atmospheric contamination by radioactive gases released from cratering explosions; a model for calculating fallout dispersion following an underground nuclear explosion; and atmospheric and soil contamination from single and multiple nuclear cratering explosions. (Abstract supplied)

845
Nordyke, Milo D. THE USE OF MULTIPLE NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES FOR GAS STIMULATION. Nuclear technology, v. 11, July 1971: 303-314. illus.
TK9001.N72, v. 11

An analysis has been made of the use of multiple nuclear explosives in a single emplacement hole for the stimulation of the production of natural gas from a low permeability gas reservoir. Both simultaneous and sequential firing have been considered. Although the physical effects of simultaneous or sequential firing are difficult to quantitatively predict, it is shown that for an area where the gas deposit is thick (>500 ft) and the maximum yield is limited by seismic considerations, the use of sequential firing is significantly more advantageous from an economic viewpoint. An economic analysis of a specific gas formation was made, assuming the use of sequential explosions for the commercial development of an entire gas field. Assuming a wellhead gas price of 30¢ per 1000 ft^3, the internal rate of return on the required investment varied from 13 to 27%,

depending on the properties of the reservoir. Before these projections can be realized, a large number of technical and operational problems must be solved. (Abstract supplied)

846
Otway, Harry J., Ronald K. Lohrding, and Morris E. Battat. A METHOD FOR ESTIMATING THE RISK FROM A PLOWSHARE DETONATION. Nuclear technology, v. 11, July 1971: 323-330.
TK9001.N72, v. 11

A method is presented for estimating the risk to the public from an underground Plowshare detonation, with a sample application to a hypothetical gas storage experiment. The method considers the probability of fission-product release as well as the frequencies of various wind and weather conditions. The fission-product release vs probability relationships were determined by a statistical analysis of applicable Nevada Test Site data, using a multivariate discriminate analysis technique. These relationships may be applied to most Plowshare underground engineering applications with the exception of those in media having formation pressure, such as natural gas stimulation. Results of the sample application indicate that the risks to the public from a Plowshare detonation are very small and that consideration should be given to executing experiments without planning for specific weather conditions. (Abstract supplied)

847
Peirson, D. H. WORLDWIDE DEPOSITION OF LONG-LIVED FISSION PRODUCTS FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Nature (London) v. 234, Nov. 12, 1971: 79-80.
Q1.N2, v. 234

Reports the results of a computation of the worldwide distribution of long-lived fission products from high-yield nuclear weapons tests. The deposition over time and cumulative totals are given, and the mechanisms of distribution and methods of calculation explained. The findings, based on rainwater samples taken at 28 collecting stations between latitudes 70°N and 76°S including 8 stations in the United Kingdom, compare favorably with the results of an independent U.S. estimate, in which a separate sampling system and different methods of analysis and integration were used. The findings also are consistent with estimates of the total amount of long-lived fission products produced by nuclear explosions.

848
Pomonti, Jean-Claude. THE OTHER SOUTH VIETNAM: TOWARD THE BREAKING POINT. Foreign affairs, v. 50, Jan. 1972: 253-269.
D410.F6, v. 50

Appraises the current situation in Vietnam with analysis of Thieu's uncontested election, the tenacious Vietnamese will to survive, the prevailing anti-American sentiment among the people, the growth of urban ghettos in a formerly rural country and the country's economic dependence on America. Pomonti expects the American withdrawal to be followed by a return to the Vietnamese roles and identities suspended during the period of foreign intervention. Fighting and confusion will occur as new alliances are worked out and new compromises considered. For awhile South Vietnam will appear to be ungovernable and headed for long turmoil. But beyond the tension "this period will have a sense of direction and permanent, well-founded values, particularly the society's desire to cohere." Eventually some government will find its level and a negotiated settlement will emerge.

849
Rapoport, Roger. THE GREAT AMERICAN BOMB MACHINE. New York, Dutton, 1971. 160 p.
UF767.R33 1971

Criticizes the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission for failure of its safety measures in nuclear weapons research and development, reveals unpublicized errors in American nuclear weapons tests that have endangered the environment, describes the process of U.S. nuclear weapons production and testing, and concludes by condemning the U.S. nuclear weapons program and proposing unilateral American disarmament.

850
REVIEW SYMPOSIUM: WAR CRIMES. Yale law journal, v. 80, June 1971: 1456-1528.
LL

Critical analyses of Telford Taylor's Nuremberg and Vietnam: An American Tragedy (cited as item 334 in vol. 8, no. 1 of this bibliography) by Noam Chomsky, Marshall Cohen, and Richard A. Falk in articles titled "The Rule of Force in International Affairs," "Taylor's Conception of the Laws of War," and "Nuremberg: Past, Present, and Future" respectively.

851
Russett, Bruce M. THE PRICE OF WAR. In Martin Oppenheimer, comp. The American military. [Chicago] Distributed by Aldine Pub. Co. [1971] p. 68-87. illus. U766.066
Reprinted from Trans-action, v. 7, Oct. 1969.
H1.T72, v. 7
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

A study of American military spending in relation to the Gross National Product (GNP) designed to determine what suffers when defense costs go up. Russett observes that military expenditures, calculated as percentages of the GNP, have not declined to the post-World War II level and measured 9.2 percent in 1968. He rejects the argument that defense spending is necessary "to take up the slack and maintain demand in an otherwise depression-prone economy," and points out that such reasoning may help keep the arms race running. After

statistical analysis, Russett concludes that the burden of defense spending falls on the consumer. He argues that "a one dollar rise in defense expenditures will, all else being equal, result in a decline of $.42 in private consumption."

852
Sakanoue, Masanobu, and Taeko Tsuji. PLUTONIUM CONTENT OF SOIL AT NAGASAKI. Nature (London) v. 234, Nov. 12, 1971: 92-93.
Q1.N2, v. 234

Reports the results of a test to determine the level of plutonium residues in surface soils at Nagasaki, Japan, 24 years after the 1945 nuclear attack. The tests indicate that plutonium levels are still remarkably high, particularly as compared with strontium-90, which is found in amounts that differ very little from those occurring in areas that have not been exposed to nuclear attack. The plutonium concentrations in the Nagasaki soils are ten times those of areas where the only plutonium source is fallout from nuclear weapons tests. It appears, therefore, that plutonium is not easily removed from soils by natural processes.

853
Salomon, Jean-Jacques. SCIENCE POLICY IN PERSPECTIVE. Studium generale, v. 24, Sept. 30, 1971: 1027-1037. AP30.S76, v. 24
"This paper was delivered on 17th October 1970, at a meeting of the Association of German Scientists in Hannover, Germany."

The threat to the environment and quality of life spun off by scientific and technological developments has virtually ended the love affair between science and the state. This was always an unequal match with science subservient to the military and economic policies of the state. The first military phase in this relationship began with World War II and was characterized by phenomenal growth in nuclear research, aerospace science, and electronics. In the second or economic phase it was believed that "some challenges were necessary to perpetuate both the process of the commitment of the State towards research activities and the process of transferring scientific discoveries into rapid practical results." The assumed relationship between science and economic growth proved unreliable. Now a new phase of science policy is emerging: the societal phase. Today avoiding "social and cultural surprise" may become as important as the dangers of "technological surprise" and "technological gap" were in the military and economic phases.

854
Schulte, Ludwig. [BUNDESWEHR IN CONFLICT. TEXTS, ANALYSES, OPINIONS ON THE MILITARY TODAY] Bundeswehr im Konflikt. Texte, Analysen, Meinungen zur soldatischen Existenz heute. Frankfurt am Main, Bernard und Graefe, 1971. 112 p.
DD259.2.S377
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Military mission and the ensurance of peace.--Defense mission of the armed forces.--Aspects of ensuring peace.--Transformation of deterrence.

Examines the role of the West German armed forces in the current paradoxical situation in which the social pressures for détente contradict the policies and means that have made possible the relaxation of tensions. The strategic deterrent itself has now become the source and object of tension. Schulte concludes that deterrence as an instrument of foreign policy is inextricably connected with political priorities and that, if foreign policy is peacefully inclined, deterrence is a basis for détente and the maintenance of peace.

855
Slocombe, Walter. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC PARITY. London, Institute for Strategic Studies, 1971. 32 p. (Adelphi papers, no. 77)
U162.A3, no. 77
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Contents.--Nuclear forces as political instruments.--The Soviet build-up and the current balance: In what sense has 'parity' been achieved?--Effects of parity on nuclear options.--Effects of parity on perceptions of national power.--Effects of parity on American-Soviet confrontations.--Appendices.

Examines the meaning of the Soviet achievement of strategic nuclear parity with the United States for international relations and politics. Slocombe discounts the significance of the new balance in the overall competition of the two powers for international power, influence, and position. He reasons that since the ability of each to destroy effectively the other remains, the new relationship will hardly alter the technical and military possibilities of nuclear weapons. The benefits of earlier superiority were basically illusory. The United States is well positioned to match any Soviet spurt to achieve its own pointless superiority. Soviet willingness to take additional foreign policy risks is possible, but not at all certain. Slocombe notes that U.S. attitudes determine in part the psychological importance of parity, so the Government would do well not to make more of this numerical equality than is necessary. A meaningful strategic arms limitation agreement "would reduce the greatest potential source of politically troublesome inferences from parity--the fear that parity is merely a prelude to substantial American inferiority." Parity will contribute little to the successful or unsuccessful resolution of a future Soviet-U.S. confrontation like the Cuban missile crisis. "The pattern of effects of parity in Europe--probably the political theatre most sensitive to changes in

the American-Soviet relationship--can be expected to be essentially congruent to that elsewhere: negligible technically, and politically significant only where parity acts in parallel with other, stronger forces."

856
Smith, Sam. THE NEED FOR PLOWSHARE GAS. Nuclear technology, v. 11, July 1971: 331-334.
TK9001.N72, v. 11

Natural gas satisfies approximately one-third of the nation's energy requirements, but domestic gas reserves are declining because the volume being consumed exceeds the quantity being discovered. Unrealistically low regulated wellhead prices have stimulated demand while eliminating the economic incentives needed to compensate for the risks associated with exploration. Natural gas is a particularly important energy resource because it is the cleanest of the fossil fuels. Increased use of natural gas by industry for electric power generation and as a transportation fuel could substantially improve air quality. However, current supply limitations foreclose such possibilities. Other methods of securing additional supplies of natural gas include pipeline imports from Canada and Alaska and imports of liquefied natural gas from Alaska and foreign sources. Coal gasification technology is expected to supplement supply by 1980. These alternatives are costly and most will not be available for a number of years. Nuclear explosive stimulation technology is capable of making a significant and needed contribution to natural gas supply if supported by federal planning and funding. (Abstract supplied)

857
Stigler, George J., and Claire Friedland. PROFITS OF DEFENSE CONTRACTORS. American economic review, v. 41, Sept. 1971: 692-694. illus.
HB1.E26, v. 41

A popular supposition holds that defense firms enjoy larger profits than other sectors of the economy. Data indicate that this notion is "correct for the 1950's and incorrect for the 1960's--a better score than popular views usually have." The defense sector appears to be economically riskier than other sectors, for "there is a positive correlation between the instability over time of the sales of a company and its share of defense business."

858
Strange, Susan. GOVERNMENT SPENDING OVERSEAS. In her Sterling and British policy: a political study of an international currency in decline. London, New York, Oxford University Press, 1971: 178-201. illus. HG939.5.S75
Issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

The British Government has done considerable spending abroad, to the detriment of its balance-of-payments position. After World War II, when the empire was dismantled, Britain itself had to begin paying for its troop commitments. Military costs rose after conscription was abolished in 1958 and increased recruiting incentives became necessary. In the 1960's Britain was spending more on defense than any other nation of comparable rank, and the burden was felt on its balance of payments. "The political justification for this large foreign establishment East of Suez was at no time in the decade 1958-1968 made absolutely clear." Economic assistance to developing Commonwealth nations was the next largest overseas expense, and the final major overseas expenditure was for British diplomatic missions, whose costs more than doubled between 1952 and 1967. "From a longer historical perspective, it may be that the heavy British Government spending of the period 1958-1968 will come to be seen as a temporary reflection of the difficult post-imperial adjustment process."

859
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Western Environmental Research Laboratory, Environmental Surveillance Program. FINAL REPORT OF OFF-SITE SURVEILLANCE FOR PROJECT SCHOONER, DECEMBER 8, 1968. 1971. 184 p. illus. (TID-4500)
DLC

"This surveillance performed under a Memorandum of Understanding (No. SF 54 373) U.S. Atomic Energy Commission."

Presents the results of the off-site radiological surveillance program conducted following the nuclear excavation experiment Project Schooner in December 1968, as part of the Plowshare Program. Graphs, diagrams, tables, maps and charts document the external gamma exposure rate observed off-site, the integrated external gamma exposure of off-site residents, and the concentration of the radionuclide tungsten-187 in the air, vegetation, snow, and milk and water supplies. "Analyses of radiological data indicate that radioactive effluent arising from this event did not present any health hazard to the off-site population, based on presently accepted safety criteria established by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission."

860
Van Dyke, Jon M. THE LAWS OF WAR. Center magazine, v. 4, July/Aug. 1971: 21-33. illus.
N&CPR

Claims that the United States has violated the laws of war, specifically the criteria of judgment used at the Nuremberg trials, and advocates an investigation of American war crimes by a group of international experts appointed by the United Nations. Van Dyke holds that the American military has not been able to police conduct in its own ranks and that "the feeble record of investigations of war crimes thus far conducted in the

United States make it unrealistic to expect any American investigating tribunal to judge fairly the criminal responsibility of American military and political leaders." The international commission that he recommends would not be given punitive powers, but the United States would be expected to cooperate.

861
Vukadinović, Radovan. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX AND US FOREIGN POLICY. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Mar. 5, 1971: 39-41.
D839.R4, v. 22

A reexamination of the role of the military-industrial complex in shaping American foreign policy is in order because of the failure of the Vietnam War and the increasing public dissatisfaction with the high costs of military hardware purchased at the expense of needed social programs. While the cooperation between the military and industry is, indeed, "becoming stronger and stronger with the development of new techniques and the new role of the Pentagon in policy formation," the public is beginning to demand a limit on the military forces and their influence on American political life. No force has emerged, however, to counter the dangerous influence of the military-industrial complex on American foreign policy or to reduce the danger of its independent pursuit of its own political ambitions either at home or abroad.

862
Wade, Nicholas. ABM DEBATE: LEARNED SOCIETY SPLIT BY OLD GRIEVANCE. Science, v. 174, Oct. 15, 1971: 276-277. Q1.S35, v. 174

A panel of inquiry established by the Operations Research Society of America (ORSA) has decided that Massachusetts Institute of Technology scientists who gave congressional testimony against the Safeguard antimissile system used false or misleading statements. The judgment and the ensuing controversy threaten to cause a major split in the Society. Set up without regard for possible conflicts of interest, the panel apparently proceeded on the assumption that professional expertise alone would ensure fairness in discharging what amounted to a self-assumed quasi-judicial inquiry. The opposition declined to participate, but the panel went ahead. When it was learned that the panel's report was to be published without being subjected to ORSA's standard refereeing process, five members of ORSA's council protested. ORSA apparently believed that either the supporters or the opponents of Safeguard presented the facts incorrectly, but the opponents have observed that there was no agreement as to just what the facts were. "The issue of the inquiry cuts across an ideological divide between those who have continued to work with the defense establishment and those who have ceased to do so."

863
Weeks, Albert L. THE PENTAGON'S ALLIANCE WITH INDUSTRY. American Legion magazine, v. 90, June 1971: 24-29, 49-54. illus.
D570.A1A32, v. 90

Takes issue with some recent criticisms of the military-industrial complex, including charges that the Pentagon and defense industries have a strangle-hold on the U.S. economy, that defense contracts are used to buy votes in Congress, that a military-industrial lobby pressures decisionmakers into assuming warlike postures, and that American wars are the outcome of a conspiracy between war profiteers and corrupt political authorities. Weeks claims that none of these charges is supported by the facts. The complex is the backbone of U.S. national security and therefore is indispensable; in its present form, it poses no danger to the liberties or prosperity of the American people.

864
Wermuth, Anthony L. THE IMPACT OF CHANGING VALUES ON MILITARY ORGANIZATION & PERSONNEL. Waltham, Mass., Westinghouse Electric Corp., Advanced Studies Group, 1970. 30 p. (ASG monograph no. 6)
U21.5.W47
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Military interest in value impact.--Value impact in general.--The youth movement.--Broad cultural value changes in process.--Potential impact upon military organization and personnel.

Assesses the impact of changing cultural values and social norms on the U.S. military system, with particular reference to problems of organization and personnel management. Among the new elements that the U.S. military must contend with are changes in public attitudes toward war; a more comprehensive social welfare system that reduces the attractiveness of military fringe benefits; a blurring of the dividing line between military and civilian life, with consequent permeation of the former with the values, attitudes, and life styles of the latter; the erosion of authority; greater attention to military affairs by the national press, which tends to misrepresent or distort the military viewpoint; a reaction against the bigness and impersonality of large organizations; new sexual mores and sex roles; and changes in the composition of the work force. The military may be unpopular, but its functions remain no less necessary, and means must be found to cope in a realistic way with these new conditions.

865
Werth, Glenn C. THE SOVIET PROGRAM ON NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES FOR THE NATIONAL ECONOMY. Nuclear technology, v. 11, July 1971: 280-302. illus.
TK9001.N72, v. 11

Seven recent Soviet publications describe their program on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. Nine applications are under development: the creation of water reservoirs, control of gas well blowouts, stimulation of oil reservoirs, creation of underground storage, stimulation of gas reservoirs, breaking of rock for underground mining, formation of canals, removal of overburden for mining, and construction of dams. Eleven nuclear projects have been carried out, involving fifteen nuclear explosives. Three applications have been reduced to practice. Nine proposed nuclear projects have been described. In carrying out these projects, the Soviets make extensive technical measurements. Analyses of these measurements, with laboratory model experiments and theoretical work, are used to project the economic benefit to the Soviet economy that is possible by employment of nuclear explosives. (Abstract supplied)

461-167 O - 72 - 6

INSTITUTIONS AND MEANS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF PEACE

INTERNATIONAL LAW

866
Ackley, Richard T. INTERVENTION VERSUS NONINTERVENTION. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 77-82. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

Since the publication of Vattel's Droit du Gens in 1758, various definitions of "intervention" have been proposed, but none has won universal acceptance from scholars. Modern students seem to favor the view that "intervention refers to organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority structures of the target." They also favor inclusion of economic and political as well as military means among the instruments of intervention, thus moving very close to the operational definition proposed by Baldwin that equates intervention with influence. So defined, great-power intervention in the affairs of other states would appear to be inevitable, and the impossibility of noninterventionist or isolationist foreign policies is a corollary. Further, if intervention is a fact of international life, it cannot be condemned out of hand as evil, and, for a great power, the moral issue of whether or not to intervene is moot. The issue is not whether, but when, and to what end, it should intervene. The decision must be the great power's own: until a world community has been established, agreement as to whether or not a particular intervention is or is not justified is most unlikely.

867
AGREEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES. Edited by K. Zemanek, assisted by L.-R. Behrmann. New York, Springer-Verlag, 1971. 268 p. (Österreichische Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht. Supplementum 1) JX4165.A34

Papers prepared as a result of research conducted at the 1969 session of the Center for Studies and Research, Hague Academy of International Law.
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--pt. 1. Co-operation agreements and the law relating to agreements concluded by international organizations, by D. M. McRae. The capacity of international organizations to conclude headquarter agreements, and some features of these agreements, by L. Bota. Formal aspects of the technical assistance agreements concluded by the UN family of organizations, by Joke M. van Wouw.--pt. 2. The capacity of international organizations to conclude treaties, by G. Hartmann. The concept and forms of treaties concluded by international organizations, by C. Osakwe. Organs competent to conclude treaties for international organizations and the internal procedure leading to the decision to be bound by a treaty. Negotiation and conclusion of treaties by international organizations, by H. Neuhold.

Answers the question of the inapplicability to treaties to which international organizations are parties of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties by presenting a series of comparative studies of international agreements analyzed in three contexts: "that of a particular organization's treaty practice, that of a specific subject matter and that of the general law of treaties." The study examines the extent of revision required if the Vienna Convention is to be applicable to agreements concluded by international organizations.

868
Bastid, Suzanne B. [PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS] Droit international public, le droit des organisations internationales. Paris, les Cours de droit, 1970. 3 v. (550, ix, xii p.)
JX3310.B3D75

At head of title: Université de Paris. Institut d'études politiques.
Includes bibliographies.

Textbook treatment of the study of international law and organizations. The author focuses on various types of international organizations, beginning with the Holy Alliance, and discusses the role these and other international organizations have played in international politics. She concludes with a survey of the origins, structures, and goals of the League of Nations and the United Nations.

869
Chkhikvadze, V., and O. Bogdanov. WHO IS HINDERING PROGRESS IN THE DEFINITION OF AGGRESSION? International affairs (Moscow) Oct. 1971: 22-28.
D839.I465, 1971

Review of the work of the United Nations Special Committee for the Definition of Aggression set up on the initiative of the Soviet Union in 1968 focusing on the obstacles to progress. Aggression is an instrument of imperialist foreign policy. The Soviet Union and other peaceloving states seek a definition of aggression in order to create "an

objective instrument for bringing aggressive acts to light and stopping them." Though the United States and its imperialist allies say they support the work of the Committee, "practical work increasingly demonstrates that the West is trying to undermine the Committee's work."

870
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS; papers of a conference of the American Society of International Law and the proceedings of the conference. Ed. by Stephen M. Schwebel. Leyden, Sijthoff; Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., Oceana Publications, 1971. 538 p. JX1248.E4
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Preface.--Towards a theory of international obligation, by Oscar Schachter.--Compliance with United Nations decisions on peace and security and human rights questions, by Rosalyn Higgins.--Procedures developed by international organizations for checking compliance, by Louis B. Sohn.--Implementation of decisions of international organizations through national courts, by E. Lauterpacht.--Application and enforcement of international organization law by national authorities and courts, by Eric Stein.--The European communities, by Michel Gaudet.--The Council of Europe, by H. Golsong.--Applying, and effecting compliance with, decisions (with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights), by A. H. Robertson.--Proceedings: The participants in the Bellagio Conference.--The agenda.--The transcript of the discussion, edited by Stephen M. Schwebel.

Papers and proceedings of the third conference of official legal advisors convened to examine the effectiveness of decisions of international organizations in member states. The agenda of the meeting included discussions on the choice of techniques to carry out a decision, the legal effects of member states' approval of international decisions, the legal effects of international decisions on states, the measures to assure compliance, and the unique problems of federal states in complying with international decisions.

871
Erven, L. WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Aug. 5, 1971: 38-39. D839.R4, v. 22

The World Conference of Lawyers was founded "as an international, non-governmental organization, . . . with the purpose of serving the consolidation of world peace through the advancement of . . . the authority of law and legal institutions in international relations. . . ." Though participants in the Fifth World Conference represented nearly all of the world's legal systems, all agreed that law must be made to prevail over force, and that there is a mutual dependence between law and peace.

872
Forman, William H. SHOULD THE LAW OF WAR BE CHANGED? American Bar Association journal, v. 57, Oct. 1971: 986-989. illus. LL

Suggests that the My Lai events may have stimulated interest in a review and possible revision of the international law of war. Forman briefly summarizes the development of these laws, particularly in regard to the treatment of civilians and prisoners. He also reviews instances of trial and sentence for violations of the law of war. He notes that after the Philippine insurrection of 1901 an American general was found guilty of violations but was only admonished and retired since his orders had not been executed or "taken literally." Forman concludes that because of public concern over My Lai a board might be selected to review and possibly revise the law of war for American forces.

873
Malawer, Stuart S. UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE JORDANIAN CIVIL WAR AND AIR PIRACY. International problems, v. 10, June 1971: 31-40. Hebr

Discusses the Jordanian civil war and the Palestinian acts of aerial piracy within the context of the failure of the Arab-Israeli talks of September 1970 and outlines the legal policies the United States might undertake to promote the movement toward peace in the Middle East.

874
Rumpf, Helmut. [VIENNA CONVENTION: THE TREATY OF TREATIES] Wiener Konvention: der Vertrag der Verträge. Aussenpolitik, v. 22, Oct. 1971: 581-592. D839.A885, v. 22

Examines the Vienna Convention designed to codify international treaty law as the "treaty of treaties" and weighs the significance of its contribution. Although more than 100 states attended the Conference, fewer than ten states have ratified the Convention or acceded to it. With its attempt to codify bases for invalidating and contesting treaties, Rumpf states, the Convention in part goes beyond existing international law as if anticipating a world legal system in enforcement. In view of the very few ratifications, Rumpf continues, it is doubtful whether the treaty will come into force. If the Convention does not strengthen international treaty law as intended, it can still exercise an indirect influence on customary law.

875
Schachter, Oscar, Mahomed Nawaz, and John Fried. TOWARD WIDER ACCEPTANCE OF UN TREATIES. New York, Arno Press, 1971. 190 p. JX1248.S34
"A UNITAR study."
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--General observations: Legitimacy of the concern of international organizations for wider acceptance of conventions concluded under their auspices. Methods used by international organizations to foster acceptance of treaties. The importance of wider adherence to United Nations treaties for the accomplishment of the purposes of the United Nations.--Analysis of statistical data regarding acceptance of United Nations treaties.--International measures to foster acceptances: Reporting by states to international organizations. Information, advice and assistance by international organizations.--National administrative machinery.--Constitutional requirements and legislative procedures concerning the conclusion of treaties.--Final clauses relating to acceptance.--Succession or accession by new states to multilateral treaties previously extended to dependent territories.--Relation of reservations to acceptance.--Annexes.--Index.

"Ascertains empirically to what extent the extrinsic factors, such as constitutional-parliamentary procedures, administrative mechanics, personnel requirements, translation facilities, 'final' clauses and others, operate as impediments to [treaty] acceptance . . . [and] describes to what extent lack of 'definitive succession' has impaired the continued application of treaties extended by the predecessor Governments." The authors examine the range and variety of national and international measures for a more universal acceptance of treaties. Annexes include charts and lists of signatures and acceptances of multilateral treaties.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION

877
Alcock, Norman Z. LET'S MAKE NATIONAL POWER THE BASIS OF U.N. VOTING. War/peace report, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 5-7. JX1901.W38, v. 11

Nations are unwilling to cede more power and authority to the United Nations because of the unrepresentative and impractical voting systems in the General Assembly and the Security Council. A new system of voting in the Security Council, weighted in terms of national power, could be the basis of a realistic reform that would assure justice to all U.N. members. In such a system national power would be measured by a "social development index" and population would be multiplied by the social development index to determine a country's voting strength in the Security Council. The General Assembly voting system would remain unchanged. Elimination of the permanent-member veto would mean that no one country, no matter how great its voting strength, could prevent adoption of a proposal favored by two-thirds of the Council, the new majority required for passage. Because this system would work to the disadvantage of large but poor nations, U.N. development aid would be tied to voting strength. All nations would be taxed a percentage of their gross national product, with those below a set per capita level receiving payments designed to develop the recipients and thereby increase their voting strength. As social development indexes approached the set maximum limit of 100, the aid payments program would begin to liquidate itself.

876
Thompson, William S. THE BELGRADE WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CONFERENCE. American Bar Association Journal, v. 57, Nov. 1971: 1121-1125. illus. LL

The convocation in July 1971 of the Fifth World Conference on World Peace Through Law in Belgrade, Yugoslavia marked the first time a world law conference has been held in a Socialist country. The choice of site underscored the Conference's faith that "people of all nations, regardless of race, color, creed, language or system of government must come together and must work together to build law for peace." One controversial issue under discussion was the future of the United Nations. After much debate a proposal to elevate the United Nations to a parliament with international lawmaking powers was defeated. A special feature of the Conference was a mock trial of a case involving "the fall on Yugoslavia's National Assembly Building of a spaceship assembled by Italy with Japanese parts and launched by the United States," causing injury to a Venezuelan and the death of an Ethiopian. The trial demonstrated that international disputes can be resolved in courtrooms by reason and law without resort to threat of war.

878
Belfiglio, Valentine J. THE UNITED STATES AND WORLD PEACE. Berkeley, Calif., McCutchan Pub. Corp. [1971] 74 p. JC361.B45
Bibliography: p. 71-74.

Contents.--Introduction.--Nature of the issues and values.--Nationalism and the nation state. The establishment of the nation state. The demise of the nation state. International law. Individual liberty. Religion and ethics. The state and the individual.--The role of the United States: The world state. Tactical principles. A national association for the establishment of a world state.--Conclusion.

Offers a theory of world history in which nationalism and the industrial revolution are temporary and ambivalent interruptions--progressive in some respects, harmful and dangerous in others--of an evolutionary progress that is sweeping man forward from the subjective individualism of the prehistoric primitive into citizenship in an international community based on objective, rational, and universal law. Man has now reached the stage where these aberrations of the recent past can be overcome and the advance resumed, but only the

United States has the power, the liberal democratic outlook, and the assimilative cultural experience to take the lead in this enterprise. A national association for the establishment of a world state ought to be established to bring pressure on the U.S. Government to force it to assume this leadership role.

879
Berner, T. Roland. THE SYSTEMS APPROACH TO PEACE. Vista, v. 7, July/Aug. 1971: 12-15. illus.
JX1977.A1U562, v. 7

Advocates the establishment of an International Nuclear Peacekeeping Organization and a Nuclear Court to ensure world peace. The proposed organization would possess the nuclear weapons of the present nuclear powers, and could outlaw nuclear weapons and their use throughout the international community. The Nuclear Court, whose decisions would be enforced by the organization, would arbitrate disputes among the nuclear five. Berner contends that little progress has been made toward a Nuclear Court despite the imminence of a nuclear holocaust. He concludes with a proposal for a congress convened in behalf of humanity to call on the nuclear five "to set up a Commission to make recommendations for procedures to be followed in setting up the Nuclear Court" and the International Nuclear Peacekeeping Organization. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, according to Berner, "are hopefully a step . . . to an ultimate commitment to the elimination of the nuclear threat."

880
Claude, Inis L. THE SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS. Virginia quarterly review, v. 47, autumn 1971: 481-504.
AP2.V76, v. 47

Americans came enthusiastically to the United Nations, seeing it not as the salvation of the world but as an ideal worth trying. The attitude toward the organization has become a touchstone of political ideologies, which see it as either the hope of man or his great undoing. Declining enthusiasm shows itself not in hostility but indifference, on the whole a healthy development. The United Nations will function best if it is regarded as a political institution rather than as a cause. For Americans the United Nations symbolized their country's acceptance of a permanent role in the international scene and its expiation for the earlier rejection of the League of Nations. The United Nations also symbolized the emergence of a new and better world order, in which the United States, by the positive exercise of its great power, would play a prime role. Now the emphasis is negative, with the United Nations' effectiveness judged by the degree to which its members, particularly the United States, allow restraints on their international behavior. Peace will be better served, however, if the United Nations acts to stimulate rather than inhibit state action, especially by the United States.

881
Cleveland, Harlan. CAN WE REVIVE THE U.N.? Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 9, summer 1971: 205-218. D839.A85, v. 9
"This paper is drawn from The United Nations in Perspective, ed. E. Berkeley Tompkins, to be published in 1972."

Experience indicates that with few exceptions international organizations do the best job of solving international problems. The United States, therefore, has a stake in seeing these organizations prosper. The most effective international organizations are those that possess strong executive leadership and take decisions by consensus rather than irrelevant parliamentary voting procedures. If the United Nations is ever to be a practical proposition, reforms involving an overhaul of the General Assembly and Security Council and a formal review of the Charter must be considered. Something should also be done to create a "consensus of the concerned" within the organization, to see that upcoming vacancies are filled with the greatest care, to encourage the Secretary-General to engage in factfinding on his own initiative, and to provide a standby military force. In addition to all this, the United Nations must be given important jobs to do--for example, a sizable role in Southeast Asia. The United States, and other countries as well, must recognize that the world of independent sovereignties is, and always was, a myth and begin to fashion the means of organized cooperation accordingly.

882
Dietterich, Paul. PHASED WITHDRAWAL: A REPORT ON THE ATTRITION OF CHURCH EFFORTS AT THE UNITED NATIONS. Christian century, v. 88, Nov. 10, 1971: 1326-1329. BR1.C45, v. 88

American church organizations are gradually removing themselves from active participation in the affairs of the United Nations. The United Church of Christ, the United Presbyterian Church, and the Episcopal Church are no longer able to maintain full-time staffs at the United Nations, and there are indications that the programs of other churches may be in trouble. Economic factors and domestic demands, for example, racial and urban problems, are the prime reasons for the cutbacks, although there are veiled anti-U.N. expressions reflecting discouragement with U.N. action and effectiveness. Some churchmen hope to see church cooperation expanded so that religious views at the United Nations will come from "one strong voice" rather than many small ones. Today a "storm-tossed" United Nations, threatened with bankruptcy and internal tensions, needs the support of church members who believe the United Nations is "essential to world peace, world justice and world order."

883
Galtung, Johan. CONDITION FOR THE SECURITY COMMISSIONS. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Mar. 5, 1971: 1-4. D839.R4, v. 22

Proposes ten guidelines for the organization of regional security commissions, four principles on which relationships between regional security commissions and the U.N. Security Council could be based, and five rules applicable to the situation of the divided nations of the world in regard to such commissions. "Many, even most, large-scale cases of direct violence have their roots within a region and can be solved within a region."

884
Gromyko, Andrei A. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 38, Nov. 1, 1971: 38-45.
FN6121.V52, v. 38
Also translated in Reprints From the Soviet Press, v. 13, Oct. 29, 1971: 5-23.
DK266.A2R37, v. 13
"Delivered to the 26th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, New York, October 4, 1971."

Speech before the 26th General Assembly stressing the parallel course followed by the United Nations and the Soviet Union toward peace, and emphasizing Soviet achievements like the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin. Gromyko outlines Soviet proposals for U.N. consideration: the admission of both Germanys, convocation of a European security conference, a U.N. role in ending the arms race, and a draft resolution convening a world disarmament conference. After reviewing American aggression in Indochina and Israeli aggression in the Middle East, Gromyko focuses on the need to implement the Declaration on Strengthening International Security.

885
Halasz, Louis. CHINA'S WELCOME AT THE U.N.: EXUBERANT TODAY, SOUR TOMORROW? War/peace report, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 3-4.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

When it takes its seat in the United Nations, the People's Republic of China will harvest a rich crop of good will from the developing nations, which see China as a fellow member of the Third World struggling unaided to develop itself and as a nuclear power to be noticed. Most excited about Chinese admission are the Latin Americans, while the Africans are cautious and many of the Asians skeptical and even apprehensive. Those with much to lose from Chinese entry are India and Japan, but most affected is the Soviet Union, which will for the first time face serious competition as sole champion of the downtrodden. The United States will not at all be a loser. The developing countries' disillusionment with China is inevitable, however, as it becomes clear that the Chinese place national interest ahead of revolutionary leadership.

886
Hudson, Richard. CATCH-22 IN THE UNITED NATIONS. War/peace report, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 7-9.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

The United Nations is caught in its own version of "Catch-22": governments must give part of their sovereignty to the United Nations to ensure a more secure world, but only the governments can induce themselves to do it. It is essential to change the present international system, in which each nation-state is responsible for its own security. The U.N. voting system should be altered so that international peacekeeping and security decisions can be made when a proposal receives nine out of fifteen votes in a vetoless Security Council and a two-thirds General Assembly majority, which in turn must be composed of nations representing a simple majority of the world's population and nations contributing at least half of the regular U.N. budget. The right of appeal to and speedy ruling by the World Court would provide an additional safeguard. To allay great-power fears concerning elimination of the veto, this new system could retain the veto right of the Security Council's permanent members for a trial period, with the system automatically reverting back to the present method if a veto should ever be cast. This scheme is close enough to the present setup to make it comprehensible. Peacekeeping decisions would be difficult to secure, but no one nation by itself could block action. The requirements for General Assembly approval retain the present one-nation-one-vote arrangement, introduce an element of democratic majority through the population component, and ensure that a decision could be implemented through the financial component.

887
Jakobson, Max. [THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS] Die künftige Rolle der Vereinten Nationen. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Sept. 10, 1971: 589-598.
D839.E86, v. 26
"The article is based on an address delivered on April 15, 1971 before a Princeton University conference on the United Nations."

The basic international factors leading to the creation of the United Nations and to a belief in its peacekeeping role disappeared soon after its founding. The wartime alliance and the British and French empires were replaced by the cold war and a vast number of new states from Asia and Africa. The conflicts which the United Nations was designed to prevent changed in nature and eluded the Charter mechanisms for handling them. The apparent ineffectiveness of the United Nations and its alleged irrelevance to the changed international setting have prompted revisionist movements to rewrite the Charter and downgrade the organization. Revising the Charter runs the risk, however, of disagreement on an improved text or any

text at all and to deny its peacekeeping role would condemn the United Nations to obscurity. What should be done, on the contrary, is to strengthen the United Nations by adopting the principle of universal membership (meaning membership for the Chinese People's Republic, the two German states, and a united Korea and Vietnam), revitalizing the Security Council through regularly scheduled meetings on the foreign-minister level, and developing guidelines for future peacekeeping actions.

888
Kim, Yong-koo. DIVIDED NATIONS AT THE U.N.? Korea Journal, v. 11, Apr. 1971: 54, 50.
DS901.K7, v. 11

The admission of the divided nations--Korea, Germany, China, and Vietnam--to the United Nations has been gaining acceptance in international opinion. Much time has passed since these nations were split, but their reunion appears as remote as ever. The parts of the divided nations have come to terms with the reality of division. They are taking a new look at U.N. membership and plans for their admittance have been advanced.

889
Newsom, David D. AFRICAN ISSUES AT THE U.N. Vital speeches of the day, v. 38, Oct. 15, 1971: 14-17.
PN6121.V52, v. 38

"Delivered before the Atlanta Press Club, Atlanta, Georgia, September 21, 1971."

The African tensions and concerns descending from colonialism and legalized discrimination lead to economic, social and political problems. Within the United Nations militant African states seek support for liberation movements, economic sanctions against Rhodesia, and an embargo on arms sales to South Africa. By virtue of its U.N. membership, the United States is involved in these issues, and it has supported specific sanctions and embargoes as well as the principle of sovereign dignity for all nations. However, the United States and the United Nations can do only so much toward resolving the unhappy fact of apartheid and the denial of majority rule. A U.N. resolution is not a law. Such reprisals against offending nations as isolation, economic sanctions, or military force are not effective or desirable. The United Nations can, however, provide the pressure of continued discussion and steadily work "toward human rights and self-determination for all in southern Africa."

890
Rogers, William P. FOREIGN POLICY AND THE UNITED NATIONS. Vital speeches of the day, v. 38, Nov. 1, 1971: 34-38.
PN6121.V52, v. 38

"Delivered to the 26th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, New York, October 4, 1971."

Calls on all nations to work diligently for peace and stresses U.S. dedication to this goal. Rogers thinks the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are of fundamental importance. Negotiations on Berlin and strategic arms have been most important and further talks, including perhaps a European conference and negotiations on mutual force reductions, might lead beyond coexistence to cooperation. At the same time the United States will not neglect its responsibilities to smaller nations and will continue its aid efforts. Rogers explains the U.S. position on representation for the Chinese in the United Nations, discusses the future of the United Nations and its need for continued leadership and financing, and proposes an interim Suez Canal agreement preparatory to a more permanent settlement in the Middle East. He concludes that "peace must be achieved and maintained not by the decree of a few but by accommodation among many."

891
THE UNITED NATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS. Edited by Leon Gordenker. Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 1971. 241 p.
JX1977.U55

"Written under the auspices of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University."
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Introduction, by Leon Gordenker.--The United Nations and the international system, by Oran R. Young.--The United Nations and the League, by Stanley J. Michalak, Jr.--An inquiry into the successes and failures of the United Nations General Assembly, by Gabriella R. Lande.--International organization and internal conflicts: some emerging patterns of response, by Linda B. Miller.--The United Nations and economic and social change, by Leon Gordenker.--The United Nations: various systems of operation, by Richard A. Falk.--Index.

Examines the past, present, and future roles of the United Nations in the international system. The essays analyze specific questions like the differences and likenesses of the League and the United Nations in handling international conflict, how member states respond to the General Assembly's recommendations, and U.N. economic aid and its effect on member government policies. Young explores the relationship between the United Nations and its international environment, while Michalak classifies conflicts involving peace and security measures undertaken by the League and the United Nations. Lande's essay, which is based on an examination of 29 resolutions, deals with the conflict resolution functions of the organization. Miller explores what happens when intrastate conflict spills over into the international arena, while Gordenker investigates the influence of U.N. economic and social programs on the developing countries.

892
Wildhaber, Luzius. [MEMBERSHIP OF PERMANENTLY NEUTRAL STATES IN THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL] Die Mitgliedschaft dauernd neutraler Staaten im UNO-Sicherheitsrat. Österreichische Zeitschrift für Aussenpolitik, v. 11, no. 3, 1971: 131-145.
DB47.043, v. 11

Examines the suitability of a permanently neutral state undertaking the responsibilities of collective security from the example of Austria's announced and subsequently withdrawn candidacy for a seat in the U.N. Security Council. Wildhaber considers whether a conflict of interests exists between a permanently neutral state's own constitutional requirements and the obligations of Security Council members to intervene, with force if necessary, against violators of the peace. After examining the intentions of the U.N. founders, the text of the Charter, and the subsequent development of the organization, Wildhaber concludes that the United Nations, originally a club of the victorious states, has become a quasi-universal world organization and that the Security Council has become a negotiating forum for peace. In this changed environment a permanently neutral state can play a useful role although not without some risks.

INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY FORCES

OTHER MEANS

893
Brock, Peter. TWENTIETH-CENTURY PACIFISM. New York, Van Nostrand Reinhold Co. [1970] 274 p. (New perspectives in political science, 26)
JX1952.B745
Bibliography: p. 265-269.

Contents.--Preface.--Varieties of pacifism at the outset of the twentieth century.--The pattern of conscientious objection: World War I.--The Gandhian philosophy of nonviolence.--Pacifism and war resistance: the interwar years.--The pattern of conscientious objection: World War II.--Pacifism in the nuclear age.--Selected bibliography.--Index.

Analyzes the pacifist movement since 1914, which Brock characterizes as "combining advocacy of personal nonparticipation in war of any kind or in violent revolution with an endeavor to find nonviolent means of resolving conflict."

894
Derriennic, Jean-Pierre. [TRENDS IN PEACE RESEARCH] Tendances des recherches sur la paix. Revue de défense nationale, v. 27, Aug./Sept. 1971: 1290-1302. illus. D410.R45, v. 27

Notes that peace research presents a basic ambiguity: on the one hand it claims to be scientific and therefore objective when dealing with war and violence, while on the other it belongs to the world of politics insofar as it is an action against war. Derriennic traces the development of the three basic trends in the evolution of peace research: (1) sociological, or research into the ultimate causes of wars with the objective of building a true peace; (2) strategic, or the game-theory study of the actors' roles in the unwinding of conflicts in order to determine the techniques of control and limitation; and (3) globalist, or the inclusion of wars and the use of violence in the complex of the processes of social transformation. The author favors the strategic approach to peace research, commenting that it "has contributed to a better comprehension of the mechanisms of conflict and the elaboration of the methods of communication allowing the belligerents better to preserve their common interests."

895
Donelan, Michael D. PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES; REPORT OF A CONFERENCE AT DITCHLEY PARK, 8-11 JANUARY 1971. Enstone, Eng., Ditchley Foundation [1971] 36 p. (Ditchley paper no. 36)
JX4473.P4

Contents.--Preface, by the Provost of Ditchley.--Terms of reference.--Report. Introduction. Prevention. Limitation. Solutions. Supervision. Conclusion.--Conference membership.

Discusses the prevention, limitation, possible solution and the supervision of peaceful settlement of international conflict. Success in resolving international disputes depends on the self-control the disputants exercise in the conflict and on the willingness of the disputants to persevere through a succession of small steps to a solution.

896
Falk, Richard A. WORLD ORDER TODAY: THE QUEST FOR STABILITY; BEYOND DETERRENCE: THE QUEST FOR WORLD PEACE; DESIGNING A NEW WORLD-ORDER SYSTEM; WORLD ORDER ACTIVISM: FIRST STEPS. In his This endangered planet; prospects and proposals for human survival. New York, Random House [1971] p. 215-413.
HC79.E5F27

Hypothesizes that the nuclear age is being superseded by the ecological age which makes even greater threats to mankind's survival. Falk examines in detail the competing claims of nation versus state and predicts the endurance of the sovereign state as the organizing principle of international society, despite pleas for cooperation and community. He considers world-order schemes already proposed for the nuclear age and notes their essential respect for human dignity and the unity of mankind. Instead of promoting a world-order scheme of his own, he proposes some guidelines to advance ecological improvement and to counter the

war system. These include wider announcement of ecological emergencies, establishment of environmental study centers, and organization of a world political party. To combat war he would urge "no first strike declarations," arms control negotiations, and a reverse arms race stimulated by reduced military spending. Although arms control may be only a substitute for long-range change, it may gain the time necessary to bring about heightened public awareness of the needs of the "endangered planet."

897
Gottesfeld, Zehava, Bonnie S. Ebstein, and David Samuel. EFFECT OF LITHIUM ON CONCENTRATIONS OF GLUTAMATE AND GABA LEVELS IN AMYGDALA AND HYPOTHALAMUS OF RAT. Nature: new biology (London) v. 234, Nov. 24, 1971: 124-125.
QH301.N37, v. 234

Reports the results of an experiment to test "the effects of lithium treatment, acute and prolonged, on the glutamate and GABA levels in the amygdala and hypothalamus of the rat." Lithium salts have been used with some success to treat manic-depressive disorders, and have been shown to reduce aggressive behavior in animals. The experiment reported here is an attempt to discover elements of the mechanism by which lithium produces its results.

898
Jordan, Robert S., comp. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATIONS. New York, Oxford University Press, 1971. 299 p. JX1954.J67
Bibliography: p. 272-287.
Includes bibliographical footnotes.

Partial contents.--Prologue: Observations on the life of an international civil servant, by Richard W. Van Wagenen.--pt. 1. The evolution of international administration: The influence of the British secretariat tradition on the formation of the League of Nations, by Robert S. Jordan. The evolving concept of the International Civil Service, by Robert R. James. Functional agencies and international administration, by Richard Symonds.--pt. 2. The application of international administration: International administration of peace-keeping operations, by Larry L. Fabian. Political-military regionalism and international administration, by Francis A. Beer. Economic regionalism and international administration: the European communities experience, by Lawrence Scheinman. The national bureaucracies of the EEC member states and political integration: a preliminary inquiry, by Werner Feld.--Epilogue: The international civil servant in law and in fact, by Dag Hammarskjöld.--The contributors.--Index.

Essays on the life of an international civil servant, the evolution of international administration, and the contemporary applications of international administration in the international community.

899
Kent, George. THE APPLICATION OF PEACE STUDIES. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, Mar. 1971: 47-53. JX1901.J6, v. 15

Criticizes Anatol Rapoport's article "Can Peace Research be Applied?" (cited as item 392 of vol. 7, no. 1, of this bibliography). Kent states that the American Government places fewer restraints than the researchers themselves on publicly-funded radical peace research. He finds that many peace studies have little practical relevance to policy and suggests reallocating energies from empirical studies of causes to systematic policy analysis of social problems, involving studies of the means of their implementation, control and cure. Kent disagrees with Rapoport's assertion that peace researchers should become a political force in their own right. Rather, Kent concludes, they should expand the application of peace studies by coordinating their research with the needs of Government policymakers.

900
Klönne, Arno. [PEACE AND POLITICAL EDUCATION] Friede und politische Bildung. WH; Werkhefte, v. 25, July 1971: 196-208.
BX803.W2, v. 25

Peace education is becoming increasingly identified with political education, and the definition of peace itself is being changed to prevent it from becoming a defensive strategy for preserving the status quo. Peace has come to mean not a static condition characterized by an absence of war but rather a dynamic movement of social development in which conflict is present as a constituent element. Adapting this new concept of peace to the classroom requires a more perceptive elaboration of prevailing peace themes: elimination of prejudice, obsolescence of war, individual responsibility, individual and collective propensities toward aggression, civilian defense, world law, and the convergence theory. These themes should be examined within the context of two central requirements: the arousal of public sentiment for disarmament from the lethargy created by the abatement of the cold war and the discovery of new nonviolent methods to effect socio-structural changes.

901
Lepenies, Wolf, and Helmut Nolte. [CRITIQUE OF ANTHROPOLOGY; MARX AND FREUD, GEHLEN AND HABERMAS; ON AGGRESSION] Kritik der Anthropologie; Marx und Freud, Gehlen und Habermas; Über Aggression. [München] C. Hanser [c1971] 140 p.
BF575.A3L45
Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface.--Experimental anthropology and emancipatory practice. Reflections on Marx and Freud, by Wolf Lepenies and Helmut Nolte.--Anthropology and social criticism. On the Gehlen-Habermas controversy, by Wolf Lepenies.--On the socio-theoretical implications of the aggression concept, by Helmut Nolte.

Essays developing a concept of anthropology that seeks the constants of human nature and identifies what is unchangeable and what can be changed by modification of the social environment.

902
Lloyd, William B. MEDIATION: THE FORGOTTEN APPROACH TO PEACEMAKING. War/peace report, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 10-11. JX1901.W38, v. 11

The growing body of peace research literature has ignored mediation and conciliation as a means of achieving and maintaining peace. Throughout the 1960's third-party offers to mediate differences involving the United States were rebuffed by Washington. The value of mediation and conciliation in resolving domestic disputes is recognized, but the method is rarely applied in international relations where traditionally mediation has been characterized as the weak state's confession of its impotence. "But with the popular awakening sparked by the failure of the Pax Americana concept in Vietnam, it would seem very moderate to demand that the acceptance of mediation offers and a willingness to negotiate on that basis be established as a norm of U.S. foreign policy." Setting an example could lead to acceptance of the process by other major powers. Precedents established by third parties in deciding disputes would strengthen international law. The Swiss, by their historical example of settling differences among the quarrelsome cantons, could be the key to making mediation a standard international practice, as they attempted to do in the League of Nations. The United Nations should offer Switzerland and Austria the status of permanent neutrality and charge them with the responsibility of continually making peace initiatives.

903
Mallory, Leslie. ROMANIAN NOTEBOOK: THE PUGWASH CONFERENCE, 1971. Spectator, v. 227, Sept. 18, 1971: 411. AP4.S7, v. 227

Impressions of the sights, sounds, and atmosphere of the 1971 Pugwash Conference. "Pugwash is a time of feelers, an experimental resonator in which the genuine interaction of opinion overrides the frozen stances of protocol." For a week the Conference members talked and planned and shaped material into reports. Attention, in accordance with tradition, centered on the nuclear arms race, but peripheral problems like poverty, population, and internal strife also found their place. Then, after a farewell luncheon, Mallory "corkscrewed back down the mountains," reflecting on the Conference and "feeling more and more that the world's bureaucrats were the only real obstacles that lay between these sensible men and the peace they so manifestly desired."

904
Nye, Joseph S., and Robert O. Keohane. TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION. International organization, v. 25, summer 1971: 329-349. JX1901.I55, v. 25

Defines transnational relations as "contacts, coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of government" and studies their influence on international affairs. The absence of government sponsorship or control is the key to the definition. Nye and Keohane are also interested in organizations (governmental, nongovernmental, and international), and their relationship to transnational affairs. They suggest five major effects of transnational interactions and organizations: "1) attitude changes, 2) international pluralism, 3) increases in constraints on states through dependence and interdependence, 4) increases in the ability of certain governments to influence others, and 5) the emergence of autonomous actors with private foreign policies that may deliberately oppose or impinge on state policies."

905
Ofshe, Richard. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PACIFIST STRATEGIES: A THEORETICAL APPROACH. Journal of conflict resolution, v. 15, June 1971: 261-269. JX1901.J6, v. 15

"The research for this paper was supported by a grant from the Committee on Research of the University of California, Berkeley."

An analysis of recent research on pacifist behavior as a strategy in conflict situations is presented, a theory which accounts for these results is developed, and the theory is extended into situations that have not been previously considered. The argument is developed that the researches on pacifist behavior which have been reported have been concerned with the wrong variables and that consideration of the social structure of both the experimental situation in which the researches were conducted and the social structure of real world situations in which pacifist strategies are attempted leads to the recognition that if pacifist strategies are ever effective at producing cooperation in conflict situations, it is through their ability to affect the audiences that observe the conflict rather than to affect the pacifist's opponent. Finally, a theory is constructed which yields predictions for the effects of certain independent variables on the probability that the pacifist's strategy will be successful in mobilizing the members of an audience to act to restrain the pacifist's opponent. (Abstract supplied)

906
Radovanović, Ljubomir. NON-BLOC COUNTRIES AND THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Aug. 5, 1971: 13-14, 27.
D839.R4, v. 22

Like the Warsaw Pact and NATO states, the nonalined states support the idea of a European security conference but their role in such a conference is not clear. If, as anticipated, the European conference deals only with the unsettled problems of Europe which are in fact the complex of inter-bloc relations, the nonalined countries would be outnumbered and their influence limited. The major blocs would be expected to agree once again on the principles of balance and spheres of interest to guarantee European peace. Such an agreement would work against the non-bloc states that are caught in between opposing spheres of interest. Active participation of the non-bloc countries in the decisionmaking at the conference is necessary to prevent the creation of a mere inter-bloc agreement and to promote a wider collective security agreement.

907
Rakette, Egon H. THE MISSION TODAY OF THE GERMAN EXPELLEES. Central Europe journal, v. 19, Apr. 1971: 129-134. illus.
DB200.7.S74, v. 19

Urges German expellees from the Eastern regions now living in West Germany to preserve the cultural heritage of their lost Heimat by seeking a reconciliation with Poland. They should take advantage of the opportunities for contact afforded by German-Polish sporting events, exchange programs, tourism, and seminars. "All expellees and refugees must share this historical task of working for the reconciliation of [the] two nations . . .," Rakette concludes.

908
Rougemont, Denis de. "RES PUBLICA EUROPÉENNE." Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 9, summer 1971: 235-242. D839.A85, v. 9
"Summary of an address on receiving the Robert Schuman Award, University of Bonn."

The basic unity of Europe--a unity in the pursuit of diversity--already exists. Federalism would be its natural political expression, but every effort in this direction has been foiled by the nation-state. The time has come when Europeans must choose between a future of collective strength and one of personal liberty: if they choose power, then the old nation-state on the Napoleonic model but expanded to continental dimensions should be their aim; if they choose liberty, then the nation-state, as a reality and as an idea, must be transcended, its sanctity debunked, its absurdity exposed. In the latter case, new systems of regional and transnational cooperation must be devised, based on the diversity of the European peoples and on a new hierarchy of political and social values--freedom rather than power and quality rather than quantity. Such an aspiration is not utopian: on the contrary, "it is the primary political task of our time."

909
Selg, Herbert, comp. [DOOMED TO AGGRESSION? PSYCHOLOGICAL STIMULI FOR PEACE RESEARCH] Zur Aggression verdammt? Psychologische Ansätze einer Friedensforschung. Unter Mitarbeit von Wilfried Belschner [et al.] Stuttgart, W. Kohlhammer [c1971] 168 p. illus.
BF575.A3S43
Bibliography: p. 155-168.

Contents.--Editor's preface.--pt. 1. The frustration-aggression theory, by Herbert Selg.--pt. 2. Drive models for aggression, by Ute Jakobi, Herbert Selg, and Wilfried Belschner.--pt. 3. Learning aggressive behavior, by Wilfried Belschner.--pt. 4. Psychophysiology of aggression, by Gottfried Lischke.--pt. 5. What is aggression? (a contribution to the problem of the terminological limitation and application of psychological concepts), by Franz Schott.--Editor's postscript.--Notes.--Bibliography.

Contends that the frustration-aggression and aggressive-drive hypotheses are dangerous in that they promote the spread of aggressive conduct and increase the likelihood of international conflict. These theories pre-excuse aggression as an unavoidable and normal act. In their place the authors suggest a psycho-educational approach to demonstrate that aggression is learned. They call for a research program using this approach to realize "education for peace."

910
Senghaas, Dieter. [CRITICAL PEACE RESEARCH] Kritische Friedensforschung. Mit Beiträgen von Herman Schmid, and others. [Übersetzung der englischen Texte von Hedda Wagner] [Frankfurt am Main] Suhrkamp [1971] 422 p. (Edition Suhrkamp, 478)
JX1963.S454
Bibliography: p. 420-421.

Contents.--Editorial preface, by Dieter Senghaas.--pt. 1. Peace research and social theory: Peace research and politics, by Herman Schmid. Violence, peace and peace research, by Johan Galtung. The fragile reason of states, by Karl W. Deutsch and Dieter Senghaas. Pluralism and the future of human society, by Johan Galtung.--pt. 2. Strategies for conflict resolution: Theories of peace, by Johan Galtung. Plea for a revolutionary type of conflict research, by Lars Dencik. Copenhagen declaration on the situation of peace research (1969).--pt. 3. Studies on research stratety: International wars in modern times: from assumptions to statements, by J. David Singer. Problems of composition in peace research, by Dieter Senghaas. Systematic design for critical

peace research, by Fritz Vilmar. On the applicability of peace research, by Anatol Rapoport. Declaration on peace research.

Essays on peace and conflict research seeking to ascertain whether or not this new interdisciplinary science has attained a level of problem awareness sufficient to predict aggression and the use of collective force, is capable of formulating strategies appropriate for conflict resolution, and is relevant in view of the magnitude of today's sociopolitical problems.

911
Smith, Claggett G., comp. CONFLICT RESOLUTION: CONTRIBUTIONS OF THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES. Notre Dame [Ind.] University of Notre Dame Press [1971] xvii, 553 p. JX1291.S45
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--pt. 1. Theoretical approaches to the study of conflict: The analysis of social conflict--toward an overview and synthesis, by Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder. Conflict and its resolution, by Morton Deutsch. Social conflict and the theory of social change, by Lewis A. Coser. Consensus, conflict and cooperation: a sociological inventory, by Irving L. Horowitz.--pt. 2. Conflict systems: The reduction of intergroup hostility: research problems and hypotheses, by Irving L. Janis and Daniel Katz. Dimensions of conflict behavior within and between nations, 1958-60, by Raymond Tanter. Dimensions of conflict behavior within nations, 1946-59, by R. J. Rummel. A structural theory of aggression, by Johan Galtung. Is there a military-industrial complex which prevents peace?: consensus and countervailing power in pluralistic systems, by Marc Pilisuk and Thomas Hayden. On the causes of war and conditions of peace, by Werner Levi. The escalation of international conflicts, by Quincy Wright. An analytical study of the balance of power theories, by Dina A. Zinnes. Nation state escalation and international integration, by Paul Smoker. Unconventional warfare, by J. K. Zawodny. Isolation and collaboration: a partial theory of inter-nation relations, by Harold Guetzkow. Nationalism and strategies of international conflict resolution, by Daniel Katz. Societal, attitudinal and structural factors in international relations, by Herbert C. Kelman.--pt. 3. The resolution of international conflict: approaches, strategies, and policy recommendations: Predicting the termination of war: battle casualties and population losses, by Frank L. Klingberg. The termination of conflict, by Lewis A. Coser. The prevention of world war III, by Kenneth E. Boulding. Some problems of disarmament research, by I. Glagolev and M. Goryainov. United Nations use of military force, by Inis L. Claude, Jr. Graduated unilateral initiatives for peace, by Charles E. Osgood. The case for unilateral disarmament, by Erich Fromm. Guidelines for research in international co-operation, by Gordon W. Allport. Strategic models for a de-polarizing world, by Amitai Etzioni.

Reprinted essays dating from 1958 on that concentrate on recommendations for the resolution or management of conflict within the framework of behavioral studies.

912
Sutor, Bernhard. [POLITICS AND EDUCATION. REFLECTIONS ON A WAY OF TEACHING POLITICAL SCIENCE] Politik und Bildung. Überlegungen zu einer Didaktik des politischen Unterrichts. Neue Ordnung, v. 25, Aug. 1971: 241-253.
AP30.N478, v. 25

Political education should be directed toward the development of a morally oriented capacity for decisionmaking in concrete situations based on knowledge of the factors concerned. Present-day political science instruction in West German schools, however, tends toward irrelevance, ignoring issues in favor of theory and idealizing the virtues of citizenship. To be relevant and effective in a democratic society, active, participatory political science instruction must avoid two extremes: abstract attention to the trappings of democracy and blinding preoccupation with current conflicts; the one leads to disappointment and cynicism, the other to radical rejection of the existing order and consequently to revolution.

913
THE 26TH ATOMIC BOMBING DISASTER ANNIVERSARY WORLD CONFERENCE AGAINST ATOMIC AND HYDROGEN BOMBS. Japan Socialist review, no. 232/233, Aug. 1/15, 1971: 3-42. HX9.J3, 1971
The 26th Anniversary World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs was held from August 2 to 4, 1971, in Tokyo.

Contents.--Keynote on the world conference.--Hiroshima appeal.--Declaration of the world conference.--Resolution on action.--Statement of the international conference.--Resolutions of the international conference.

Statements, declarations, and resolutions calling for general and complete disarmament, the Japanese Diet's defeat of the Okinawa agreement, opposition to Japanese rearmament and nuclear weapons, total U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam, and cooperation with U.S. antiwar movements.

914
Varsavskii, C. M., and A. Parthasarathi. REPORT ON THE SYMPOSIUM. Pugwash newsletter, v. 8, Jan. 1971: 72-78. N&CPR

Surveys the papers, discussions, and observations presented at the Eleventh Pugwash Symposium which was devoted to the theme "What can scientists do for development?". This issue also contains the resolution on the prohibition of the use of biological weapons adopted at the 10th International Congress for Microbiology.

915
Vilmar, Fritz. [CRITIQUE OF "PEACE EDUCATION"--CRITICAL PEACE EDUCATION] Kritik der "Friedenspädagogik"--Kritische Friedenspädagogik. WH; Werkhefte, v. 25, July 1971: 209-213.
BX803.W2, v. 25

Peace education and peace research fail in their objectives because they seek to change the individual through idealistic appeals, abstract logic, and academic platitudes when they should be exposing the real threats to peace, that is, the ruling power elites. Critical peace research and peace education must create public awareness of the machinations of these elites (e.g., glorification of war, ideological threats, military forces, armaments industry) and public willingness to take concrete political action, including nonviolent confrontation against military and other repressive forms of authority. ". . . the theory and practice of nonmilitary collective action for effecting or safeguarding democratic structures will in the future achieve basic significance in the elimination of suicidal military ideologies, armament programs, and 'defense systems' from the spirit and interest of modern industrial societies."

916
Visser, W. J. A. CHURCH AND PEACE. NATO's fifteen nations, v. 16, Aug./Sept. 1971: 25-27.
UA646.F5, v. 16

Recent efforts by the Vatican, the World Council of Churches, and other Christian organizations to take a more active part in international politics are dangerously misguided. Sustaining these efforts is a spurious "theology of the redeemed," which for these churchmen has all but replaced the doctrine of original sin. The resulting belief that man can construct a perfect society here on earth is sheer pagan hubris. In short order this utopian thinking has seriously undermined the will and the capacity of the Western powers to resist Soviet encroachments. Make no mistake: Soviet imperialism cannot be stopped by appeals to reason and humanity. NATO, not peace committees, is the "shield and safeguard of the West."

917
Warwick, Donald P. TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE. International organization, v. 25, summer 1971: 655-674.
JX1901.I55, v. 25

It is a cardinal tenet of advocates of international exchanges of people that improved relations on a people-to-people basis can pave the way to world peace. There is, however, very little evidence to support this contention. The transnational experience can have a considerable, and often a positive, influence on an individual, depending on his age and motivation for travel and on the cultural compatibility and communication facility awaiting him in the host country. "The relationship between effects on individuals and on world peace, however, is complex and not always positive."

ARMS CONTROL: GENERAL DISCUSSION

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

918
Kutakov, Leonid N. THE UNITED NATIONS AND DISARMAMENT. [New York] United Nations [1970] 8 p. (United Nations. Office of Public Information. [United Nations publication] OPI/408)
JX1974.K86

Traces developments within the United Nations in the field of disarmament since 1945. Kutakov discusses several disarmament landmarks like the nonproliferation treaty and the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. He notes that the major threat to peace and stability comes from the nuclear arms race and other weapons of mass destruction like chemical and biological weapons and concludes that much has been learned from the disarmament negotiations of the past 25 years about conference machinery and techniques.

GENERAL ANALYSES

919
Afheldt, Horst, and Philipp Sonntag. STABILITY AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS. New York, World Law Fund [1971] 85 p. illus. (World Law Fund. Occasional papers, 1)
U163.A34

Extract from the longer work, Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhutung, cited as item 1656, v. 7, no. 4, of this bibliography.

Includes bibliographical references.

Contents.--Preface, by C. F. von Weizsäcker.--Introduction.--Development of a mathematical model based on the classical concept of stable deterrence through a reciprocal second strike capability (assured destruction).--The application of the model to the determination of stability at the strategic level.--New strategies for stabilizing the balance of power at the strategic level?--Do the new strategies provide a better way toward disarmament?--Prospects and consequences.

Develops "a mathematical model which elucidates the rather intricate relationships connecting the number of offensive missiles and their vulnerability, the number of defensive missiles and their accuracy, along with other offensive and defensive weapons." The model is applied to an analysis of a number of issues relating to the strategic arms race and disarmament. From the model, it appears that the introduction of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles and ABMs, far from improving the prospects for disarmament, actually encourages a further evolution of weapons technology and produces a dangerously unstable situation. It also appears that in the present state of international politics and military technology the outlook for stabilization through arms control is not very promising. Stable peace must wait upon the realization of vast changes in the international system and the societies of the two superpowers. Meanwhile, limited arms control measures might prove useful as one means of buying time.

920
Arkadev, N. IN THE VAN OF THE FIGHT FOR A WORLD WITHOUT ARMS. New times, no. 45, Nov. 1971: 19-22.
D839.N483, 1971

Disarmament has always been one of the most important lines of Soviet foreign policy. While it was successful in leading efforts to end atmospheric nuclear testing, the Soviet Union has encountered American opposition in banning underground tests. Much credit for the conclusion of the nonproliferation treaty, the treaty on the exploration and use of outer space, and the treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons on the seabed and ocean floor is due the Soviet Union, which backs a draft treaty on activities on the moon and supports the idea of nuclear-free zones. The Soviet Union has proposed a five-nation nuclear disarmament conference to discuss either the full range of nuclear disarmament or individual steps toward that goal. An agreement on biological disarmament has been reached and it is hoped an agreement on chemical disarmament will follow. The Soviet proposal for a world disarmament conference which has been widely acclaimed by most countries indicates the sincerity of the Soviet campaign for disarmament.

921
Blumberg, Avrom A. MODEL FOR A TWO-ADVERSARY ARMS RACE. Nature (London) v. 234, Nov. 19, 1971: 158.
Q1.N2, v. 234

Offers "a mathematical model for a two-adversary arms race." The model is described by the pair of equations

$$u_1' = (K_1 u_2 + L_1 u_2')(a - u_1)$$

$$u_2' = (K_2 u_1 + L_2 u_1')(b - u_2)$$

in which u_1 and u_2 represent the stockpiles of the two adversaries; the primed functions, u_1' and u_2', the time rate of change of these stockpiles; and a and b, the finite resource limitations on each side. The model is applied to an exploration of the consequences of several different types of armament and disarmament policy at various levels of armament.

922
Canada. Dept. of External Affairs. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT. In its Annual report; 1970. [Ottawa, Information Canada, 1971] p. 62-65.
DLC

Summarizes the Canadian Government's proposals and activities during 1970 concerning the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Seabed Treaty, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, chemical and biological agents, and mutual balanced force reductions.

923
CHIAO KUAN-HUA EXPLAINS CHINESE GOVERNMENT'S PRINCIPLED STAND. Peking review, v. 14, Dec. 3, 1971: 14-16. illus. DS701.P42, v. 14
"Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Delegation of the People's Republic of China, spoke at the plenary meeting of the U.N. General Assembly on the afternoon of November 24 [1971]. . . ."

China favors disarmament, but for many small states the prime necessity is not disarmament but defense of independence against rampant imperialist aggression. To make no distinction between aggressors and victims is wrongheaded. The superpowers are the main threat to world peace. Their arms control agreements "are in essence a camouflage for their own nuclear arms expansion in the name of nuclear disarmament, a means for consolidating the nuclear monopoly of the two superpowers and carrying out nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. . . ." The first steps towards abolishing nuclear weapons should consist of no-first-use pledges by the superpowers and their withdrawal of nuclear weapons from foreign soil. The superpowers' nuclear threats have forced China to develop its own nuclear weapons for self-defense, but China will never use nuclear weapons first or practice nuclear blackmail. China supports the convocation of a conference of all nations to achieve the total elimination of nuclear weapons. However, if the Soviet proposal for a conference is accepted, "such a world disarmament conference would inevitably become a permanent club for endless discussions that solve no substantive problems, which will result in perpetual arms expansion alongside perpetual disarmament talks." The United Nations' innumerable disarmament resolutions have become propaganda screens for the superpowers. For these reasons, the Chinese Delegation proposes that the Soviet resolution not be acted on in this session of the General Assembly.

924
Dyson, Freeman J. ARMS CONTROL AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE. Chicago, University of Chicago, 1971. 26 p. (An Occasional Paper of the Center for Policy Study. The University of Chicago)
DLC

Holds that technology is not necessarily decisive in assessing the feasibility or desirability of arms control measures. Dyson argues that the political advantages both sides gain as a result of an arms limitation agreement or test ban must outweigh the technical problems and arguments. He presents three technological arms control problems: the fission-free bomb, which failed to disrupt the test ban treaty; the ABM; and the 1817 Rush-Bagot agreement limiting naval armaments. Dyson contends that so long as both sides have a strong political interest in maintaining an agreement and are willing to negotiate or to ignore technological changes, an accord is unlikely to be adversely affected by these changes.

925
Feld, Bernard T. THE 21ST PUGWASH CONFERENCE ON SCIENCE AND WORLD AFFAIRS. Science, v. 174, Dec. 10, 1971: 1150, 1152-1154, 1156.
Q1.S35, v. 174

Reports on the proceedings of the 21st Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, which met at Sinaia, Romania, from August 26 to 31, 1971. The major concern of the Conference being disarmament and related matters, the full range of measures under discussion in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament was examined. Recommendations of the Conference's working group in International Security and Further Steps towards Disarmament included a severe (preferably zero) limitation on ABM deployment; a "meaningful" limitation on the further deployment of offensive systems, coupled with substantial reductions in the very near future; greater attention to antisubmarine warfare developments and other areas where new arms races of potentially great harm might emerge; extension of the nuclear test ban to underground testing; and a limitation on tactical nuclear weapons and conventional forces in Europe.

926
Gould, Loyal N. THE ENDC AND THE PRESS. Stockholm, Amlqvist and Wiksell [1969] 77 p. (Stockholm papers, no. 3) DLC

A study by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute describing how the press of various countries came to present such divergent reports of the meetings of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee (ENDC) in Geneva. Gould analyzes both the press coverage and the verbatim reports of the meetings over a two-week period to determine the degree and kind of selection in reporting. He finds that the national press tends to report mostly the position of its own delegation to the Conference. He concludes that the press arrangements for the ENDC were "unusually bad" and contributed "to the patchiness of the press coverage" and suggests that either the meetings should be opened or a good press officer provided by the Committee. The appendix gives a quantitative analysis of the press coverage.

927
Keys, Donald F. LAST CHANCE FOR U.S.-SOVIET PACT. War/peace report, v. 11, Oct. 1971: 14-16. illus.
JX1901.W38, v. 11

The United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating in earnest at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) because future arms control discussions will have to include China and France. "This is probably the last year in which the two superpowers will have a chance to work out agreements on arms between just themselves." Their previous monopoly of the field has meant little in the way of meaningful agreements. Progress at SALT has been encouraging. France and China cannot be expected to cooperate with the CCD, which is essentially a Soviet-American creature. Establishment of a new forum is needed, possibly through reactivation of the U.N. Disarmament Commission. Currently the CCD has been working on a ban on chemical and biological weapons and a complete ban on nuclear testing. Attempts by the United Nations to take a more active role in arms control and disarmament proceedings have been put down or ignored, but there are still useful tasks the organization could undertake to promote agreements. "In the fall of 1971, prospects for progress on disarmament, as on most other questions of world concern, appear neither bright nor bleak, but moderately hopeful."

928
Lvov, M. DISARMAMENT--BOTH NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE. New times, no. 45, Nov. 1971: 15-18. illus.
D839.N483, 1971

The necessity for disarmament is greater than ever before because of the continuing arms race; the possibility of achieving disarmament is better than before because of the new balance of power in the seventies. Imperialist forces started the arms race because the controlling military-industrial complex paid only lip-service to disarmament. Because socialism has triumphed in a substantial part of the world and achieved nuclear parity, the imperialists can no longer emasculate Soviet disarmament proposals with measures designed to "control" arms only--a ploy obviously in the interests of aggressors. The world wants peace and disarmament and it demands that governments convert expenditures on arms to social needs. The chances of solving the disarmament problem are improving as the imperialists discover the social and economic implications of the arms race for their countries.

929
PEKING AND ARMS CONTROL. Current scene, v. 9, Aug. 7, 1971: 11-12.
DS701.C9, v. 9

While itself advancing comprehensive disarmament proposals, Peking views the other international disarmament measures of recent years as a superpower plot. Maoist thought assigns only limited military value to nuclear weapons. Peking has called for Asian and Pacific nuclear-free zones, opposed the nuclear test ban treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the nonproliferation treaty, and the Seabed Treaty, and condemned the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. In 1963 China proposed a world summit conference to discuss comprehensive nuclear disarmament, repeated the proposal after its first successful nuclear test, and revived the idea in 1970. So far only Pakistan and Morocco seem to have commented officially on the Chinese plan. In 1966 Peking ended its activities in the World Council of Peace and the World Conference against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs.

930
Rubakov, V. PEKING AND DISARMAMENT. New times, no. 50, Dec. 1971: 9-10.
D839.N483, 1971

Peking's attitude towards disarmament plays into the hands of the imperialists and disappoints those states that had hoped that with Chinese admission to the United Nations the problems of disarmament could be resolved. Peking "has not hesitated to take a stand identical with that of the imperialist spokesmen in order to block the Soviet proposal" for a world disarmament conference. Peking's leaders oppose steps towards either conventional or nuclear disarmament on the obviously fictitious grounds that China is threatened by aggression from the north.

931
Terchek, Ronald J. THE MAKING OF THE TEST BAN TREATY. The Hague, M. Nijhoff, 1970. 211 p.
JX1972.7.T45
Includes bibliographical references.

Partial contents.--Introduction.--The president and the treaty.--Decision-making in the executive branch.--The media and the treaty.--Group articulation and activity.--Public opinion and the test ban treaty.--The Senate: preliminary considerations.--The Senate: the debate and vote.--Conclusions.--Appendixes.

Examines the roles of the President, executive agencies, military services, media, pressure groups, congressional committees, and the Senate in the struggle to ratify the 1963 nuclear test ban treaty. Terchek uses survey data, interviews, official documents, and memoirs to present a picture of the politics employed and coalitions constructed by both sides during the period immediately before ratification. He contends that President Kennedy was the dominant factor in the policy and decisionmaking processes, not only because of his constitutional role, but because of his management of the options he opened or foreclosed for others. Kennedy became in effect the major architect for the arms control agenda during this period.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACHES

ARMS CONTROL: SPECIFIC PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

REDUCING THE RISK OF WAR

932
[AMERICA'S STRATEGY OF DETERRENCE] Amerikas Strategie der Abschreckung. Europäische Begegnung, v. 11, Sept. 1971: 28-32. illus.
AP30.E78, v. 11

Scenario of events from the first sighting of Soviet missiles on the North American Air Defense radar screen to the launch of Minuteman missiles and the start of B-52 bombers toward targets in the Soviet Union. The safety measures built in to preclude accidental or irresponsible triggering of the fateful sequence are stressed.

933
Djerdja, Josip. THE NONALIGNED IN THE ERA OF NEGOTIATION. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Sept. 1971: 1-3. D839.R4, v. 22

The nonalined states have an important role to play in the coming change from an era of cold war to an era of negotiation. They have long opposed the bloc politics responsible for the cold war and the arms race. Since the Lusaka Conference the nonalined states have played a progressively more active role in relieving tension in Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. The long struggle in Indochina has become more a part of the nonalined cause than the other two regional struggles. It is hoped that the ideas of the nonalined states will play a major role in ending American involvement in Asia and establishing peace there and in the world.

934
Hutchins, Francis G. THE ADVANTAGES OF AN IRRESPONSIBLE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM. Public policy, v. 19, spring 1971: 275-287.
JA51.P8, v. 19

A precipitous withdrawal from Vietnam should not be considered a desperate, hasty act, as many moderate war critics do. The 1947 British withdrawal from India is a classic example of the beneficial effects this course can have for the occupied nation. Gandhi argued that an immediate British pullout, with its attendant chaos and anarchy, would serve Indian nationhood better than an orderly withdrawal. He said that in seeking a smooth transition the British would carve up India to settle their diverse obligations rather than allow Indians to resolve conflicts and adjust to a new internal balance. "The best way for South Vietnam to become an independent, unified nation is for it to fight for its life all by itself, without equipment, without efficient organization, and without foreign assistance."

935
Kahin, George McT. NEGOTIATIONS; THE VIEW FROM HANOI. New republic, v. 165, Nov. 6, 1971: 13-16.
AP2.N624, v. 165

The Vietnamese Communists' 7-point peace proposal offered in July seriously attempted to meet U.S. objections to previous plans. The Communists believe that as long as the Thieu regime remains in power, confident of American support, there can be no negotiated settlement of the war. The proposals were aimed at inducing the United States to permit free elections for a South Vietnamese President whose interest did not lie in a continuation of the fighting. The proposals also guarantee the safety of U.S. forces withdrawing before a fixed date and call for the release of prisoners of both sides. Because the United States gave the South Vietnamese custody of prisoners, any scheme involving prisoner release must of necessity include Saigon. The Communists have given special emphasis to guaranteeing the safety of all political groupings, believing that the United States was using the bogey of a "bloodbath" as an excuse for not negotiating. A unique feature of the proposals is the willingness to accept international guarantee of any settlement. The Communists are quite serious about their proposal, and it is the United States that is largely responsible for the aborted talks in Paris.

936
McClintock, Michael, Paul Rissman, and Alwyn Scott. TALKING TO OURSELVES. Environment, v. 13, Sept. 1971: 16-19, 42. illus.
UF767.S33, v. 13

Criticizes Project Sanguine, a communications system designed to employ low-frequency radio waves between continental United States and its nuclear submarine fleet. The authors contend that aside from its possible effects on the environment, Project Sanguine would be unreliable as a last line of defense in the military communications network because of its excessively slow message transmission rate and the exorbitant amount of input power required.

937
SOVIET UNION AND UNITED STATES SIGN AGREEMENTS TO PREVENT NUCLEAR WAR. Reprints from the Soviet

461-167 O - 72 - 7

press, v. 13, Oct. 29, 1971: 24-29.
DK266.A2R37, v. 13
Translated from Pravda, Oct. 1, 1971.
Slav Rm

Texts of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America and of the Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Measures to Improve the USSR-USA Direct Communications Link. The remarks of Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko express his satisfaction regarding these agreements "born in the course of the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitation."

938
Stibi, G. PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY--A MUST. Kernenergie, v. 14, July/Aug. 1971: 209-211.
QC770.K4, v. 14

While the German Democratic Republic strongly advocates the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the tremendous increase in the number of nuclear reactors heightens the danger of a takeover for military purposes. That danger will continue unless an international accord is reached prohibiting all means of mass destruction, the United States changes its position on underground testing, and the nonproliferation treaty is universally accepted. The Federal Republic of Germany stubbornly opposed this treaty and is even now delaying ratification because it wants freedom of action for the pursuit of its revanchist policies. The West German physicist, Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker, identified in his Kriegsfolgen und Kriegsverhütung (cited as item 1656 in vol. 7, no. 4 of this bibliography) the catastrophic peril that the West German and NATO nuclear posture threatens. "What an immense blessing it would be for mankind if the huge sums spent at present on the arms race instigated by the imperialist states could finally be used for peaceful purposes."

939
Vilmar, Fritz. [BASES OF A NON-IMPERIALIST DEVELOPMENT POLICY] Grundsätze einer nicht-imperialistischen Entwicklungspolitik. Frankfurter Hefte, v. 26, Aug. 1971: 598-604.
AP30.F555, v. 26

The industrialized states of both the capitalist and Communist systems are exploiting the developing countries for selfish economic, geopolitical, and strategic advantage, with the result that North-South differences have become part of the larger East-West struggle. Nonimperialistic development assistance should be based on priority aid to those countries whose socioeconomic and political conditions most promise democratic reform, demilitarization of capitalist-Communist competition in the Third World, reduction of armament expenditures to increase funds available for development aid, and the substitution of mutually beneficial trade policies for those founded solely on profit.

940
VOTING ON SOVIET DRAFT RESOLUTION POSTPONED. Peking review, v. 14, Dec. 3, 1971: 18-19.
DS701.P42, v. 14

On November 26, 1971, the U.N. General Assembly decided to postpone voting on the draft resolution of the Soviet Delegation for the convocation of a world disarmament conference. Chiao Kuan-hua, Chairman of the Chinese Delegation, on November 24 stated China's consistent stand on this issue in a speech (an abstract of which appears elsewhere in the current issue of this bibliography). His speech was immediately attacked by Soviet representative Malik, who denied that the Soviet leading group engages in superpower threats and blackmail. Two days later during final debate, Chairman Chiao made another speech "sternly refuting the distortion, calumny and attack made by Malik at the November 24 meeting against the principled stand of the Chinese Government on disarmament." A number of other representatives expressed reservations about the Soviet proposal during debate.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS

941
Albrecht, Ulrich. [THE ARMS TRADE] Der Handel mit Waffen. München, C. Hanser, 1971. 216 p. illus.
HD9743.A2A64
Bibliography: p. 201-216.

Contents.--Foreword, by Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker.--Introduction.--Export of arms--a summary.--Dominating factors in the arms trade.--New competition against American market might.--Market assistance for the export of arms.--Arms exports and power politics.--Appendix I: arms trade tables.--Appendix II: bibliography.

Attributes arms transfers more to the domestic economic developments and needs of the seller states than to their geostrategic policies, with the consequence that weapons are often sold without knowledge of how and against whom the purchaser intends to use them. In supporting this contention, Albrecht shows how the international arms market has ballooned in recent years and taken on the features of state rather than private enterprise. He also describes the various forms of international competition and the political and technical influences to which arms transfers are subject.

942
E., P. A. INDIA AND PAKISTAN: FORMULA FOR WAR. Flight international, v. 100, Dec. 16, 1971: 987-991. illus.
TL501.F5, v. 100

Describes developments leading up to the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, especially the prewar, fifteen-year air rearmament of the two powers, and briefly chronicles the events in the first week of the air war. Between 1956 and 1970, both nations sought to strengthen their air forces, Pakistan apparently with no hesitation, India somewhat reluctantly. Pakistan was responding to tensions growing out of its border dispute with India, which was motivated by reaction to the Pakistani buildup and fear of China. The superpowers, along with France, Great Britain, and Communist China, were more than willing to minister to whatever conventional armaments demands the two nations might make. The facts of the resulting air arms race are presented in a table showing, for each major transaction, the type of aircraft or missile, the country of origin, number, date of transfer, and miscellaneous other data.

943
Harrison, Stanley L. CONGRESS AND FOREIGN MILITARY SALES. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 79-87. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

The successes of the U.S. military assistance program have not prevented the erosion of its support in Congress. Fierce controversy has swirled around particular features and specific applications of the program, and many Congressmen are now convinced that the whole concept is defective in that it promotes arms races abroad and encourages the diversion of scarce development resources to military uses. There are strong pressures at work that tend to force arms sales up: the Nixon Doctrine, in particular, with its stress on substituting local selfhelp for direct U.S. involvement, puts a premium on the supply of military hardware to foreign states, and with military sales in this "special position," it is certain that the Administration will want to give them a boost. But there is no guarantee that the Congress, anxious over the arms race, the Vietnam War, and U.S. overseas commitments, and doubly jealous now of its prerogatives as watchdog over Government programs, will be cooperative.

944
Kemp, Geoffrey. THE INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRADE: SUPPLIER, RECIPIENT AND ARMS CONTROL PERSPECTIVES. Political quarterly, v. 42, Oct./Dec. 1971: 376-389.
JA8.P72, v. 42

Explains the political, economic, and military motivations that determine the arms trade policies of the suppliers and the procurement methods of the recipients. Kemp observes that more often than not the politicomilitary factors of an arms trade deal are given more consideration than the economic ones. He states that prospects for controlling the arms trade are very slim because "it is difficult to see what set of circumstances will bring about a major change in the current behaviour of the nations engaged in the process."

945
Milner, C. G. CUSTOMER SUPPORT FOR OVERSEAS NAVAL CONTRACTS. International defense review, v. 4, Feb. 1971: 50-51. illus.
N&CPR

Reveals that a recent development in overseas sales for weapons systems has been an emphasis on customer support services. Milner describes the support service requirements of a country that decides to build its own warships, how these requirements are met, and the long-term benefits possible. He discusses the Indian Leander frigate program as an example of the organization and development of one such system of customer support.

946
Mischke, Ferdinand O. [THE EASTERN BLOC'S WEAPONS TRADE WITH THE THIRD WORLD] Rüstungsgeschäft des Ostblocks mit der Dritten Welt. Wehr und Wirtschaft, v. 15, Sept. 1971: 438-439.
U3.W38, v. 15

Soviet arms deliveries to Third World states have proved to be more effective in gaining control over internal developments than the previously used subversive techniques. Deliveries of weapons, often culled from obsolescent East Bloc inventories, make the recipient states dependent on the Soviet Union for spare parts, ammunition, cadres, and training programs. Falling behind in their payments, the Third World states are forced into ceding bases and making other concessions. To make their deals appealing, the Soviets often sell arms at bargain prices, taking local currency and commodities in exchange and dumping the commodities at below world prices, further placing the arms recipients in their debt. As part of its geopolitical strategy for gaining a foothold wherever possible, the Soviet Union will deliver weapons to states whose existence is not endangered, unlike the American policy that is designed to preserve balances of power.

NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

947
Forschungsdienst China-Archiv. [PEKING VETO AGAINST FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE] Pekinger Veto gegen Konferenz der fünf Kernwaffen-Mächte. China-Analysen, v. 10, Sept. 1971: 17-18.
DS701.C356, v. 10

Peking's rejection of the Moscow-proposed five-power nuclear conference is a further indication of the depth of the Sino-Soviet split. It is also another confirmation of Mao's theory of the antithesis existing between the two superpowers and the medium-sized and lesser states. In justification of its rejection Peking pointed to the Soviet-American inability to reach a complete nuclear accord and to the continued nuclear buildup even during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT).

For that reason the peoples of the world have lost confidence in the superpower negotiations and demand a worldwide disarmament conference in which the nonnuclear states will have a voice. Peking's interest in disarmament reflects its desire to have the Soviet Union and the United States remove their nuclear arms from the Central Asian and Pacific areas. While Peking denies being a nuclear power, it nonetheless regards itself as very much a part of the new three-power configuration. Peking's rejection of the Moscow recommendation will cause the Soviet and American negotiators at SALT to take a fresh look at China's perhaps underestimated nuclear potential.

948
King, Peter. HOW WIDE IS A NUCLEAR THRESHOLD? INDIA AND THE BOMB. Australian outlook, v. 25, Aug. 1971: 198-212. DU80.A947, v. 25

The Indian Government, aware of the great costs of nuclear programs, has given no indication that it intends to acquire nuclear weapons. Pronuclear sentiments do exist, however, both inside and outside the Congress Party, and could grow stronger. Indian nationalists of various hues are demanding the bomb as a means to regional influence, great-power status, and independence in defense policy; defense intellectuals are voicing the same demand with more sophistication. The nuclear advocates find it all too easy, however, to speak of India as though it were "a prospering middle power rather than a striken colossus." Here, it needs to be remembered that India's "nuclear option" is really little more than the ability to produce a few plutonium bombs at great and perhaps disastrous economic and political cost. They also are much too cavalier in their consideration of the impact of nuclear weapons on relations with Pakistan and China and of the certainty that Indian cities will become nuclear targets when India itself acquires nuclear weapons. That India may find itself engaged one day in a civil nuclear war is another overlooked possibility. There are ethical gaps in the nationalist case as well, and these underline not only the weakness but the deep-seated ambiguities of the Indian tradition of nonviolence. It is unfortunate, indeed, that Sino-Indian relations have taken such a bad turn, for it is this especially that makes the nuclear option attractive.

949
Morokhov, Igor. THE PEACEFUL ATOM: LOOKING AHEAD. New times, no. 48, Nov. 1971: 18-20. illus. D839.N483, 1971

Discusses the rapidly expanding peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Soviet economic development and the results of the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy sponsored by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Soviet Union announced its readiness to produce enriched uranium for nonnuclear states to use in generating electricity, its progress towards controlled thermonuclear synthesis, and its opposition to dumping radioactive wastes into the seas. Morokhov says it is "generally conceded" that the Soviet Union is ahead in research to convert nuclear energy directly into electricity. The Conference commended the IAEA for successfully implementing a safeguard system to supervise the nuclear nonproliferation treaty.

950
Nanda, Krish. WILL INDIA GO NUCLEAR? Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Dec. 1971: 39-41. illus. TK9145.A84, v. 27

Until China demonstrated that it had atomic weapons it was understood by all that India would not seek nuclear capability. Now the Indian Parliament is divided sharply on the question of whether or not India should seek nuclear armament. Conservative members do not wish to acquire nuclear capacity primarily on economic grounds but ethical considerations are also involved. Advocates of national independence point to the importance of self-defense. "Both sides share the feeling that possession of the nuclear bomb has given China a decisive political (as opposed to military) advantage." Pressure to "go nuclear" seems to be increasing as Chinese prestige increases. If India "mounts the nuclear horse," it will "not be for reasons of security but of status."

951
Sampooran Singh. INDIA AND THE NUCLEAR BOMB. New Delhi, S. Chand, 1971. 180 p. illus. UA840.S26
Bibliography: p. [172]-180.

Contents.--Nuclear bombs.--Fission and fusion explosions.--General characteristics of nuclear explosions.--The significance of the possible use of nuclear weapons in future wars.--Nuclear strategy.--India's strategic defence planning.--Economic implications of nuclear weapons.--The world and the bomb.

Examines whether or not India should acquire nuclear weapons, taking into consideration its security and political requirements, economic parameters, military strategy, industrial and scientific potential, and the realities of the present international situation. Sampooran Singh thinks that India's decision not to sign the nuclear nonproliferation treaty was wise, that as a nonnuclear power India has been relegated to the status of a satellite country, and that the acquisition of nuclear weapons is urgent in view of China's growing nuclear weapons potential and the diminishing deterrent capabilities of the superpowers with respect to China. He asserts that a nuclear weapons program "is technically feasible, politically highly desirable, strategically inescapable and economically not only sustainable but actually advantageous."

952
Shestov, V. SOVIET PROGRAMME OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. International affairs (Moscow) Sept. 1971: 78-83. D839.I465, 1971

The Soviet Union is prepared for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference and awaits the cooperation of the other nuclear states. A large segment of the bourgeois press commends the Soviet proposal which is an integral part of the foreign policy program announced by the 24th Soviet Party Congress. France has endorsed the proposal, while Peking, Washington and London continue to study the idea. Though the nuclear powers do not have a common approach to disarmament, they must begin to bring their views together at the conference table. A five-power conference will not interfere with the work of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks or the Disarmament Committee, as some Western sources complain, because each effort deals with different aspects of the disarmament problem and can only contribute to the goal of ending the arms race.

953
SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR CONVENING WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 13, Oct. 1971: 14-16. DK266.A2R37, v. 13
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 9, 1971.
Slav Rm

Text of a letter from Andrei Gromyko to United Nations Secretary General U Thant prior to the 26th session of the General Assembly proposing the convening of a world disarmament conference. Gromyko says that while the Soviet proposal for a five-power nuclear disarmament conference may resolve that problem the most realistic solution to the problem of general disarmament lies in the convocation of a world disarmament conference.

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

954
Krutzsch, Walter. [THE 24TH U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY AND DISARMAMENT] Die XXIV. UNO-Vollversammlung und die Abrüstung. In Sicherheit und Abrüstung, Lebensfrage der Völker; UNO-Bilanz 1969/70. Berlin, Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, 1970. p. 67-[83].
JX1954.S494

Although the problem of general and complete disarmament still attracts great interest, as was shown at the 24th session of the General Assembly, the Socialist states were forced to concentrate their efforts on partial disarmament and limitation measures by the tactics of the imperialist states. Reports by the Secretary General and the World Health Organization to the General Assembly on the effects of the use of nuclear weapons left a vivid impression. As a result the United States and Great Britain sought to minimize the importance of the Geneva Protocol in order to prevent a ban on bacteriological and chemical weapons and pleaded for a differentiation between the two. The imperialist powers favored a British resolution providing for a ban on bacteriological weapons only. There is evident cause for hope, however, in the unity of the Socialist states and of many of the nonalined states in refuting the imperialist arguments. (Translation of supplied abstract, modified)

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

955
Bull, Hedley. STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION; THE PRECEDENT OF THE WASHINGTON AND LONDON NAVAL TREATIES. [Chicago] University of Chicago, 1971. 44 p. (An occasional paper of the Center for Policy Study)
JX1974.B733

Notes six factors common to both the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the Washington and London Naval Treaties, describes the course of agreement and results of the naval arms treaties, and derives from the historical experience with arms control agreements a number of propositions applicable to the SALT talks today.

956
Dzialas, Rudolf. [ASPECTS OF THE STRATEGIC BALANCE] Aspekte des strategischen Gleichgewichts. Wehrkunde, v. 20, Sept. 1971: 449-453.
U3.W396, v. 20

Outline of the salient features of the Soviet-American nuclear balance, supported by quotations primarily from American sources. Dzialas briefly discusses the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the advanced generations of Soviet intercontinental missiles, the doctrine of strategic sufficiency, the role of research and development, the potentials and vulnerability of the two superpowers, and American measures to maintain the nuclear balance. He concludes that a balance of reduced armament is the best hope for maintaining security in Europe and in the world.

957
Finan, James S. EUROPE, THE SUPER POWERS AND SALT. Queen's quarterly, v. 78, autumn 1971: 456-461.
AP5.Q3, v. 78

While the superpowers regard the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) as a means of carrying out new European policies, Europe's reactions reflect differing priorities and differing perceptions. As regards security, Western Europe fears that the Soviet Union is using the talks to separate the United States from Europe. American enthusiasm for SALT also makes Western Europeans wonder whether the United States might not settle for a partial solution that left European security uncertain. On the political and economic fronts, Western Europe is hopeful that by lessening Soviet-American antagonism SALT may expand détente in

Europe and facilitate economic contacts, strengthening the European Economic Community in the process. Eastern European governments have fewer reservations about the military aspects of SALT but see in a reduction of superpower tensions the opportunity for greater political freedom and national identity. "In general terms, attitudes toward SALT are a function of the manner and degree to which the negotiations promote or threaten vital interests," but since the states of Eastern and Western Europe have not participated in SALT, "they can, therefore, only give SALT their general support while remaining continually alert to potential risks."

958
Imai, Ryukichi. JAPAN AND THE WORLD OF SALT. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Dec. 1971: 13-16. illus. TK9145.A84; v. 27

Japan tends to feel removed from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks which it sees as primarily a European concern of the superpowers. While still under the American nuclear umbrella, Japan considers that its best defense lies in embracing the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and rejecting any thought of becoming a nuclear power. It is not economically feasible for the country to develop an atomic arsenal now, and possession of nuclear weapons might make Japan more vulnerable to retaliatory strikes. Under the terms of the NPT Japan can continue to develop its industrial nuclear capacity in line with the safeguards outlined by the International Atomic Energy Agency and utilize the treaty's provisions for exchange of technical information. Further, if Japan were to feel seriously threatened at some later time, it could convert its industry to weapons manufacture with reasonable speed. "In the world of NPT, this recognition in itself provides sufficient deterrence without having to turn the potential into expensive reality."

959
Perl, Martin L. SALT AND ITS ILLUSIONS. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Dec. 1971: 7-12. illus. TK9145.A84, v. 27

Popular illusions about the nature of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) make for undue optimism and obscure the fact that the major objectives of the talks--stopping the nuclear arms race, beginning nuclear disarmament, and reducing the chance of nuclear war--are not being achieved. One illusion is that continued multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) installation will not inhibit successful negotiations. In fact, MIRV creates instability in the arms balance, since both sides compete to protect their deterrence power, hardening silos and honing missile accuracy. A similar illusion is that continued research and development in nuclear weapons is no barrier to attainment of SALT objectives. A third illusion is that SALT, because it eases tensions, encourages a respite in the arms race. In practice, the "breathing space" created by the nuclear test ban treaty was an active period of weapons testing. If nuclear protest and antiwar groups accept the third illusion, they may mistakenly relax their pressure for disarmament. "The only agreements likely to come out of SALT are those which relate to aspects of nuclear weaponry about which neither side cares."

960
Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, 21st, Sinaia, Romania, 1971. SALT AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. Bulletin of the atomic scientists, v. 27, Dec. 1971: 17-19. TK9145.A84, v. 27

"Excerpted from the Statement by the Pugwash Continuing Committee."

Reports discussants' reactions to the fast-paced arms race and their pleas for significant progress in arms limitation. They urged the deployment of ABMs at the zero level, since that is absolute and easy to define. They also called for substantial reductions in offensive weapons and warned against letting the arms race shift into new fields like antisubmarine warfare. Not surprisingly, there was disagreement about the need for inspection and verification with regard to chemical and biological disarmament. As a basis for future negotiation, the conferees offered "A Specific Proposal for Tactical Nuclear Arms Limitation in Europe," whose goal is the "simultaneous elimination of both military blocs--NATO and the Warsaw Treaty." Finally, the group called for a broadening of disarmament talks and greater participation by France and China.

961
Smith, Gerard C. U.S. AND SOVIET UNION BEGIN SIXTH PHASE OF SALT TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, Dec. 6, 1971: 659-660. JX232.A33, v. 65

Statement made on Nov. 13, 1971, upon the arrival of the United States delegation at Vienna, Austria, for the commencement of the sixth session of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks on Nov. 15. The session will be devoted to carrying out the U.S.-Soviet understanding of May 20, 1971, which established a framework for the negotiation of "an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems, together with certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons."

962
Sullivan, Robert R. ABM, MIRV, SALT AND THE BALANCE OF POWER. Midwest quarterly, v. 13, autumn 1971: 11-36. AS30.M5, v. 13

Some theorists of nuclear strategy think Soviet-American parity adequate for defense. Others claim that the United States must maintain clear nuclear superiority in order to keep Soviet aggression in check. Since the United States has

this superiority, it can afford to be inferior in conventional weapons. However, the current Soviet buildup of nuclear weapons threatens to upset that balance, and the present official American thinking is that "nuclear preponderance" must be restored through deployment of ABMs. This would also serve to keep China in line. Since the Soviets seem determined to achieve parity, the arms race may be on. It might be wise for the Soviets to accept some degree of U.S. nuclear superiority which would in fact be balanced by Soviet conventional strength. The Soviet Union could do this without losing face by accepting the U.S. proposal to restrict new strategic launcher deployment while equipping replaced launchers with multiple warheads. The United States could thus maintain its nuclear umbrella for Japan and India and both superpowers could continue their almost absolute nuclear superiority over China. Alternatively, India, Japan, and perhaps Australia might be given nuclear weapons for their own defense. The controlled spread of nuclear weapons could effectively stabilize local balances.

963
U.S. AND U.S.S.R. CONCLUDE FIFTH PHASE OF STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, Oct. 18, 1971: 403-404. JX232.A33, v. 65

Text of a joint U.S.-Soviet communique issued at Helsinki, Finland, on Sept. 24, 1971, at the conclusion of the fifth phase of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This phase was devoted to "detailed consideration of issues relating to an agreement on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems." Consideration was also given to "issues involved in agreeing on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms." During the course of the discussions, "certain areas of common ground with respect to such limitations have been developed, . . . and a clearer understanding was achieved concerning issues to be resolved."

REGIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

964
Allard, Sven. RUSSIA AND THE AUSTRIAN STATE TREATY; A CASE STUDY OF SOVIET POLICY IN EUROPE. University Park, Pennsylvania State University Press [1970] 248 p. DB99.1.A5912 1970
Includes bibliographical references.

Analyzes the background of the Soviet withdrawal from eastern Austria and explains Moscow's motives for signing the Austrian State Treaty. The withdrawal was unique in Soviet foreign policy history and "it probably took place because President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were not seeking a détente with the U.S.S.R."

965
Badgley, John. AN AMERICAN POLICY TO ACCOMMODATE ASIAN INTERESTS IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. SAIS review, v. 15, no. 4, 1971: 2-10.
D839.S35, v. 15

In view of the immediate interests of Japan, India, and Indonesia as well as China and the Soviet Union in the Indian Ocean, the Nixon Administration should make a major effort to prevent strategic conflict in that area. An extension of the Antarctica Treaty of 1958 to the Indian Ocean would achieve two objectives: the strategic security of that region and the world community and a foundation for the development of the science, technology and national economies of Asia. The Asian and non-Asian states which have ready access to the Indian Ocean could cooperate through either the United Nations or a specially established Commission. "Unquestionably, the maritime interests of the Asian states would be served by a demilitarization agreement, and the expenditures saved from the refusal to develop" strategic naval capabilities could be diverted to improve land forces for internal security.

966
Bellany, Ian. BALANCING MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS. Nature (London) v. 234, Dec. 10, 1971: 361-362.
Q1.N2, v. 234

Offers a mathematical analysis of the problem of mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe. The object of the analysis is to provide "logical baselines, using a mathematical approach but without indulging in massive computation, for deciding when, and in what sense, small force reductions involving two opposing parties might be said to be balanced." The results indicate, among other things, that no matter which of the usual meanings of "balance" is assumed, equal or nearly equal percentage cuts by both sides best preserve the balance of conventional strength in the course of a reductions program. The analysis assumes that these reductions will be small--on the order of 10 percent or less of existing forces--but does not deal directly with the question of what the optimum-sized reduction would be.

967
Berger, Rolf. [ON THE EVE OF EUROPE'S REBIRTH À LA VIENNA CONGRESS?] Vor der Wiedergeburt Europas à la Wiener Kongress? Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Oct. 10, 1971: 665-672.
D839.E86, v. 26

As the Western European economies continue to prosper and the visions of a new world holocaust recede, earlier enthusiasm for a new order of European political unity appears to have lost its strength. The growing number of bilateral agreements tends to support this assessment. President Pompidou's preference for some vague confederative arrangement in the future, Prime Minister Heath's view that the vital interests of a state should

not be sacrificed to an international accord, and Chancellor Brandt's laudatory comments on the new Franco-German entente seem to point toward an order of confederation (not federation) reminiscent of the Vienna Congress. A confederative arrangement, based on national statehood, sovereignty, and the supremacy of national government, promises to lead to the same catastrophe that the proponents of a politically united Europe have sought to avoid.

968
Byrne, Gary C., and Kenneth S. Pedersen, comps. POLITICS IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEMOCRACIES: PATTERNS AND PROBLEMS. New York, Wiley [1971] 435 p. JN94.A3 1971b
Bibliography: p. 427-432.

Partial contents.--European disunion and the technology gap, by Robert Gilpin.--The gap is not technological, by Theodore Levitt.--Is NATO indispensable? by Klaus Knorr.--The changing context of European security, by Pierre Hassner.--The uniting of Europe reconsidered, by Ernst B. Haas.--The Common Market and federalist Europe, by David P. Calleo.

Collection of articles and essays dating from the 1960's on Western Europe's "identity crisis" and on the problem of balancing tradition and change in the four West European democracies, Great Britain, France, Italy, and West Germany. The writings are devoted to and deal with several subconflicts, the resolutions of which will largely determine "the final shape of Western Europeans' efforts to cope with their general task of identity building." These subconflicts include the confrontations between technocrats and humanists and between nationalists and internationalists or supranationalists and the struggle between two social orders, one characterized by rigidity and stratification, the other by mobility and increased opportunities.

969
Clemens, Walter C. MUTUAL BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Oct. 1971: 3-11. illus.
Z6723.U35, v. 51

It now appears that the Soviet Union is ready to move toward mutually beneficial security arrangements with the West. Indicative of this is a new willingness to regularize the status of Berlin, to yield a place to the United States and Canada in any European settlement, and to discuss mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) as opposed to a unilateral U.S. withdrawal. There are some signs of Soviet bad faith, but when viewed in the context of other Soviet arms control moves, and considering that the Kremlin has some very good reasons for seeking troop reductions in Europe, the Soviet about-face seems credible. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) will have an important bearing on the outlook for MBFR. By the same token, progress on MBFR, or on Berlin or a European security conference, would facilitate progress at SALT. The question is still open as to what type of force changes would be mutually acceptable. Small, gradual reductions might give each side the confidence to go further. There is some danger that Western troop strength will fall below a safe level during these changes, but further reductions would enable the West to rely less on the conventional side of flexible response. An agreement must, as a matter of course, include verification provisions to make an attack next to impossible without a large buildup of forces in advance of the target date.

970
Foch, René. EUROPE AND TECHNOLOGY: A POLITICAL VIEW. Paris, The Atlantic Institute [1970] 55 p. (The Atlantic papers, 1970, 2)
T26.A1F6

Analyzes the causes for the failure of an overall European policy for science and technology and suggests the elements of a strategy for the future. Foch advocates "the need for a common attitude towards the United States and other external powers," noting that different national attitudes toward America have been endlessly divisive for Europe. He proposes plans to bring national technology programs within a common framework and procedures for the systematic allocation of resources to technological objectives.

971
FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL ON PROSPECTS FOR A CONFERENCE ON EUROPEAN SECURITY. In Germany (Federal Republic, 1949-). Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, v. 19, Oct. 26, 1971: 284-285.
DD259.A35, v. 19
Excerpts from an interview in the Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt.

No conditions other than resolution of the Berlin problem stand in the way of multinational preparations for a European security conference. There is no connection in point of time between the normalization of relations between the two parts of Germany and the opening of the Conference, for these are parallel developments. Mutual balanced force reductions (MBFR) should not be divorced from political détente and are a subject for discussion at the Conference, but the technically more definable problem of reductions "does not lend itself to be discussed to any useful purpose at such a mammoth conference." The technical and military aspects of MBFR require the close collaboration of those directly concerned.

972
IN THE INTERESTS OF ALL PEOPLES: TEXT OF QUADRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ON BERLIN. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 13, Oct. 1, 1971: 5-13.
DK266.A2R37, v. 13
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 4, 1971.
Slav Rm

Text of the four-power agreement on West Berlin signed September 3, 1971, including the four appendixes to the treaty.

973
Karjalainen, Ahti. MUCH DEPENDS UPON NATO [interview] GDR review, v. 16, no. 9, 1971: 18-19. illus. DD261.G2, v. 16

Cognizant of realities but nonetheless optimistic, Finland continues its efforts to arrange a European security conference. Replies to its initiatives have been basically positive, but progress is slow. "Much depends on the position of the NATO countries." In regard to the United Nations, Finland adheres to the principle of universality and, therefore, believes that both German states should be given equal status within the framework of that body as well as within its special agencies. Evenhanded settlement of differences between the two states would create the preliminary conditions for the security conference.

974
Kulish, V. M. THE EUROPEAN CONFERENCE AND THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES. Review of international affairs, v. 22, Sept. 20, 1971: 11-14. D839.R4, v. 22

The first step toward European security is the convocation of a security conference to discuss the territorial status quo in Europe, the reduction of the influence of the armed forces on international relations, and the renunciation of the use of force. States sincerely interested in promoting European security will not require the resolution of other problems as a precondition for the conference. The key to security is the renunciation of the threat and use of force, which would result in a better negotiating climate and a more confident Europe and pave the way for solution of the political problems of European security. The Soviet proposal for an all-European conference would consider the military and political problems of European security on parallel but separate bases and, naturally, would not attempt to solve both in one forum.

975
A LONG STRIDE TOWARD CONSOLIDATION OF PEACE. Reprints from the Soviet press, v. 13, Oct. 1, 1971: 17-19. DK266.A2R37, v. 13
Translated from Pravda, Sept. 4, 1971.
Slav Rm

The fastest possible ratification of the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin would be in the interests of all. By clearly recognizing that West Berlin does not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany and by embodying several practical measures concerning transit between the Federal Republic and West Berlin, the agreement will be an effective instrument for normalization and European security.

976
Maievskii, Viktor. [IN THE INTEREST OF ALL PEOPLES] Im Interesse aller Völker. Sowjetunion heute (Vienna) v. 17, Oct. 16, 1971: 5, 10, 14. DK266.A2S784, v. 17

The recent Crimean meeting between Chancellor Willy Brandt and Party Secretary Brezhnev indicates that an end to the cold war and the arms race is now possible. The process of normalizing relations in Central Europe is proceeding on the basis of the inviolability of postwar frontiers and the existence of two German states. The four-power Berlin Agreement creates a favorable environment for holding a European conference on peace and security, in which the United States and Canada may participate. Disarmament is one of the cornerstones of Soviet peace policy. Toward that end the Soviet Union has called for a conference of the five nuclear powers and a world disarmament conference. In spite of the favorable responses to Soviet initiatives, the tired old champions of NATO's policy of militarization and tension seek frantically to thwart the movement for détente and peace.

977
Mazrui, Ali A. AFRICAN RADICALISM AND ARMS POLICY. African scholar, v. 1, no. 4, 1970: 3-4. DT1.A2286, v. 1

Implicit in the Pax Britannica and similar notions is the idea that the white race is obliged to keep the rest of mankind disarmed. But is this not an imperial application of the principle recognized in domestic politics that violence is and, of right, ought to be the monopoly of those who rule? Africans have long recognized the link between Negro dignity, world peace, and disarmament, but a white monopoly of violence is a different matter. Until the white man lays down his own weapons along with the rest of mankind, the black man's right to bear arms--this too is essential to his dignity--will not be abandoned. In Africa, vestiges of the Pax Britannica remain, but the initiative no longer lies with the British. Britain has, on various occasions, helped to maintain order in Uganda, Tanzania, Kenya, and Nigeria, but, in each case, only at the request of African authorities. Africa is not, as some would have it, a laboratory for experiments in arms control. To want to impose an arms policy on Africa, while the major powers continue to gamble with the very survival of the human race, is just one more example of imperial arrogance.

978
Musílek, Jaroslav. CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND EUROPEAN SECURITY. Czechoslovak life, no. 8, 1971: 1. DB191.C7, 1971

Czechoslovakia supports wholeheartedly the endeavors of the Socialist states to resolve the problems of European security and to seek contractual recognition of the inviolability of European frontiers and the renunciation of the use of

force. Therefore Czechoslovakia endorses the proposal for a European security conference and welcomes the public demonstrations of support in Western Europe. The Czech concept of European security predicates the existence of two sovereign and equal German states, full international legal recognition of the German Democratic Republic, prevention of activities of Sudeten German revanchists, and invalidation of the ignominious Munich Diktat. The Soviet Union has indicated the way to peace and confidence in Europe through its proposals for mutual force and armaments reduction in Central Europe and for a disarmament conference of the nuclear powers.

979
PEACE AND SECURITY FOR EUROPE; "NEW TIMES" FORUM. New times, Nov. 1971: 10-14. illus.
D839.N483, 1971

Statements by Stefan Doernberg of the German Democratic Republic, R. H. Oittinen of Finland, and Victor Larock, former foreign minister of Belgium, as to the urgency of convening a conference on European security and the proposal to hold an Assembly of Public Representatives for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

980
Schacht, Kurt. [SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND EUROPEAN SECURITY] Sozialdemokratische Parteien und europäische Sicherheit. Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, v. 16, Sept. 1971: 898-903. D839.B57, v. 16

Although the Social Democratic governments of Western Europe are increasingly interested in the convocation of a European security conference, they unfortunately differ among themselves on the agenda of the conference as well as on their estimates of the changed continental power relationships. Admittedly adjusting to the new realities in Europe is a painful process for those parties that supported the United States and NATO in the cold war. However, even some of these national parties--those in France, Norway, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxemburg--are restudying their positions. Particularly disappointing is the attitude of the German Socialist Party. Instead of reaping the dividends of social reform possible in the détente caused by the Moscow and Warsaw treaties, it continues to ply an Ostpolitik aimed at ideological influence over the domestic affairs of the Socialist states in Eastern Europe. The movement for détente and "an all-inclusive European security system" must be reinforced by the masses and by the party rank-and-file in order to overcome that segment of the party leadership that holds that the role of social democracy is to support the imperialism of the United States and NATO.

981
Tharp, Paul A., comp. REGIONAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: STRUCTURES AND FUNCTIONS. New York, St. Martin's Press [1971] 276 p. illus.
JX1979.T45

Partial contents.--Preface, by Paul A. Tharp, Jr.--Introduction.--Interest articulation and aggregation: Interest group activities in the EEC, by Leon N. Lindberg. Bureaucratic political activism in LAFTA, by Ernst B. Haas and Philippe C. Schmitter. Radicals and moderates in the OAU, by Patricia Berko Wild.--Socialization: An end to European integration? by Ronald Inglehart. Political culture and integration in Southeast Asia, by Werner Levi. Political culture and integration in Scandinavia, by Amitai Etzioni.--Rule making: The rule-making system of the European Community, by Leon N. Lindberg and Stuart A. Scheingold. The rule-making system of the OAS, by Ann Van Wynen Thomas and A. J. Thomas, Jr. Reform of the OAS, by William Manger. COMECON: the institutional structure, by Andrzej Korbonski.--Rule adjudication: Rule adjudication and integration in the European community, by Stuart A. Scheingold.--A survey of recent developments: Economic integration in Central and West Africa, by Bahram Nowzad. Latin American economic integration, by Richard D. Baker. Common defense considerations and integration in Southeast Asia, by Bernard K. Gordon. United States policy toward regional organization, by Joseph S. Nye.

Collection of articles and selections analyzing the political processes of several regional international organizations which in their ensemble indicate the evolution of a new world political system and the gradual demise of the nation-state system. Tharp asserts that the replacement of the nation-state system by the political associations arising out of regional and universal international interests started after World War II and continues "as a process of political evolution as profound as the change from feudalism to the nation-state" system. He studies the political processes of regional organizations--interest articulation and aggregation, socialization, rule-making and rule adjudication, by means of a modified version of the structural-functional approach developed by Almond and Powell for the study of political institutions in nation-states.

982
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. THE INDIAN OCEAN: POLITICAL AND STRATEGIC FUTURE. Hearings, Ninety-second Congress, first session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 242 p.
KF27.F6483 1971b
Hearings held July 20, 22, 27-28, 1971.

Testimony of scholars and current and former officials of the Departments of State and Defense concerning the direction of American foreign policy in the political and strategic future of the lands bordering the Indian Ocean. Several themes emerged from the hearings. It was stressed that the Indian Ocean may soon become the site of com-

petition among the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and Japan. Though the United States has legitimate interests in the Indian Ocean, firm commitments now concerning the nature and extent of its involvement there would be premature. The United States "should rely on diplomatic finesse rather than military power in dealing with the problems of the Indian Ocean area." It is hoped that that area can be spared the travail of cold-war interpower conflicts.

983
Visotskii, V. LANDMARK IN THE STRUGGLE FOR DÉTENTE. International affairs (Moscow) Nov. 1971: 12-16, 38. D839.I465, 1971

The four-power talks on West Berlin initiated by the Soviet Union produced an agreement which is a major step forward not only in consolidating European security but also in improving the total climate of East-West relations. All peaceloving states have gained by this agreement, which affirms that West Berlin does not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany and curtails its political activity in that city. The agreement strengthens the international position and respects the rights and interests of the German Democratic Republic. It creates an appropriate atmosphere for ratification of the Soviet-West German and Polish-West German treaties and for the convening of a conference on European security. The Soviet Union has produced an historic success in its policy of peaceful coexistence.

984
YOU NAME IT, WE'LL DISCUSS IT. Economist, v. 240, July 17, 1971: 16-17. illus. HG11.E2, v. 240

The fact that the superpowers have learned to hold the Helsinki disarmament talks in summer rather than midwinter may be "a portent of encroaching sanity." Other signs of harmony include the agreement to discuss ABM systems before strategic weapons. There are indications too that the Soviets will agree to postpone the question of American forward-based systems until NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries are ready to discuss mutual force reductions. The Soviets have also been participating cooperatively in the germ warfare talks at Geneva and calling for five-power nuclear discussions. Some observers, however, are skeptical about Soviet enthusiasm for negotiation on many issues, for they fear it may conceal the fact that the Soviet Union "does not really mean to settle any of them."

SPECIAL ENVIRONMENTS

985
AERO-SPACE LAW SYMPOSIUM II. De Paul law review, v. 20, spring 1971: 581-698. LL

Partial contents.--Some comments on a true step toward international co-operation: the treaty of January 27, 1967, by Aldo A. Cocca.--International protection of astronauts and space objects, by Stephen Gorove.--Peaceful resolution of outer space conflicts through the international court of justice: "the line of least resistance," by George P. Sloup.

Papers dealing with the intricate legal problems confronting man in outer space. Cocca looks into the problems of rights and responsibilities for the moon and other celestial bodies. He explains the United Nations Treaty under which no country can appropriate any territory of outer space, but all countries have freedom of exploration. Gorove considers what would happen if a stray rocket and crew were forced into an unplanned landing on a foreign state. He presents two international documents designed to resolve the legal aspects of such potential problems. Sloup urges the International Court of Justice to begin now to anticipate possible future problems and suggest appropriate legal solutions.

986
Hoffmann, Paul J. NEW WORLD FOR WHICH TO WAR. In U.S. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Military review, v. 51, Nov. 1971: 67-76. illus. Z6723.U35, v. 51

Between now and the year 2000, not outer but inner space will be the focus of international opportunity and conflict. As a depository of vast mineral wealth and food reserves, as the key to control of the sea surface, and as an avenue of approach between nations the undersea will almost certainly be an object of national competition and perhaps war. The United States already finds itself in a political struggle with the have-not and non-oceanic powers over the future exploitation of this vast region. As the conflict moves beyond politics into the realms of economic and military warfare, some unique challenges will have to be faced. Problems of detecting enemy units and protecting friendly ones in the undersea environment will require imaginative solutions. Oceanography, of course, will be the key science, but most branches of technology will have a contribution to make as well. As land resources are depleted, those of the sea will become more critical, not only to economic wellbeing, but as elements of national power. Failure to control these resources and deny them to hostile powers could upset the world power balance to the detriment of the United States.

987
Hollick, Ann L. THE LAW OF THE SEA AND U.S. POLICY INITIATIVES. Orbis, v. 15, summer 1971: 670-686. D839.068, v. 15

Appraises new U.S. policy positions with respect to the breadth of the territorial sea, offshore fishing rights, the continental shelf boundary,

freedom of transit through international straits, and an international regime for the deep seabed and ocean floor. Hollick concludes that although fear of national claims over offshore areas may have engendered the American draft convention on the seabed and a willingness to provide for special fishing rights, Washington's position reflects a genuine concern for the advancement of the developing countries.

988
Knox, J. B., and others. COMPARISON OF U.S. AND U.S.S.R. METHODS OF CALCULATING THE TRANSPORT, DIFFUSION, AND DEPOSITION OF RADIOACTIVITY. Livermore [Calif.] University of California, 1971. 50 p. illus. (Lawrence Radiation Laboratory)
Sci RR
Microfiche UCRL-51054

"Prepared for U.S. Atomic Energy Commission under contract No. W-7405-Eng-48."

Contents.--Abstract.--Introduction.--Summary of U.S. and U.S.S.R. calculation methods.--Case study of Schooner event: comparison of calculations by U.S. and U.S.S.R. methods.--Hypothetical calculations of PNE [peaceful nuclear explosives] at the Isthmus of Kra: comparison of U.S. and U.S.S.R. calculation methods.--References.

Compares the American and Soviet methods for predicting the distribution of downstream radiation debris from peaceful nuclear explosives. The study examines in particular the medium- and long-range prediction measurements of radioactivity from the U.S. cratering experiment "Schooner." The major result of this study, the authors indicate, is that the two prediction methods are within about a factor of 2 at distances of more than 1,000 kilometers downwind in considering the vertical integral of radioactivity through the Schooner debris cloud center, providing that widespread precipitation scavenging did not occur beforehand.

989
Kulebiakin, V. THE MOON AND INTERNATIONAL LAW. International affairs (Moscow) Sept. 1971: 54-57.
D839.I465, 1971

Stresses the timeliness and significance of the recent Soviet initiative in the field of outer space law evidenced by the submission to the 26th United Nations General Assembly of a draft treaty on the moon. Can the moon be saved from becoming another source of international conflict? The goals of the Soviet proposal are to provide a solid foundation in international law for space activities, to promote cooperation among the nations active in exploring outer space, to prevent military bases from being established on the moon, and to demilitarize outer space. Kulebiakin thinks that the conclusion of such a treaty would frustrate the imperialists' designs to establish military bases on the moon.

990
Maechling, Charles. THE POLITICS OF THE OCEAN. Virginia quarterly review, v. 47, autumn 1971: 505-517.
AP2.V76, v. 47

The stability in international law and practice enjoyed by ocean and seabed matters is coming to an end. The discovery of ocean resources coupled with the technological advances necessary to exploit them has incited national claims to jurisdiction over large areas of formerly free international seas. The U.S. Government has been internally divided on the question of seabed control, with the Defense Department favoring minimal national control to ensure maximum access for military purposes, and the Interior and Commerce Departments desiring a broadly legal continental shelf to further resource exploitation. The U.S. draft seabed convention hopes to limit national claims while giving less-developed countries a share in the revenues from seabed exploitation, but the formula appears to have little chance of success. "Only an international régime that will actually govern ocean space and take title to its mineral resources--not merely act as a claims registry and royalty depository--can check the current trend toward creeping extension of coastal state jurisdiction over the hitherto free spaces of the ocean and seabed."

991
Schacky, Erwin Freiherr von, and Hans L. Waiblinger. [THE SEABED TREATY OF FEBRUARY 11, 1971] Der Meeresboden-Vertrag vom 11. Februar 1971. Europa-Archiv, v. 26, Sept. 25, 1971: 659-664.
D839.E86, v. 26

Sketches the negotiations and various drafts leading to the formulation of the 1971 Seabed Treaty. In spite of its compromise character, the treaty represents another step in the continuing endeavor to limit the deployment of weapons of mass destruction. Its advantage lies in extending the nondeployment prohibition to a vast area of the world's surface, although the authors note that from a practical point of view it is doubtful whether weapons would have ever been placed on the ocean beds. In the psychological and political realm, the successful negotiations demonstrate the possibilities for limited agreements in the superpower dialog, the influence of smaller states on formulating major international agreements, and the pragmatic approach that can be adopted in promoting disarmament and arms control.

992
Wilcher, Marshall E. MILITARY AFFAIRS ABROAD: NATO'S THIRD DIMENSION. Air University review, v. 22, Sept./Oct. 1971: 65-68.
TL501.A5574, v. 22

During the last few years NATO has expanded its nonmilitary role to include environmental problems like air and water pollution, disaster relief, and auto safety devices. The impetus for NATO's

"third dimension" was provided by President Nixon, who, at the 43rd Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington in 1969, urged the creation of a committee to meet the challenges of modern society. In response, the North Atlantic Council established the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society whose function is "to work on common environmental and social problems and to stimulate action by member nations of the alliance in these areas." NATO's third dimension, aside from bringing environmental problems into focus in some of the member nations, is potentially important in achieving cooperation between the alliance and the Warsaw Pact. Although social and environmental problems are subordinate to the greater politicomilitary issues that divide East and West, "the environment is an area that may hold promise for reaching agreements between the two blocs."

ENFORCEMENT OF AGREEMENTS

993
Crowley, Barbara K., and Lawrence S. Germain. ENERGY RELEASED IN THE BENHAM AFTERSHOCKS. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 61, Oct. 1971: 1293-1301.
QE531.S3, v. 61

The aftershock activity of the BENHAM explosion, which occurred over an area of 100 km^2 and lasted for several weeks, was far more intensive than that following JORUM and HANDLEY. However, the radiated seismic energy of the aftershocks was only of the order of one-hundredth of the energy of BENHAM that coupled into seismic wave motion. The aftershock volume of BENHAM does not appear to be significantly different from the volume for aftershocks from a natural event of the same body-wave magnitude. (Abstract supplied)

994
Evernden, J. F., and others. DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN SMALL-MAGNITUDE EARTHQUAKES AND EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, Nov. 10, 1971: 8042-8055. illus. QC811.J6, v. 76

Data are presented that address the problem of discrimination between earthquakes and explosions of small magnitude ($3\ 3/4 \leq m_b \leq 4\ 3/4$). Data sources include various long-period seismometer installations in the United States. The data suggest that long-period disciminants useful at $m_b \geq 4\ 3/4$ remain as useful at $m_b \geq 4$. The conclusion is also drawn that detection of the surface wave of $m_b = 4$ earthquakes can be accomplished at distances of 6000-7000 km. (Abstract supplied)

995
Greenfield, R. J. SHORT-PERIOD *P*-WAVE GENERATION BY RAYLEIGH-WAVE SCATTERING AT NOVAYA ZEMLYA. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, Nov. 10, 1971: 7988-8002. illus. QC811.J6, v. 76

The teleseismic *P*-wave signal from underground explosions at Novaya Zemlya Island is followed by a coda lasting several minutes. The power level of the coda was measured on Lasa beams for two explosions and on five single seismometer records for one explosion. If we use a statistical approach, the measured coda level can be explained by assuming that the coda is a result of scattering of source-generated Rayleigh waves to *P* body waves by the island coastlines, river valleys, and other topographic features that are found within a few hundred kilometers of the source. The rate at which the coda decays with time is consistent with the hypothesis of coda generation by scattering. (Abstract supplied)

996
THE LIMITS OF SEISMOLOGY, by our Washington correspondent. Nature (London) v. 234, Nov. 5, 1971: 6-7. Q1.N2, v. 234

Though the U.S. Defense Department has financed some remarkable advances in seismic monitoring techniques, the Administration is standing pat in its demand for on-site inspection of any comprehensive test ban. It becomes increasingly evident that the issues now are political rather than technical. This is the conclusion suggested by recent hearings of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on the subject of seismic detection capabilities. Government spokesmen maintained, while some seismologists denied, that natural limitations to seismic detection capabilities, together with the existence of techniques for "masking" underground explosions, reduce to an unacceptable level the probability of detecting and unambiguously identifying small, but militarily significant explosions by seismic means alone. Clearly, a major point of contention is the strategic value of nuclear explosions of a size that would go undetected by seismic means. Further hearings on this and related issues, such as the future of the Advance Research Project Agency's seismic research program now that its funds are running out, are badly needed.

997
Marshall, P. D., A. Douglas, and J. A. Hudson. SURFACE WAVES FROM UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS. Nature (London) v. 234, Nov. 5, 1971: 8-9. illus. Q1.N2, v. 234

Argues that the yield of underground nuclear explosions fired in consolidated rock can be estimated from the recorded surface wave magnitude within a factor of two, a great improvement over estimates based on body wave magnitude. The same data is said to show that "the use of the m_b:M_s criterion to identify explosions at the teleseismic detection limit of $M_s \sim 2.5$ implies yields of about 40 kton in dry alluvium and 3 kton in consolidated rock."

998
Mueller, Richard A., and John R. Murphy. SEISMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR DETONATIONS: PART I. SEISMIC SPECTRUM SCALING; PART

II. ELASTIC ENERGY AND MAGNITUDE DETERMINATIONS. In Seismological Society of America. Bulletin, v. 61, Dec. 1971: 1675-1704.
QE531.S3, v. 61

A seismic-spectrum scaling model based on an analytic approximation to the nuclear seismic-source function is described and evaluated in terms of the behavior of a large body of measured spectral data. The results of the scaling analysis indicate that the yield, depth of burial and emplacement medium of the nuclear device play significant roles in defining the seismic-spectrum scaling of underground nuclear detonations. (Abstract supplied, modified)

999
Myers, Henry R. EXTENDING THE NUCLEAR-TEST BAN. Scientific American, v. 226, Jan. 1972: 13-23. illus.
T1.S5, v. 226

Reprinted as part of Senate Resolution 230--Submission of a Resolution Relating to Underground Nuclear Weapons Testing. Congressional record (daily ed.), v. 118, Jan. 24, 1972: S297-S308.
J11.R52, v. 118

The detection of possible violations has dominated public discussion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. The major seismographic research effort begun in 1959 has recently conclusively demonstrated that the long-period waves generated by a nuclear explosion along the earth's surface can be identified and distinguished from those generated by a small, shallow earthquake. Further, the average ratio of the surface-wave magnitude to the body-wave magnitude through the earth is smaller for explosions than for earthquakes. It is now possible in almost every instance to distinguish a natural seismic event from a nuclear explosion large enough to be meaningful. To argue therefore "that inspections are still necessary implies the acceptance of the following dubious propositions: (1) that significant tests might escape the various monitoring systems operated by the U.S., (2) that inspections would play a substantial role in deterring violations or in alleviating suspicions that might arise and (3) that the Russians would agree to inspection procedures of the kind that would be required if they were to serve their purpose." The schemes for active evasion of a complete test ban are all of doubtful efficacy. Desert alluvial deposits dry and deep enough for a nuclear test to produce minimal seismic waves and collapse craters not observable by satellite are not thought to exist in the Soviet Union. Detonating the explosion in a spherical cavity might muffle the signal, but excavation of a suitable chamber would be prohibitively expensive. By detonating several appropriately timed and placed charges to produce an earthquake-like signal, a violator might escape detection but this is not certain. Masking a nuclear test in the signals of an actual earthquake would require a state of constant readiness and a swift but correctly timed decision to proceed. The not unreasonable possibility of an accident in a clandestine test serves as a deterrent to cheating. It is hard to quantify the risks of either party in a total test ban. Neither continued testing nor its cessation will alter favorably or unfavorably the strategic position of the United States. However, "the failure to prohibit underground tests plays into the hands of those in the non-nuclear nations who press for the acquisition of nuclear forces; it tends to reinforce the contention that the statements of the superpowers are not matched by actions, and it undermines the credibility of the U.S. Government, which has maintained for more than a decade that unresolved verification problems are the obstacle to a ban on underground tests."

1000
NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES. Edited by I. D. Morokhov. In United States Atomic Energy Commission Translation Series. University of California, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, Calif. Feb. 1971. 190 p.
Sci RR
Microfiche UCRL-Trans-10517

Translated by R. Addis from the Russian Atomnye vzryvy v mirnykh tselyakh, 1970, 124 p.
Slav Rm

A collection of articles describing different aspects of industrial uses of underground nuclear explosions in the Soviet Union. It includes a survey of results of some experimental explosions set off in the USSR for such purposes as creating a water reservoir in an arid region, eliminating accidental or undesired gas gushers, increasing the yield of oil wells, etc. Described also are other planned industrial uses of underground nuclear explosions. The mechanical action of single and multiple underground nuclear cratering explosions are considered and the investigated properties of excavations dug with such explosions analyzed. Special attention is devoted to problems of nuclear-explosion safety, primarily to radiation hazards, and the spread of the explosion products over long distances, the nature of the radioactive contamination of the atmosphere and ground by single and multiple underground nuclear cratering explosions, and many related subjects, are discussed. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1001
Oliver, Jack, and Leonard Murphy. WWNSS: SEISMOLOGY'S GLOBAL NETWORK OF OBSERVING STATIONS. Science, v. 174, Oct. 15, 1971: 254-261. illus.
Q1.S35, v. 174

Reports on the establishment, organization, and major contributions of the World-Wide Network of Standard Seismograph Stations (WWNSS), run by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey and consisting of 120 stations whose data have made the system the heart of observational seismology. Oliver and Murphy note that the idea of the WWNSS originated at a 1959 meeting of the Panel of Seismic Improvement, which was formed to upgrade seismological capability, particularly in terms of detection and verification of underground nuclear explosions.

The authors say, however, that the WWNSS stations are not intended to be a global surveillance system for detecting explosions. Background noise at most WWNSS sites usually prevents the network from detecting small detonations. "A far better detection network with more uniform coverage can be made by utilizing a smaller number of stations and carefully selecting each site for low background."

1002
PLOWSHARE--PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES. In U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. The nuclear industry 1971. [Washington, for sale by the Supt. of Docs., U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971] p. 141-152.
DLC

Explanation of the Plowshare program and its objectives, the exploration of nuclear explosions phenomenology and the practical application of the information obtained in industry, science, and public works. The program has sponsored specific experiments to study the nuclear stimulation of natural gas production in two major programs, Gasbuggy and Rulison. The Rio Blanco and Wagon Wheel projected studies will continue stimulation study and permit comparison of the effects of simultaneous and sequential detonation. Other Plowshare research has considered the feasibility of a geothermal power plant using nuclear explosions to tap into an area of ground heat convertible to steam to power a turbo-generator. Such research may help reduce the anticipated energy gap.

1003
Savino, J., and others. EXCITATION OF SEISMIC SURFACE WAVES WITH PERIODS OF 15 TO 70 SECONDS FOR EARTHQUAKES AND UNDERGROUND EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, Nov. 10, 1971: 8003-8020. illus. QC811.J6, v. 76

Using data from high-gain seismographs operating in the deep (543-meter) mine observatory at Ogdensburg, New Jersey, we analyzed the excitation of long-period surface waves by earthquakes and underground explosions for four different regions of the world: western United States, the Aleutians, Novaya Zemlya, and Central Asia. The most important result of this study is that discrimination between earthquakes and underground explosions on an M_s-m_b basis is enhanced when the amplitudes of Rayleigh waves with periods near 40 sec, rather than 20 sec, are used to determine M_s. A discriminant based on surface waves with periods near 40 sec is particularly advantageous because of a very stable and pronounced minimum in earth noise in this period range. Love waves also yield a distinct separation between earthquakes and explosions on the basis of M_s (Love) at 20 and 40 sec with m_b and can be used for discrimination of small events for which no Rayleigh waves are recorded. The discrimination threshold at Ogdensburg is $m_b' \approx 3.8$ for the western United States at a distance of about 30° and $m_b \approx 4.4$ for the Aleutians at 70°. All the events studied could be discriminated by using 40-sec Rayleigh waves. Amplitude spectra of Rayleigh waves in the period range 15 to 70 sec were computed for events in the western United States, the Novaya Zemlya region, and the Aleutians. The spectral amplitudes decrease more rapidly with increasing period for explosions than for earthquakes in the western United States and Novaya Zemlya. These spectral differences are consistent with an impulsive source time function for explosions. In the Aleutians, however, the shape of the spectrum of long-period waves for the underground explosion Milrow is similar to spectral shapes for some, but not most, nearby earthquakes. Two plausible explanations for this spectral similarity are contamination of the Milrow spectrum by earthquake-generated Rayleigh waves, or the effects of focal depth and radiation pattern on the earthquake spectra. (Abstract supplied)

1004
Seaborg, Glenn T. GENERAL CONFERENCE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY HOLDS 15TH SESSION AT VIENNA. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, Oct. 18, 1971: 419-424.
JX232.A33, v. 65

Statement made on Sept. 22, 1971, to a meeting of the 15th session of the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, Austria, Sept. 22-27, 1971. Seaborg outlines U.S. views on some matters of concern to the Agency--the negotiation of safeguards agreements under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, technical assistance activities in the developing countries, the supply of enriched uranium to nonproducing user countries, environmental problems, cancer research, and the health of the Agency itself.

1005
Sokol, Daniel. GROUND WATER SAFETY EVALUATION--PROJECT GASBUGGY. Palo Alto, Teledyne Isotopes, Mar. 12, 1971. 38 p. (Prepared for U.S. Atomic Energy Commission)
Sci RR
Microfiche PNE-1009

The most likely path for hydrologic transport of radionuclides from the Gasbuggy Site to possible water-use points is through the Ojo Alamo Sandstone. Groundwater in the Ojo Alamo Sandstone flows westward. The point at which groundwater in the Ojo Alamo Sandstone could mix with other water is along the San Juan River near the mouth of Los Pinos River, 38 kilometers northwest of the Gasbuggy Site. Based on available data, groundwater flowing from the Gasbuggy Site will take 5900 years to reach the confluence of the San Juan and Los Pinos Rivers. At the Gasbuggy Site, the total dissolved solids, sodium, and sulfate content of the groundwater occur in concentrations higher than acceptable for irrigation or domestic use. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1006
U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group. PROJECT PRE-GONDOLA III PHASE II SUMMARY REPORT: CONNECTING ROW-CRATER EXPERIMENT. [J. E. Lattery, edi-

tor] Livermore, Calif., Mar. 1971. 68 p. illus. (Plowshare--civil, industrial and scientific uses for nuclear explosives. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers)
Sci RR
Microfiche PNE 1117

Project Pre-Gondola III Phase II was a row-crater experiment conducted on 30 October 1968 by the U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group at a site near Fort Peck, Montana. The primary experimental objective was to form a row-crater which would smoothly connect to the crater formed by a previous row-charge detonation, Pre-Gondola II. Technical programs were implemented (1) to measure motions of surface ground zero, (2) to compare preshot and postshot hydrologic, lithologic, and physical conditions of the site and cratered area, (3) to measure long-range airblast, (4) to determine the size and form of the dust cloud, (5) to measure intermediate-range seismic motions, and (6) to measure induced motions of the Fort Peck dam and associated structures. The final results and analyses are presented for all except the long-range airblast program. Final results for this last will be reported separately. (Abstract supplied)

1007
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Nevada Operations Office. Office of Effects Evaluation. SEISMOLOGY, AFTERSHOCKS, AND RELATED PHENOMENA ASSOCIATED WITH UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS: A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF SELECTED PAPERS WITH ABSTRACTS. Las Vegas, Nev., May 1971. 36 p.
Sci RR
Microfiche NVO-87

The AEC/Nevada Operations Office has supported an extensive research program in underground nuclear explosion seismology and associated aftershocks for the past two and a half years. In a continuing effort to assist scientists and other researchers involved in the study of this controversial subject we have compiled this bibliography. In order to make the list as comprehensive as possible, abstracts have been included with each paper. The sources of these abstracts are varied. They were taken verbatim from the specified article in the journal in which they were published, the U.S. Geological Survey publication Geophysical Abstracts, or in the case where no abstract was written, the introduction and conclusion of the paper served this purpose. In the case of papers presented at symposia where there was no published report, the abstract was also taken verbatim from the symposium program (Geological Society of America publication, "Abstracts With Programs" and "EOS, Transactions of the American Geophysical Union"). These abstracts represent the interpretation of the abstractor only and do not necessarily represent the views of the AEC. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1008
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization. PROSPECTS FOR COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN TREATY. Hearings, Ninety-second Congress, first session. July 22 and 23, 1971. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971. 153 p.
DLC

Investigation of the importance of a comprehensive test ban treaty and the attendant benefits and risks. Philip J. Farley, Acting Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, told the subcommittee that such a treaty would diminish nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and would help prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. He stressed that the treaty would be effective only to the degree that it contained satisfactory provisions for verification and explained the Administration's policy with regard to inspections. The committee later heard testimony about the present status of monitoring technology. Throughout the hearings there was emphasis on the U.S. commitment to a comprehensive test ban treaty.

1009
Vortman, L. J. AIRBLAST FROM PROJECT TRINIDAD DETONATIONS. Sandia Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico, June 1971. (Operated for the United States Atomic Energy Commission by Sandia Corporation) 223 p. illus.
Sci RR
Microfiche SC-RR-71 0056

Airblast was measured from distances of a few hundred feet to about six miles from single one-ton surface, near surface, and buried explosions. Similar measurements were made perpendicular to and off the ends of buried single row-charges detonated simultaneously and with delays between rows. Explosives were either ammonium nitrate and fuel oil or aluminized ammonium nitrate slurry. Single charges detonated at and near the surface gave peak overpressures and impulses close to those of TNT charges burst similarly. Buried single charges had positive impulses comparable to those from TNT, but had ground-shock-induced peak overpressures about twice those of TNT, and gas-venting peak overpressures from two to eight times those of TNT. A one-ton charge placed at the bottom of a 14-inch-diameter unstemmed hole produced overpressures and airblast energy about midway between an equivalent surface burst and a completely stemmed explosion at the same depth. Waveforms from all row-charge detonations were complex, and neither peak overpressures nor positive impulses could be related consistently to those from single charges or to smaller buried TNT charges in a more uniform medium. No airblast damage occurred at either Jansen or Trinidad, Colorado at a maximum peak overpressure of 0.009 psi. (Abstract supplied)

CONSEQUENCES OF ARMS CONTROL

1010
Rodberg, Leonard S. REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC CONVERSION. [Washington, Coalition on

National Priorities and Military Policy, 1971. 11 p.] DLC
Program: p. [11].

Summarizes the discussions and conclusions of the Conference on Economic Conversion, sponsored by the Coalition on National Priorities and Military Policy and held in Washington, D.C., on March 31 and April 1, 1971. The conference considered the impact of reduced defense expenditures on the national economy, the individual worker, research and development, the local community, and industry, and explored means of assisting in the transition to a less defense-oriented economy. Rodberg concludes that "conversion can best be facilitated by measures that will stimulate a healthy economy (primarily through some combination of additional spending in the domestic area and tax reductions) and by steps that will provide economic security for individuals as they make the adjustment to new occupations."

OTHER PROBLEMS AND MEASURES

1011
Alexander, Yonah. A CHRISTIAN CHURCH IN SEARCH OF PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. International problems, v. 10, June 1971: 41-45.
Hebr

Excerpts from an interview with George Appleton, titular head of the Anglican Church and its Evangelical Episcopal community in the Middle East, focusing on the Middle East crisis and the Church's role in advancing the cause of peace in the region. Appleton concludes that while the churches must become more active in promoting peace, there are limits to what they can do, and that both Arabs and Israelis must negotiate together or face another war.

1012
Foster, William C. BAN ALL NUCLEAR TESTING. Atlantic Community quarterly, v. 9, summer 1971: 174-183. D839.A85, v. 9
"From the DACOR lecture, delivered . . . March 11, 1971."

The next step in arms control must be a comprehensive nuclear test ban. The American approach to arms control is largely pragmatic; the Russians have more of a predilection for the general and the lofty. What is needed is an American initiative that will catch the imagination, and especially the Russian imagination. An agreement of this kind would have an immediate impact on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, adding "a new note of moral uplift and purpose," and doing much to clear the atmosphere for progress on the sticky problems posed by the ABM and the multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle. Over the long haul, a ban would also put the brakes on military technology, and as a side benefit of no small value, it would free scientists from the responsibility for making difficult moral decisions relating to weapons of mass destruction. There is no question that a ban could be adequately verified by seismic means. Nondetectable explosions would be far too small to be of any military value. For too long, the United States has allowed itself to be delayed by technical details; now is the time to show the world that this country has "the moral courage and imagination to get off this moving train which is taking us nowhere but to oblivion."

1013
Freistetter, Franz. [NONVIOLENT RESISTANCE] Gewaltfreier Widerstand. Österreichische militärische Zeitschrift, v. 9, Sept./Oct. 1971: 268-272. U3.034, v. 9

Nonviolent resistance has never prevented aggression and therefore cannot effectively replace other defense mechanisms, but apparently it can complement a comprehensive national defense program. Nonviolent acts can be employed to defend social patterns and political institutions and to change and weaken an opponent's goals and eventually force him to yield. For nonviolent resistance to be an effective instrument, however, the public will must be organized. Nonviolent acts of resistance require planning and cannot be only spontaneous individual reactions.

1014
Haug, Hans-Jürgen, and Hubert Maessen. [OBJECTORS TO WAR SERVICE, AGAINST THE MILITARIZATION OF SOCIETY. INCLUDING A LEGAL ADVISORY] Kriegsdienstverweigerer, gegen die Militarisierung der Gesellschaft. Mit einem juristischen Ratgeber. [Frankfurt a. M.] Fischer-Taschenbuch-Verl. [1971] 212 p. illus. UB342.G4H38

Contents.--Against the militarization of society, by Hans-Jürgen Haug and Hubert Maessen.--Education for vassalage, by Johannes Schulz.--Statements on the functional inability of the Bundeswehr, by Karl-Michael Vogel and Johannes Schulz.--The civil war mission, by Heinrich Schacht.--The military-industrial complex, by Mathias Jung.--Objection to war service: political alternative, by Winfried Schwamborn.--On the self-organization of those performing substitute service, by the corporate authorship of Federal Substitute Service Headquarters.--Clearly demogogic formulations, an interview with Heinrich Böll.--Nonviolent but revolutionary? Critique of nonviolence, by Sven Papcke.--Legal adviser, by Martin Klein.--Annex: documents.

Essays denouncing the Bundeswehr, the military-industrial complex, and NATO as inimical to conscience, peace, and democracy. Haug's introductory essay attributes the decay and destruction of democratic institutions to the militarization of society and assails service in the Bundeswehr as a degradation of the individual.

1015
Hirasawa, Tomowo. RADIATION PATTERNS OF *S* WAVES FROM UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. Journal of geophysical research, v. 76, Sept. 10, 1971: 6440-6454. illus. QC811.J6, v. 76

Use is made of polarization angles of *S* waves from the Greeley, Boxcar, and Benham events to determine focal mechanisms of earthquakes presumably triggered almost instantaneously by the events. Although other possibilities are not completely excluded, the observed *S* waves are interpreted as mixed waves of direct *S* phase and reflected phases (*sS*, *pS*) from a composite source of explosion and double-couple force. Assuming a vertical strike slip, the strike of the *P*-wave nodal plane and the relative strength of the double-couple source compared with that of the explosion are determined. The seismic moments of triggered earthquakes are calculated as $3.9\text{-}6.3\times10^{23}$ dyne cm for Boxcar and $1.4\text{-}2.3\times10^{24}$ dyne cm for Benham. Particularly in the case of Benham, the rise time of about 2 sec together with the seismic moment of 2.3×10^{24} dyne cm is compatible with the observations of seismic waves. The possibility of estimating the pre-existing tectonic shear stress is suggested in the case of Boxcar. The tectonic stress is estimated at 130 bars from the assumption of stress relaxation due to a cavity created by the nuclear detonation. (Abstract supplied)

1016
Jacobs, D. G., and others. THEORETICAL EVALUATION OF CONSUMER PRODUCTS FROM PROJECT GASBUGGY. FINAL REPORT, PHASE 1: IMPACT OF HYPOTHETICAL RELEASES OF CONTAMINATED GAS IN THE SAN JUAN BASIN. (Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Union Carbide Corp., Oak Ridge, Tenn.) Sept. 1971. 43 p.
Sci RR
Microfiche ORNL-4646
Prepared for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission.

The first phase of a theoretical evaluation of potential radiation exposures from Project Gasbuggy, dealing with the hypothetical domestic and commercial utilization of contaminated natural gas within the San Juan Basin, has been completed, and the results are reported in detail. Although none of the gas from the Gasbuggy well, the first of a planned series of nuclearly stimulated natural gas wells, has been introduced into the gas gathering and distribution system of the El Paso Natural Gas Company, the analysis was based on this system and on data from the production testing of the Gasbuggy well for maximum realism. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1017
Nesbitt, William A. TEACHING ABOUT WAR AND WAR PREVENTION. By William A. Nesbitt for the Foreign Policy Association. [New York, Crowell, 1971] 166 p. illus. (New dimensions series [5]) U21.2.N48
Includes bibliographies.

Contents.--Introduction.--pt. 1. Developing an understanding of the causes and nature of war: Conflict, violence, and war. Is man the cause? Some psychological factors in war. Do nation-states cause war?--pt. 2. War and the international system: Understanding the international system. The military system and arms. Is war useful? The possibilities of large-scale war.--pt. 3. Examining approaches to preventing World War III: Examining proposals for changes in the current system. Examining proposals for systems change.--pt. 4. Additional approaches to teaching war/peace concepts: Using history. Examples of units and courses on war and peace.--Resources: Resource organizations. Audio-visual materials. Bibliographies. Simulation games of international conflict.

Attempts "to translate some of the findings in the war/peace field into a conceptual framework of value to teachers, as well as to provide some practical classroom suggestions." To assist in course design, Nesbitt briefly discusses various theories and aspects of human conflict, international relations, military policy, and proposals and suggested alternatives for eliminating or reducing war and the risk of war. He suggests reading matter for each topic and sources for obtaining additional study material and other teaching aids.

1018
OFF-SITE ENVIRONMENTAL SURVEILLANCE: PROJECT BUGGY I. (Public Health Service, Las Vegas, Nev. Southwestern Radiological Health Laboratory) 1970. 128 p. Sci RR
Microfiche PNE-327
"This surveillance performed under a Memorandum of Understanding (No. SF 54 373) for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission."

The Southwestern Radiological Health Laboratory (SWRHL) provided off-site radiological surveillance support for Project Buggy I, conducted at the Nevada Test Site (NTS) at 0904 PST on March 12, 1968. The radioactive effluent released from this event traveled northward from the NTS and was detected in the environment as far north as Montana. The highest exposure rate observed off-site was 8.5 mR/hr measured during cloud passage at an unpopulated location approximately 80 miles from the point of detonation. The highest integrated exposure observed in the off-site area, as measured by thermoluminescent dosimeters, was 11.3 mR in the same unpopulated area. Thermoluminescent dosimeters located at populated areas indicated no external radiation exposures above background. These dosimeters were placed prior to the detonation to document the external radiation exposure from cloud passage plus 8 days of residual activity. (Abstract supplied, modified)

1019
Schmidt, Helmut. TRANS-ATLANTIC ASPECTS OF SECURITY, DÉTENTE IN EUROPE. In Germany (Federal Re-

public, 1949-). Presse- und Informationsamt. Bulletin, v. 19, Sept. 28, 1971: 252-253.
DD259.A35, v. 19

"The article by the Minister of Defence is based on an interview published recently by the General-Anzieger, a Bonn daily newspaper."

The probability of the two superpowers engaging in a nuclear exchange has lessened considerably, due in part to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. The Soviet Union fortunately did not insist on including tactical nuclear weapons in these talks, for these weapons are an essential element of the common Western strategy of deterrence. German security policy requires that the United States and the Soviet Union not reach accords over the heads of other states and that the equilibrium of military forces acting within Europe and upon Europe from the outside be maintained. In addition, a mutual balanced force reduction (MBFR) should not be limited to the superpowers, Bundeswehr forces must not gain in relative strength in any MBFR phase, nor arms limitations be restricted to the two Germanys, and adequate American forces must remain in Europe. As regards the American presence, "no one can ignore influential political trends of a different nature in the United States, which could add difficulties to the Western position." Although MBFR would be an important topic at a European security conference, it could not be solved at a conference but would rather require negotiations over a period of years.

1020
Steiniger, Peter A. THE PROGRAM OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOR STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. German foreign policy, v. 10, no. 5, 1971: 392-400. DD261.4.D353, v. 10

Lauds the U.N. Declaration for Strengthening International Security and the General Assembly's comprehensive 27-point program for world peace but commends as superior the peace proposals of the 24th Soviet Party Congress. Steiniger contrasts the two programs and finds the Soviet one more practical in that it names the centers of war in Southeast Asia and in the Middle East and offers the way to a political solution. The Soviet program, moreover, recommends specific disarmament measures ranging from a treaty ban on nuclear-biological-chemical weapons and nuclear-free zones to a conference of the five nuclear powers and finally to a world conference to end the arms race.

1021
Tami, Thomas M., Thomas A. Gibson, and Austin L. Prindle. FAR-OUT FALLOUT COLLECTION PROGRAM. PROJECT SCHOONER. U.S. Army Engineer Nuclear Cratering Group, Livermore, Calif., 1970. 18 p.
Sci RR
Microfiche PNE-527

The Far-Out Fallout Collection Program was an experimental program to collect and to analyze samples of long-range fallout from Plowshare nuclear cratering events. Samples of fallout from Schooner, a 31-kt cratering experiment, were collected at downwind distances ranging from 65 to 500 km from the detonation site. The field operations required to obtain the fallout samples and the radiochemistry techniques used to analyze the samples are described. Measured values of the gamma exposure rate resulting from fallout at downwind locations in eastern Nevada and western Utah are reported. The maximum recorded exposure rate 65 km from the detonation site was 130 mR/hr. Of the 80 fallout samples collected, 16 were radiochemically analyzed to determine the species and quantities of radionuclides, present. The presence in each analyzed sample of up to 20 different radionuclides, including ^{90}Sr and ^{131}I, was determined. The radiochemistry results are expressed in terms of deposited radioactivity per unit area (pCi/m^2). (Abstract supplied)

1022
U.S. AND U.S.S.R. SIGN AGREEMENTS TO REDUCE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR. In U.S. Dept. of State. Department of State bulletin, v. 65, Oct. 18, 1971: 399-403.
JX232.A33, v. 65

A White House press release announcing Presidential approval of two agreements negotiated by the United States and the Soviet Union at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, together with the texts of the agreements and remarks by U.S. Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko at the formal signing. The first agreement commits the two parties to "take steps each considers necessary to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons," to make "arrangements for rapid communication should a danger of nuclear war arise from such nuclear incidents or from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems," and to give "advance notification of certain planned missile launches." The second provides for improvements in the direct communications link established between the two countries in 1963.

1023
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. REPORTS AVAILABLE IN PLOWSHARE OPEN FILE. Las Vegas, Nevada Operations Office, 1971. 38 p.
Sci RR

Lists publications available to the scientific, technical, and industrial communities relevant to Projects Gasbuggy and Rulison. Also included are other publications concerning the Atomic Energy Commission's safety programs for underground nuclear tests.

1024
White, Clayton S. THE NATURE OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN ESTIMATING THE IMMEDIATE CASUALTIES FROM NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS. (Lovelace Foundation for Medical Education and Research, Albuquerque, N. Mex.) 1971. 49 p.
Sci RR
Microfiche CEX-71.1

Considerable progress has been made in assembling range-yield-effects data for nuclear detonations applicable to a variety of burst conditions and tentative though incomplete biomedical criteria have been formulated for assessing the hazards of exposure to blast as well as ionizing and thermal radiations. Even so, great care must be taken if meaningful concepts are to come from a combined use of the physical and biomedical data. The physically and biologically oriented problem areas were presented and discussed. Also, survival data for the Hiroshima explosion were used to show that the conditions of exposure more than any other factors determined immediate survival and more than anything else was responsible for keeping the casualty figures as low as they were. (Abstract supplied, modified)

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